FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JANUARY
1950

VOL. 28 NO. 2
$1.25 A COPY
YOUR Foreign Transactions

INVOLVE SPECIAL PROBLEMS

The officers of this bank know that your business is different and that each depositor has individual foreign banking requirements.

With top-ranking correspondents in every principal free city of the world, The New York Trust Company is equipped to adapt its facilities to the particular needs of each depositor.

THE
NEW YORK TRUST COMPANY

100 Broadway
Madison Avenue and 40th Street
Ten Rockefeller Plaza

Member of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
BIG VALUE AT LOW COST

The telephone is a big bargain in security, convenience and good times for every member of the family. Just in the steps it saves, it more than pays for itself. Its value in emergencies is often beyond price. Day and night, every day, the telephone is at your service. And the cost is small — within reach of all.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM
FOR FOREIGN TRADE
COMPLETE BANKING SERVICE

Import Letters of Credit
Export Letters of Credit
Collection of Dollar Drafts

Guaranty Trust Company of New York
Capital Funds, $371,000,000

140 Broadway  Fifth Ave. at 44th St.  Madison Ave. at 60th St.  Rockefeller Plaza at 50th St.
London  Paris  Brussels
Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
World Wide Banking Service

"Outstanding Strength" for 113 Years

The National Shawmut Bank
40 Water Street, Boston

Foreign Exchange  Foreign Collections
Commercial Letters of Credit
Complete Export and Import Financing
Banking correspondents in principal cities throughout the world

MEMBER FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION  Cable address: QUOSHAWMUT, BOSTON
Chase Travelers' Letters of Credit often facilitate overseas business trips. These letters of credit are world currency and, in addition, serve as introductions to bankers and businessmen everywhere.

Traveling executives of many leading companies carry these Chase credits. Why not find out more about this quick, satisfactory way of arranging for the financing of your trips abroad? Just write to our Foreign Department or inquire at any Chase office.

THE CHASE NATIONAL BANK
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
HEAD OFFICE: Pine Street corner of Nassau
Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
OVERSEAS BRANCHES
London • Frankfurt/Main • Heidelberg • Stuttgart • Tokyo • Osaka
Havana • San Juan • Panama • Colon • Cristobal • Balboa
Offices of Representatives: Mexico, D.F. • Buenos Aires • Rome • Cairo • Bombay
THE CHASE BANK: Paris • Shanghai • Hong Kong
Your personal Global Strategy...
carry NCB TRAVELERS CHECKS!

Wherever you go for business or pleasure . . . plan security for your travel funds by carrying National City Bank Travelers Checks. Spendable everywhere, just like cash. But if they are lost or stolen, their full value is refunded to you. Available in denominations of $10, $20, $50 and $100. Cost only 75¢ per $100. Buy them at your bank.

THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK
Head Office: 55 Wall Street, New York 15, N. Y.

First in World Wide Banking
Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

ARGENTINA
Buenos Aires (502 Roosevelt Ave.)
Flores
Plaza Once
Rosario

BRAZIL
Rio de Janeiro
Porto Alegre
Recife
(Pernambuco)
Santos
Sao Paulo

CANAL ZONE
Balboa
Cristobal

CHILE
Santiago
Valparaiso

CHINA
Shanghai

COLOMBIA
Bogota
Barranquilla
Medellin

CUBA
Havana
(Ciudad de la Habana)
Cuatro Caminos
Galiano
La Lonja

FRANCE
Paris
(IBC Branch)

HONG KONG
Hong Kong

INDIA
Bombay
Calcutta

JAPAN
Tokyo
Osaka
Yokohama

MEXICO
Mexico City

PERU
Lima

REP. OF PANAMA
Panama

SINGAPORE
Singapore

URUGUAY
Montevideo

VENEZUELA
Caracas

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Overseas Branches
THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1948-1949

By JOHN C. CAMPBELL

with an Introduction by

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

In a penetrating analysis of the way American policy developed to meet the new conditions of the postwar world, the author sets the stage for his detailed discussion of events in the year that followed adoption of the Marshall plan. The Soviet-Communist challenge in Europe and the Far East inevitably claims many pages in a volume whose most dramatic chapters are concerned with the battle for Berlin and the consolidation of the free world in the North Atlantic Treaty. However, other aspects of American foreign relations — the European Recovery Program, the Palestine conflict, the Bogotá Conference, the operation of the United Nations, and many others — are treated in full detail.

"This is a smooth and coherent chronicle of the year's events in all fields of foreign affairs . . . as contemporary history it is the best work in its field."
— Washington Post

"It is the kind of a book which in an ideal democracy every active citizen should read."
— The Review of Politics

"Its objectivity . . . is an invaluable corrective to so much of what is today being written on international issues."
— Saturday Review of Literature

This is the third volume in the new postwar series of the Council on Foreign Relations annual surveys of American foreign policy. Besides 541 pages of text (illustrated with maps), it contains an extensive selected bibliography, a chronology of world events and an index.

At all bookstores * $5.00

PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS FOR THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
58 EAST 68 STREET • NEW YORK 21

London: ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Bank of New York
AND
Fifth Avenue Bank
Established 1784

New York's
First Commercial Bank

Capital Funds over $34,000,000

48 Wall Street • 530 Fifth Avenue
63rd Street and Madison Avenue • 73rd Street and Madison Avenue

Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
IN THE FAR EAST

By PAULINE TOMPKINS

This book promotes a clearer understanding of what is happening in the Far East today, and of the present troubled relations between America and Russia. It tells the complete story of the strategic, psychological, moral, and diplomatic jockeying between the two countries from the beginnings of their rivalry in Asia in 1895, down to 1948. Considering these events in the larger setting of world affairs, Dr. Tompkins forcefully condemns "balance of power" politics and makes an urgent plea that this policy be replaced by world government. "It is for the lessons that Dr. Tompkins draws, lessons pointed out with vigor and political wisdom, that this book is worth while." — Nathaniel Peffer, New York Times Book Review. $5.00

History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolution

By PETER I. LYASHCHENKO

This authoritative textbook, used in economics courses in Soviet universities, is the first work in any language to cover the economic history of Russia from earliest times to the Revolution of 1917. A vast compendium of historical economic data, it includes many little-known areas of Soviet Russia, giving particular attention to the economic history of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. With 21 unusual maps. $13.00

The Community of Man

By HUGH MILLER

Offering a philosophy formulated from biological concepts, this book shows how men and nations can — and must — cooperate with each other. The author’s optimism is based on a wide knowledge of religion, philosophy, and the natural and social sciences. $3.00

Bangkok Editor

By ALEXANDER MACDONALD

All the color and life of the exotic little kingdom of Siam are caught in this lively account of an American newspaper who founded a newspaper there immediately after the recent war, amid incredible difficulties, high intrigue, and dramatic events. $3.00

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

New York 11

Advertising section continued in back of magazine
The Decline of Diplomacy                      Lord Vansittart 177
Science and Politics in the Twentieth Century   James B. Conant 189
Devaluation and European Recovery               R. C. Leffingwell 203
After Devaluation: The Common Task              Sir Arthur Salter 215
Tito: A Study                                     Fitzroy Maclean 231
Labor and the Church in Quebec                   Blair Fraser 247
The Unifying Force for Europe                   Paul Reynaud 255
Social Forces in Germany Today                  Edgar Salin 265
The Race Between Russia and Reform in Iran      T. Cuyler Young 278
Theories of Socialist Imperialism                Lenore O'Boyle 290
Pakistan's Claim to Kashmir                      Sir William Barton 299
The Battle for Moscow, Turning Point of the War  Vice Admiral Kurt Assmann 309
Recent Books on International Relations          Robert Gale Woolbert 327
Source Material                                  Ruth Savord 345

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
Editor
BYRON DEXTER
Managing Editor
Editorial Advisory Board
ISAIAH BOWMAN                  STEPHEN DUGGAN     CHARLES SEYMOUR
GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE            ALLEN W. DULLES      HENRY L. STIMSON
JOHN W. DAVIS                  CHARLES H. McILWAIN   HENRY M. WRISTON

Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed at 10 Ferry Street, Concord, N. H. Editorial and Business Offices, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N. Y. Cable address, Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $5.00 a year, post free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them.
CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

LORD VANSITTART, Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, 1930-38; Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Foreign Secretary, 1938-41 • • • JAMES B. CONANT, President of Harvard University; Chairman of the National Defense Research Council, 1941-46; member of the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission • • • R. C. LEFFINGWELL, Chairman of the Executive Committee of J. P. Morgan and Company; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, 1917-20; Chairman of the Carnegie Corporation; Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations • • • SIR ARTHUR SALTER, Member of Parliament for Oxford University; Secretary of the Allied Maritime Council during the First World War; Director of the Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations, 1922-30; Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Shipping, 1939-41, and afterward Head of the British Shipping Mission in Washington • • • FITZROY MACLEAN, M.P., Brigadier Commanding the British Military Mission to the Partisans in Jugoslavia, 1943-45; author of “Eastern Approaches” • • • BLAIR FRASER, Ottawa Editor of Maclean’s Magazine • • • PAUL REYNAUD, formerly President of the Council of Ministers of France; formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs, of Finance, and of Justice; member of the National Assembly since 1946; Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Council of Europe • • • EDGAR SALIN, Professor of Political Economy, University of Basel, Switzerland; former Professor at the Universities of Heidelberg and Kiel; author of many biographies, histories and economic works • • • T. CUYLER YOUNG, Associate Professor of Persian Language and History, Princeton University; for seven years in Iran for the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions; Public Affairs Officer of the American Embassy at Teheran during the war • • • LENORE O’BOYLE, Assistant Professor of History, Woman’s College, University of North Carolina • • • SIR WILLIAM BARTON, for 35 years in the Indian Civil Service, most recently as British Resident in Baroda, Mysore and Hyderabad; author of “India’s North-West Frontier,” “India’s Fateful Hour” and other works • • • VICE ADMIRAL KURT ASSMANN, former head of the Historical Section of the German Naval High Command, editor of the official history of German naval operations in World War I and lecturer on strategy at the German Naval Academy; now employed on research work by the British Admiralty (the views expressed in his article are personal and not those of the Admiralty).

The articles in Foreign Affairs do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries Foreign Affairs can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas that it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.

The Editors.
THE DECLINE OF DIPLOMACY

By Lord Vansittart

THE very first of my letters this morning was a blurb for the Bible in Basic! I put it under my saucer, and then reflected that (a) tea is an insipid drink, (b) everything changes, including taste. Palmerston only discovered at 80 his ideal petit déjeuner, chops and a bottle of port. His taste may have been reflected in his diplomacy. The profession has passed from the flamboyant to basic, and beyond — into billingsgate.

The general decline, in this century, of artificial manners is rather worse than interesting; and in no sphere has the downward curve been so steep as in diplomacy. I began my job 47 years ago, and it was a fairly gentlemanly one on the surface. “The rapine underneath” was there, but it was relatively war in lace. Some conventions and ostensible courtesies were preserved.

Occasionally someone exploded in uniform and in dubious French. (The Americans in their frigid dress-clothes were mostly immune from even these ebullitions.) Sometimes one ran into quite a bit of dirt. But life slid along between the clashes and flounderings.

Remnants of the jargon long remained embedded in our language. Thus, when war came, an Ambassador “asked for his passports” (in the plural). In fact he had but one, from which he was never parted. I recently saw the old touch taken literally. In the film life of President Wilson the German Ambassador visited the White House at midnight, I think, to “ask for his passports.” Author and audience perhaps thought that the President kept them somewhere. I even think that he produced them. The episode recalled a dead world.

Nowadays our diplomatists are booted around incontinent. The tone adopted to and about western diplomatic and consular representatives of all grades by all governments of the Iron
Curtain is on the same level as the vituperations of their press. It is the style of an aggressive drunk. Buffon said that "style is the man himself," but it is, alas, more than that. This is the style of a creed and an era.

In the days when politeness was a tradition, and tradition counted, demands for the recall of diplomats were unknown save in rare cases of extreme provocation or impropriety. (The expulsion of Lord Sackville from the United States was not really deserved.) Now removal of Ambassadors or Chargés d'Affaires is continually demanded on the flimsiest pretext, and subordinates are simply thrown out in 48 hours. (I have often urged that we should all retaliate more formidably; Communist missions are much more useful to them than ours in Totalitaria are to us.) The excuse for this insolence is usually some stale and fantastic taradiddle on the theme of espionage, which is worked to death like much else by the Cominformants. The simplest conversation with a local citizen is sufficient to start the insanity, which invariably ends in manifold liquidations.

Here it should be stated parenthetically as a quite small cause of disrespect that Ambassadors have been multiplied beyond sense or recognition to gratify amour propre. Before 1914 only the Great Powers had Ambassadors, and these had both rank and power. Now they are increasingly mere mouthpieces; they have lost stature, and braided lightweights have not gained it.

Diplomacy would, however, have changed even without this minor metamorphosis. It is a commonplace that the Iron Curtain exists not only to prevent its inmates from knowing anything of the outside world, but also to bar all understanding from unwelcome but inevitable intruders, which is the totalitarian conception of even the most diplomatic infidel. Here we get nearer to the real causes of the decline in diplomacy during the second quarter of the twentieth century. For, until the First German War at least, diplomatists who knew well the peoples and languages of the countries where they were posted were thought to be an asset to both parties. They were always useful in maintaining good relations; they were often exceedingly popular, and the governments to which they were accredited were loath to let them go. Indeed foreign requests for prolongations of their appointments were sometimes embarrassing. Sometimes they—for instance Herrick—acquired the popularity without acquiring the tongue.
The past put a premium on courtesy. Wherever they went—mainly without let or hindrance—sane diplomatists tried to absorb as much as possible for their real purpose—peace, which they much enjoyed. Contrast this with the real policy of Totalitaria, which is the deepening and widening of ignorance. There is a deliberate aim to get rid of western diplomatists who know the language or nature of the country where they are stationed. There are many cases where this has been the sole reason for expulsion. The change is fundamental.

Here again I must diverge for a moment to complete the picture, and to add in fairness that often where a government had evil intentions its diplomatic representatives were kept in ignorance, the better to play their parts; or sometimes, knowing, they protested. There were bad men in the business, like Holstein, but the novelesque Machiavellis were the exception, not the rule. To the same order of ideas belongs the dramatized cliché of the mid-nineteenth century that “a diplomatist is an honest man paid to lie by his country.” With the advent of Nazism and Communism, alike state conspiracies, most of their representatives were involved.

Thus we come to the main cause for the decline of diplomacy; and it will only be fully apparent when we look at its operation from the other end—that is, the composition, activities and purposes of the Communist staffs in foreign capitals. This is a matter to which I have amply drawn attention in the House of Lords, in the hope of making the democracies realize the total nature of the change before it is too late.

The change resides in this. The old diplomacy mainly existed to maintain good international relations. When it failed its job was done, and it packed up—“asked for its passports,” or more prosaically took a train—for then war had come in spite and not because of it in most instances. Enough official papers from the last century are now available to prove the truth of this assertion. Take, for example, the desperate efforts made to deter Germany from the last two of her five wars. In 1914 both Lichnowsky and Mensdorff did what little they could to mellow their evil governments. Broadly speaking, the real charge that can be made against the old diplomacy is that, though sometimes tough or provocative, it was mostly too suave and honeyed on the part of the intending aggressor, too patient and conciliatory on the part of the aggressed. The second tendency issued in appeasement.
Nowadays the diplomacy of an increasing part of the world is thoughtfully calculated to create and maintain bad relations. This, of course, is done in no mere Schadenfreude or spirit of spite. Bad relations with western democracies and capitalist countries are an article of faith, an accepted condition for the survival of Totalitaria. The successful Communist statesman is therefore he who ensures the permanence and intensity of this condition. So the missions of the Cominform are largely stocked with persons who make no pretense of practising diplomacy as previously defined, but are employed solely for hostile propaganda, sabotage, subversion and espionage. I have plenty of evidence and illustration for which I have no space here, and which indeed are unnecessary to demonstrate so notorious a truism.

To revert again to the old diplomacy, espionage was not usually practised from embassies, though they were often the victims of it. They were generally kept apart from such compromising activities—at least by the cautious or respectable Powers. An occasional Military Attaché was mentioned in a scandal like the Dreyfus case. The diplomatic body was, however, practically never involved in such hullabalooas as those now fabricated by ubiquitous secret police disguised in the combinations and permutations of infinite initials. Erstwhile spy-stories rarely attained publicity; when they did there was something in them, but gentlemen in knee-breeches and decorations were seldom implicated. (Of legitimate information they naturally obtained as much as possible.) Sardou's famous play, "Les Pattes de Mouche," often acted in Britain and the United States under the title of "Diplomacy," was a joke in the profession. (Abel Hermant's "La Carrière" was great fun.) Communist diplomatic missions, on the contrary, are everywhere up to the eyes in spying, and "make no bones" about it, though they protest loudly and pro forma when detected.

Espionage, however, is only the beginning of the mischief. Sabotage is an even surer way of ensuring the ideal of bad relations, because it is more widely felt. Totalitarian diplomacy now practises two kinds of sabotage, both of which are directed by its missions. The first, of course, is technical preparation for the event of war. The second is the "softening" or undermining of the countries with which war is contemplated. It is essential for the Soviet "Day" that these should first be economically weakened or ruined. The most favored methods are the "unoffi-
cial" and "rolling" strikes; but there are many other means of fomenting political disloyalty through industrial disaffection. The details of the technique do not concern us here; the point is that they are a function of the new diplomacy. The old might well turn in its grave. By these openly flaunted means a maximum of resentment is attained by Soviet diplomacy and its satellites. It all sounds like madness, but there is a tireless method in it.

The next activity is more insidious and equally novel, though its advent has been more gradual. It is openly to persuade as many people as possible, in the country whose hospitality is accepted, to hate and revile their own land. This is by far the best way to ensure bad relations. It is achieved partly by Communist press and radio from without, but also by local agencies for publicity (which take orders and subsidies from the Cominform through Communist embassies and legations), and finally by forming and financing "Friendship Societies" to cover the knaves who recruit the fools.

All this leads logically to the next step in the decline. Under the old school, immunity was limited to the diplomatic staff. There were considerable doubts whether it even extended to the consular personnel. Certainly no one would ever have thought of extending the claim to any other body. Such a course would have been impossible, and anyhow it would not have paid, for it would have lowered the status of the greatly self-esteeming plenipotentiaries.

With the vicious extension of the province of diplomacy has come a corresponding exaggeration of the claim for immunity. When all sorts of rogues are part of the machinery, all sorts of devices must be thought up to cover them. The process began in the greatly overstaffed Communist trade agencies—thin concealment indeed, seeing the small trade done by them. Now it has reached the press agencies, and has just produced a cause célèbre, which may find its place in international law, if any such thing is preserved in the future—a doubtful hypothesis.

The Soviet Government keeps Tass agencies everywhere for disseminating propaganda. Hitherto these have enjoyed no more privilege than any other undiplomatic body. But recently the London office of Tass brought a foul charge against a most worthy and distinguished exile. He tried to bring a libel action, and Tass at once bolted for cover. It produced to the British court a certificate from the Soviet Ambassador affirming that the news
agency is an organ of the Soviet Government. The British court felt bound to accept the certificate. By this trick the agency has hitherto avoided prosecution. I say "hitherto," for I do not mean to let the decision stand unchallenged, and shall attack it when Parliament reassembles. I have already obtained from the Lord Chancellor a public admission that the claim is wholly unprecedented. Just think of the consequences were such a pretension conceded! Any foreign fount of malevolence would then be a law unto itself; there would be no conceivable bound to privilege, which would need only a small further stretch to cast its mantle over espionage as well. Even the most disreputable gangsters would thus be an official part of the new diplomacy. It is typical of the times that such a monstrosity as this Ambassadorial testimony should have been put forward at all. It must be brushed aside, and that gesture also will be symptomatic of a growing disregard for envoys.

Of old, as aforesaid, we diplomatists lived together in apparent comity for enjoyable lapses of time. Even in periods of friction there was some semblance of esprit de corps. We were rival practitioners of the same honorable trade. All this is changed. Nowadays these accumulated and exploited elements of discord amount to a state of permanent bad temper. I sometimes think that the degradation of the language of diplomacy is even more sinister than the debasement of its performance. There is a smell of the jungle about these dense growths of words, which smother old conceptions like voluble creepers.

Diplomacy has passed through every phase in its short life, for it only began in the last few centuries, and grew up late. It started with covenants secretly arrived at, less because anyone was ashamed of their contents than because these were of no interest to an illiterate and uninfluential public. The old methods have proved to be no more obnoxious than the new. Similarly, the balance of power, after having been first an ideal and then a punch-bag, is now being practised again and not mentioned by name — which is perhaps sensible, seeing that "human notions are few, not far between."

In the twentieth century, however, President Wilson had a brain-wave. He dreamed of "open diplomacy," and of "open covenants openly arrived at." That really sounded like something. Only after unhappy experience was it discovered that preliminary negotiation cannot profitably be conducted in the open.
This glimpse of the obvious was generously assisted by the well-informed activities of the press and by the embarrassing antics of national propaganda and self-advertisement. Wilson was sagely crying for the moon. All right, said some, let us compound for open covenants secretly arrived at. Alas, great chunks of humanity were morally indisposed even to this check on their way to the abyss. The Nazis and the Communists in their amours begat a clutch of secret treaties much worse than any that had gone before.

The world of optimists, or even meliorists, thought again, and tended to content itself with a diplomacy which could produce decent treaties "any old how." In consequence it got some rather indecent ones after much indecent bickering. The Allies, still so-called, concluded — a verb as inept as the noun — the treaties with Italy and the other ex-satellites, which contained many grave errors and stood no chance of observance, as I pointed out at the time. We have since discovered that the new diplomacy affords no possibility of concluding a German treaty at all; and this is just as well, when we consider the total perfidy of Totalitaria. It is one of history's little jokes that the authors of the Treaty of Versailles were blamed for drafting it in six months. We may be sorry for the Austrians, but even if their desire for a treaty be fulfilled, it will also be an unjust one, which would compromise the little country's prospect of economic survival, and even of territorial integrity. King Log being withdrawn, King Stork may return. No treaty is certainly better than a bad one. I understand this to have been the view of the American representative. I certainly concur in it. I have no wish to see Austria either ruined or reinvaded. In any case even a good treaty would not be kept by the Soviets. The futility of treaties is, however, another matter, which would require a chapter, or even a book, to itself. I will not dwell on it here, beyond observing that all endeavor of diplomacy in treaty-making is stultified by the habitual treaty-breaking of modern despotism.

We have reached the paradox that the decline of diplomacy has synchronized with the increasing equipment of its exponents. The great Ambassadors of the nineteenth century were sometimes not particularly clever men; sometimes they were not even particularly well educated, and owed their positions to favor. I saw at close quarters some who survived into the twentieth. Few of them would have had the least chance of withstanding an examination in any modern sense; but they did their work with au-
authority, partly because there was no organized attempt to prevent them. In the period preceding theirs, an Ambassador's authority was even greater: he sometimes initiated policy and enjoyed considerable latitude, owing to lack of communications. As these improved, Ambassadorial status dwindled to that of mere executant of a policy decided not even in Foreign Offices but in Cabinets.

In complete contrast with a school as extinct as the dodo, our young men today are trained, perhaps overtrained, for a vanishing future, and tested and accoutred with all specialized ingenuity, some of it—in our case—sometimes a little silly. "Too clever by half," my Victorian nurse used to say. Their intellectual attainments greatly, and rightly, exceed those deemed essential in the zenith of diplomacy when the wheels of procedure crunched over the gravel, not always easy going but good enough for carriage folk. Now the surface is made for speed, but the road is usually blocked. Simultaneously the traffic has increased. The staffs of missions have been multiplied tenfold. And all this apparatus has been brought into play in an era which offers less hope for it. The negotiators of the Austrian treaty re-formed, dissolved, returned, mulled over their texts, till they knew them and each other by heart. Nothing happened year after year. Such treaties as have been landed lie instantly in fragments, and all protests are vain. These goings-on would have been deemed impossible in an age less efficient and more affable.

Diplomacy, with all its failings—it had many because it was far too much a class affair, and power politics are never pretty—was an instrument of civilization. It is being paralyzed, but only in common with other previously accepted amenities. It was one of the many veils in which we had sought to soften the outlines of the real harshness of human nature and existence. Now veils have gone out of fashion. I have "done" many conferences in my life, but never went into one without some hope of a fairly quick result. No one could say the same today. Results are often not expected, and often not even desirable, while the technique of negotiation is equally often transformed into a brawling match.

A gallant and pernickety veteran, who had risen to a colonelcy in the First War Against the Germans, immediately volunteered for the Second, and was duly invalided out. Describing his experiences in his club, he said: "My dear fellow, you really can't
think what it's like this time! The smell . . . the noise . . .
and . . . the people!" The comment is less applicable to the
battlefield than to the conference chamber, for all its new-
fangled facilities of earphones and automatic translations.

It may be said that this applies only to the representatives of
half mankind. There is no reason why the other half should not
behave itself. Part of our species is being conducted by sedulous
apes back to the treetops, where it cannot exist; but the rest of
Homo sapiens can live up to its lightly assumed title. That is
perfectly true. And it isn't — not perfectly. We cannot get away
from "the noise . . . and the people" of the Iron Curtain lead-
ers so long as we have to meet them in the United Nations or in
any more of these shy-making Big Fours — the Apotheosis of
Avoirdupois. The pace of a troop was proverbially regulated by
the slowest horse; the tone of a conference is set by its noisiest
delegation. Diplomacy could flourish only so long as there was a
loose, tacit and general agreement to behave more or less like
gentlemen. There was no snobbery in the notion — only an in-
stinctive recognition of our own limitations. The code was quite
vague, and we never used the term "gentlemen's agreement" until
it had become anathema to use the word gentleman in any other
sense. It survived for a while like an appendix in the diplomatic
body. From the moment when the behavior of rowdies became a
constant feature, the old body was plainly moribund — for good
or evil. We may hope for "somehow good," but the adverse bal-
ance is thus far incontestable.

One kind of old diplomacy did cling on until the end of the
war; but it was the dubious sort known as personal. From dis-
tant days to the present, Very Important Persons have kept up
intimate and important correspondences. Then it was time to go,
and they mostly took their personal archives with them, salving
their public consciences by underlining the word Private in the
top left-hand corner. Some valuable material vanished in this
way. Only a man as unearthy as Edward Grey kept and left his
"private" correspondence in its official place. There is no positive
harm in getting off the record, unless the exchanges become un-
duly secretive, as they sometimes do. Subordinates may then err
through ignorance of vital passages between superiors. In general
we may say that it is natural for the great to be on epistolary
terms — within limits.

Unhappily, and mechanically, those limits extend themselves.
From having their private post offices, the great pass easily to having their private postmen. Thus a rival Foreign Office was run by Lloyd George: it consisted of Lord Lothian. As liaison between Curzon and Lloyd George I had the uneasy task of trying both to contend and coöperate with it. Very Important Persons comprehensibly like to count on a reliable body of assent. They mean to pursue a policy: why weaken themselves by doubts and contradictions? The term yes-men is unnecessarily harsh — indeed unfair — because most henchmen are sincerely fascinated by their chiefs. Thus Chamberlain too had his supporter, Sir Horace Wilson, and the Foreign Office was again overshadowed. As Chief Diplomatic Adviser I saw Chamberlain only thrice in three years, and never once alone. What could be more understandable? He knew that I disagreed with his views. Unhappily neither Lothian nor Wilson had experience of Europe. Nor, for that matter, had Harry Hopkins. Yet it seemed as natural to his patron that he should be sent to cope with Stalin as it seemed natural to Chamberlain that Halifax should go to Berlin and Berchtesgaden under the amateurish cover of a hunting exhibition.

The V.I.P.'s often love to get rid of experts (which was easier of yore, when there weren't many anyway) and to indulge in a little — which becomes a lot — of diplomacy "on their own." I fully understand the taste, but — all passion spent — condemn it because it is apt to be attended by favoritism and incompetence. There is something restricted and restraining about an expert, which makes him look narrow to the wide-eyed; and since

"les oreilles des grands
Sont souvent de grandes oreilles,"

he is sometimes compelled, if he has any guts, to adopt the governor's touch, which is unfair to him. There is something at once humble and superior about an expert — a trying combination. Consequently some antagonism may arise on both sides. But I do comprehend the recurrent itch of the Big Boys (Fours or better) to give rein to their untrammelled inspirations; and it was good entertainment when one day at the Peace Conference M. Clemenceau flared up, and threw out all his own experts plus everyone else's. A little personal diplomacy was impending. Arthur Balfour's chief interest in Lloyd George — and a fascinating one too — was wondering, in his own words, what the Little Man would do next.
In modern times personal diplomacy was much favored by both Churchill and Roosevelt, who loved to carry on negotiations free from "interference." This predilection was facilitated, and in part necessitated, by war; but such courses are always apt to go too far and to produce errors which might be avoided, given better opportunities for briefing. When it came to personal diplomacy with Stalin, the results were more unfortunate, and to East Europe ruinous. The deals at the expense of Poland and China were as immoral as anything in the ages preceding Ostensible Enlightenment, and were only put over by the weight of unparalleled authority. I do not suppose that there have been many further temptations to personal diplomacy with the Kremlin.

The practice is an essay in omniscience, and it is only sometimes successful, because everyone needs advice. *Nemo sapit omnibus horis* was translated by Mr. Carter of "The Dolly Dialogues": "Everyone has been in love at least once." He should have added, "in love with himself." There is nothing new in a tendency which has long roots, but it has grown considerably as the century wears on — perhaps the right expression.

Another modern habit greatly increasing of late is "popular diplomacy." Of course there is really no such thing, just as there is no "popular democracy." There are either democracy and diplomacy without epithets or there are not. In this case the device is an attempt to bypass the governments concerned by appealing over their heads to their people. This has developed into a pernicious usage, and some may point to the fact that the United States virtually started it in the First World War. The answer is that it would have come about anyhow. President Wilson hoped to curtail hostilities by addressing himself to the German people. Most commentators greatly overestimate the effect of this legitimate manoeuvre in wartime. I am not among them. The Germans fought both their great wars to the bitter end. In any case when Wilson later attempted the same tactics with the Italians, the results were admittedly disastrous.

Since then the Totalitarians, in complete control of all their means of communication, have taken over and insensately developed the method. I have already enumerated the nefarious uses for which Communist missions really exist. For true diplomatic considerations they might as well not be there, and we of the democracies might almost as well have no representation in Moscow, though there are a few faint arguments for maintaining it
in satellite countries. Communist radio is Communist diplomacy, and it has defeated its own ends. While the bellowings go crescendo, the fruits are in marked diminuendo, for no Soviet spokesman seems to have a middle register.

The method is already past its peak, but it has forced itself back upon the democracies by making them resume and improve Wilson’s initiative. In the ungraceful German metaphor, we have to do a bit of “howling with the wolves.” Here also the effect is small, because so few of the enslaved peoples are able to hear the B.B.C. or the Voice of America owing to jamming and the shortage of receivers. Still we rightly plug along in this duplicate diplomacy; my only comment is that we do not exploit it with sufficient punch and virility. We may as well “make the best of a bad job.”

“Everything flows,” though not to the pacific. We have lost the belief in automatic progress, and diplomacy is for the nonce among the casualties, through no fault of genuine democracy. It outlasted the parallel practitioners of the League, and could well have coexisted with the United Nations, had they not suffered from trichinosis. It has only wilted under Communist hot air. It may come to its own again in modern dress; indeed it has never fallen into disuse among civilized peoples. But, in common with other advantageous growths, such as Justice, it can never regain worldwide acceptance, so long as the New Barbarians hold sway. We had better make up our minds to that, and conduct ourselves accordingly.

Harold Nicolson calls the life of his father, Lord Carnock, “a study in the Old Diplomacy.” There was something to be said for it. Some will say: “Not much.” Having experienced both old and new I reply: “More than can be said for its successor.”
CONTROVERSIES among the military leaders of the nation have in recent months been the subject of headlines in the daily papers. As a consequence the general public has been given a glimpse of a serious problem which faces a democratic nation in this age of applied science. Quite apart from the merits of any type of organization of our defense establishment, quite apart from inter-service rivalries, even the casual reader must be disturbed by the obvious conflict of expert technical opinion; and even more disturbed that this conflict has remained unresolved at the highest level. Members of Congress and civilian officials of the Federal Government have become involved in intricate questions which in large part turn on judgments about scientific and engineering problems. There can be no doubt that politics and science, once quite separate activities, have become intermeshed and at times the grinding of the gears produces strange and disturbing noises.

By what procedures are a free people to determine the answers to such complex questions as to whether a large amount of the taxpayer's money is to be spent on the development of a given weapon or its auxiliary? Granted the matter must be left to the people's elected representatives and the President exercising through subordinates his power as Commander-in-Chief, nevertheless the problem still remains, how are politicians to resolve conflicts of opinions among scientists and engineers? Have we devised as yet even the first approximation to a satisfactory procedure for evaluating technical judgments on matters connected with the national defense, including atomic energy? Some who have been close to the postwar scene in Washington and have followed some of the research and development projects must be inclined to answer this question in the negative.

It is one of the purposes of this article to urge the need for careful attention to these questions, even to suggest one possible line of attack on what is a political and not a scientific problem. But before plunging into this area, so obviously full of controversy and of pitfalls, an analysis of the whole zone in which poli-
tics and science mingle may not be entirely out of order. For, after all, the issues which have been publicly raised about strategic bombing are but one small segment of a far larger field. The whole position of science, pure and applied, in relation to the collective activities of free men has altered within a generation. There are many divergent views on matters even more fundamental than the technical discussion of modern arms. What is the relation of science to technology? Is there a scientific method which can be applied even to the solution of the political problems of assessing science? What is the relative importance of investigations in pure science as contrasted with applied science? Is there immediate hope that some of the ills of modern society can be cured by the more vigorous scientific study of mankind? Can a unifying philosophy for a nation be found by making science the central core? These and a host of related questions crowd the page when one attempts the task of writing even a brief review of the status of science and politics in the mid-twentieth century.

Instead of beginning with a study of some of the dilemmas inherent in the workings of the political machinery of a free country, let us turn to the opposite pole and examine the condition of science in the other half of the divided world. (And we may note parenthetically that the problem of how to evaluate technical opinions must be as perplexing in Moscow as in Washington.) More than one observer in the course of the last two decades has been impressed by the deep concern for science manifested by the Kremlin. American scientists who by special invitation attended the celebration of the Russian Academy of Science in the summer of 1945 noted with satisfaction the rôle played by Stalin in the public ceremonies honoring the scientists. One might jump to the conclusion that the interest in science shown by the highest officials of Soviet Russia proceeded solely from their realization of the importance of modern science to technology. While this realization plays its part, it would be a mistake to regard it as the only or even the prime factor.

In the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," an official publication, the authors speak of the "tremendous part in the history of the party" played by a book of Lenin's on "Materialism and Empiriocriticism." This volume, published in 1909, the official historians of the Bolshevik Party go on to say, "safeguarded a theoretical treasure from a motley crowd
of revisionists and renegades.” It is important to realize that the controversy in which the writing of the future ruler of Russia is alleged to have played so critical a rôle involved the nature of “scientific truth.”

Forty years and more ago, so we are told, the whole future of the Communist Party was threatened by false doctrines concerning the validity and meaning of scientific principles in the field of physics. Can one wonder that a monolithic political party which so interprets its own history must continue to regard scientific theories and their interpretation as within the field of official competence? As the history to which I have just referred states clearly, no revolutionary party can accept any such doctrine as unity based on diversity; on the contrary, the success of the party has from the first been based on a rigid conformity enforced by the expulsion of those deviationists who did not understand or would not understand the “science of the development of society” as laid down in the Marxist-Lenin theory.

There is no indication that those in control of the Party today are any less determined than their predecessors. Scientific theories that do not fit within the framework of the official version of dialectical materialism are clearly heresies; once convinced of this, the erstwhile proponents will of course publicly acknowledge their errors. Difficult as this may be for many in the western democracies to understand, the phenomenon of loyal sons of a church admitting their mistaken views and recanting is surely nothing new in history.

The fact that experimental findings in biology may be closely related to broad generalizations about heredity and thus have an impact on political and social theories obviously enhances interest in controversies in this particular field of science. But it is interesting to note that within the year Pravda has published at least one article devoted to a critique of modern theoretical physics. Matters that would not incite even the passing interest of ninety-nine politicians out of a hundred in the western democracies are treated therein as of deep significance. But any tendency to congratulate the Soviet Union on the high standard of sophistication of the readers of Pravda (at least as regards the philosophy of science) will be checked by a casual perusal of the article. For the stamp of orthodox dogma is impressed on every paragraph.

One may say that the Lysenko controversy merely shows that
relatively ignorant and ruthless men are now determining party policy in the field of science. But is it not inherent in any authoritarian system that human beings with all their fallibility must determine from year to year what is true doctrine and what is not? Politics, often of the crudest personal sort, will influence their decisions. The proponents of dialectical materialism in all lands place the physical sciences in a high position and speak glibly and confidently of the scientific method. When one version of this philosophy is transformed into the official doctrine of a party which must harbor no dissenters, the freedom of scientific thought automatically disappears. This is not to say that within wide limits scientific inquiries may not be ardently supported and that technology may not flourish. But can there ever be genuine scientific freedom in a society where all philosophical opinions must conform to the official interpretation of party dogma? This is a question which inevitably arises when one studies the history of the Communist Party.

In an article on "Lenin and Philosophical Problems of Modern Physics," published in Pravda on May 12, 1949, S. I. Vavilov, the President of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., described the problem of physics and politics in the following revealing terms:

Soviet physics, as well as all Soviet science, long ago entered the life of the state, having directed all its forces, in the service of our native land, toward satisfying the requirements of the great work of building communist society.

Soviet physicists base their work on the world outlook of dialectical materialism, raised to a higher level by the genius-inspired works of Lenin and Stalin. But we cannot ignore the fact that some of our physicists still preserve idealistic survivals, supported chiefly by an uncritical reception of the literature of capitalist countries.

It is our urgent task to fight these survivals by merciless criticism and self-criticism. Their harmful influence is great. Physicists must become more active in fighting them. . . .

That a wholehearted acceptance of science by politicians can lead to the curtailment of the work of scientists seems to have been clearly demonstrated. The recent events in the Russian Academy which have so stirred the scientific world outside Russia would seem only to underline what all Marxists have long preached, that science is a social activity not separable from other human undertakings.

Jumping back to the United States, we would do well to examine briefly the changing status of the scientist in recent years,
Those concerned directly with technology, the practical men, the inventors and the engineers, have long occupied a place of honor in our country. But the concern of the politician with science and scientists is a relatively new phenomenon. Unlike the situation in the Soviet Union, this is not a consequence of any development of a clear-cut national philosophy in which science plays a predominant part. Quite the contrary. The American public is quite uncertain as to the relation of the physical and natural sciences to the set of moral and spiritual values by which the average individual guides his daily life. Controversies on the relation of science to philosophy and religion are as vigorous today as ever before. Even within academic circles it is by no means clear that the changes in the outlook of physicists during the last 30 years have been assimilated into the thinking of professional philosophers. The advent of the scientists into the news and the growing interest of the nation in science are the direct consequences of World War II. But quite apart from the fact that certain new tools of war, notably the atomic bomb, the proximity fuse and radar, were products of scientific laboratories, there has been a growing appreciation in the last 50 years of the national importance of scientific progress. Today a government official or an elected representative in Washington thinking in terms of either increasing the military potential of the country or the industrial capacity will wish to consult both scientists and engineers.

Forty years ago the writer of an article such as this might have had to underline the fact that the scientist as well as the engineer was involved. He might have been worried lest the reader fail to realize the significance to a modern society of advances in pure science. The popularization of many fields of science in connection with medicine, public health, agriculture and industry as well as war has eliminated all such fears. In general terms the taxpayer and the stockholder are ready to take on faith the statement that science is important even if it costs the nation or the industrial corporation considerable sums of money.

Yet those who have had little or no contact with scientific research or with modern industrial production often equate science and technology. Now to do so is to misread history. From such a misunderstanding of the past relation of science to advances in the practical arts may flow mistaken judgments about the present and unreliable forecasts of the future.
Since an analysis of the nature of science is basic to all the questions considered in this article, a brief digression on this point may be in order. But first a word as to terminology. There is no unanimity of opinion among learned men as to a proper definition of science. One may use the word as the Germans use Wissenschaft, as covering the whole field of accumulative knowledge. To do so would be to include under the heading "scientists" not only investigators in the physical and natural sciences but mathematicians, logicians, economists, anthropologists, epistemologists, sociologists, archaeologists, historians, students of linguistics and many other scholars. But what the man-in-the-street means by science is something that has achieved startling technical results within the last two generations. And when the Marxists use the word "science" as St. Paul used the word "charity," they are in effect draping around themselves or their ambitions the whole fabric of the physical sciences with its glittering triumphs in the fields of both theory and practice. Furthermore, when the scientific method is glorified by its apostles and envied by many others, what is generally in mind is that method by which the physical and natural sciences are alleged to have made their progress. In short, the procedures of one segment of the whole enterprise of accumulating and advancing knowledge are in high repute because they have worked and are still working. And let us hasten to note that contrary to some captious critics the test, although a pragmatic one, is by no means solely in terms of practical applications, and certainly not in terms of dollars and cents.

With these thoughts in mind it might be well to define science in such a way as to concentrate attention on what have been the essential features of the intellectual enterprises that most people have in mind when they speak of science. Here is a definition which I venture to believe meets this requirement: "Science is an interconnecting group of concepts and conceptual schemes arising out of experiment and observation, and fruitful of new experiments and observations." The emphasis should be on the word "fruitful." The concepts and conceptual schemes must, of course, lead to relatively simple formulations of the previously recorded experimental observations; but to think of science as a set of static principles and theories is to fail to appreciate the true nature of the undertaking. The new philosophy which first attracted attention in the seventeenth century had a dynamic
nature which if anything has been more and more prominent as the adventure has prospered through the centuries.

The definition of science just proposed places no restriction on the field of inquiry, but it does assign a central rôle to the development of new concepts and their relation to experiment and observation. If one accepts some such statement about science, several current formulations of "the scientific method" become untenable. Indeed, the whole idea of there being one scientific method disappears. To the extent that those who speak glowingly of the scientific method are promoting the use of hardheaded reason and trying to restrict the impact of emotional rhetoric, they deserve the support of all thoughtful citizens. But one may quarrel with their use of words. Because these enthusiasts cite the rapid progress of the experimental sciences as an example of the type of human activity to be encouraged, they must be asked to consider very carefully the history of those sciences which have progressed most rapidly, namely, astronomy, physics, chemistry and experimental biology. Now it is easy to show that these sciences would never have developed as they have in the last three centuries and a half if the scientific method were merely, as has been said, "the habit of seeking facts and accepting them, if they appeal to the logic of our sensory tests, no matter what they may do to previous generalizations."

Nor can the scientific method be accurately described as "the use of the working hypothesis." Common sense procedures in everyday experience have used the working hypothesis ever since the cave men. A naïve form of the "if . . . then" type of reasoning is employed by all of us every day. If this is a real brick and not a piece of red paper (working hypothesis), then when I kick it, I will stub my toe or not; after this mental exercise the trial is made. The chef seeking to improve a sauce argues in the same fashion: if I add more pepper, the taste will be improved or not. By such cut-and-try methods the fine art of cooking has advanced through the centuries. By similar trial and error procedures the methods of making metals, machines, tools of all sorts were developed long before the advent of science. What confuses many a writer about science and its methods is that the working hypothesis is indeed an essential element in the thinking of the experimental scientist, but not the sole element. The transition from common sense to science is continuous. The empirical procedures of the cook today or the artisan of the
Middle Ages are combined in modern science with the abstract type of thought that comes from mathematics. The fruitful periods in the history of the experimental sciences have been the result of a curious interweaving of (a) limited working hypotheses as related to actual experimental manipulations, (b) working hypotheses on a grand scale which may or may not become new conceptual schemes and (c) deductive reasoning coupled with carefully defined terms.

It is interesting to contrast the activities of the eighteenth century assayists with the modern analytical chemist. Before people had any clear idea of elements or the nature of such fundamental chemical processes as oxidation, the devising of ways to determine the value of metallic ores was little different as regards methodology from improvements in the art of cookery. Men worked blindly without any theory to guide the way, and used working hypotheses on so restricted a basis as to justify calling their experimentation mere trial and error. But by such purely empirical trials they did develop fairly satisfactory procedures for assaying a variety of ores. The chemist today, on the other hand, has at his disposal a vast array of concepts and conceptual schemes (the theories of chemistry and physics) as well as a great body of scientific information. Like his predecessors of two centuries ago he must test his working hypotheses by experiment. There will be some empirical steps in his procedure of which he can say only “by trial and error I found so and so to be the best way of operating.” But the degree of empiricism in the final method will be low as compared to the eighteenth century. The impact of theory on practice has been high.

Until the mid-nineteenth century the instances were few where the new scientific knowledge had reduced the degree of empiricism in the practical arts. Coke replaced charcoal in the manufacture of iron before anyone had formulated any general ideas about reducing ores to metals; the crucible steel process was widely used before anyone knew that the difference between iron and steel depended largely on the amount of dissolved and combined carbon in the iron. Here and there in the eighteenth century, and increasingly in the nineteenth, discoveries made in the laboratory affected industrial practice. Occasionally the new ideas incorporated in the expanding body of scientific theory were used as guides to practical improvements. However, only with the rapid development of the electrical industry and syn-
thetic dye industry in the second half of the nineteenth century did a union of science and technology become so productive as to constitute a revolution. For in these new industries the use of scientific principles was essential and further progress required the employment of theory; pure empiricism proved highly unrewarding. Therefore, in the last third of the last century we find the scientists in the laboratories of the German universities and technical high schools not only advancing pure science, but training research men for industry and cooperating with industry. Scientific research as apart from engineering practice was beginning to have real industrial significance.

The pattern set in Germany and by the new industries was followed slowly in other countries. In this century the pace has quickened; scientific research has penetrated into almost all the older practical arts to a greater or less degree. Today science and industry are acknowledged partners. To understand the nature of this partnership it is well, however, to distinguish clearly between three types of experimentation: 1, the old art of trial and error — empirical invention; 2, experimentation in which scientific theories play a predominant rôle and the aim is to improve a practical procedure (in industry, agriculture or medicine) — this is applied science; 3, experimentation aimed at extending a conceptual scheme, testing a new concept, or obtaining information to fill in a gap in a systematic classification — this may be called pure science. These three activities are differentiated in part by a difference in methods, in part by a difference as to goals. The work of the “pure scientist” may be defined as extending the boundaries of science without regard to the practical applications of new knowledge; the work of the “applied scientist” may be defined as reducing the degree of empiricism in a given industrial art.

What is the bearing of all this on science and politics? Simply this: today, managers of industry and public officials seem convinced that the greater the penetration of science into industry the better. Almost every industrial art (including all those concerned with the manufacture of weapons) has still a high degree of empiricism; but hardly one exists in which the degree of empiricism has not been diminished in the last 50 years by the introduction of more physics and chemistry. With this decrease have come rapid practical improvements. Therefore, looking at the immediate past, the hardheaded American citizen has be-
come convinced of the importance of applied science. In short, science has proved to be a horse worth backing.

Investigations in science represent a leap into the unknown; betting on science is betting, it is not buying a sure thing. All trials of new procedures are uncertain, but recent history seems to show that gambles with applied science pay off better than those with purely rule of thumb inventions. Therefore, a society bent on material prosperity and involved in an armament race (at least temporarily) had better have the maximum amount of applied science. But in a given segment, the application of science sooner or later comes to an end unless new concepts are developed, or the conceptual scheme extended. The applied scientist reaches the dead end of a road and calls to his colleague in the university laboratory for new supplies of scientific knowledge. Whence it follows that the nation must speed up the advance of science itself. This means that large sums of money must be spent on another speculation, another type of gamble, adventures in pure science. The implementation of this conclusion through a National Science Foundation unfortunately still awaits Congressional action.

Scientists demand more money for the advance of pure science — more money for research in the natural and physical sciences. To these claimants for support have been added in ever-increasing volume the voices of the proponents of more emphasis on research in the social sciences. Some have even suggested that we shall be bogged down in applying the fruits of research in the natural and physical sciences until the social scientists have made more progress in studying man and his institutions. To them more than one skeptic has raised the question, can there be a truly scientific study of human behavior? No writer on science and politics can dodge this issue.

We have seen that the Marxists have pinned their faith on science. To them, therefore, social science means the further extension of their own brand of scientific philosophy which acknowledges no limitations. A more cautious approach points to the slow growth of the sciences of physics and chemistry as illustrating the need for persistence and optimism in any intellectual undertaking. While the prenatal history of modern science can be traced far back into antiquity, few would challenge the thesis that something approaching a revolution occurred in the seventeenth century. New procedures followed a new out-
look and soon proved to be very fruitful in certain areas; me-
chanics, including celestial mechanics, was built on sure founda-
tions and elaborated in astounding proportions within three or
four generations. But even when people had seen how the combi-
nation of a broad hypothesis, mathematical reasoning and experi-
mentation could be prolific in certain fields, it required genera-
tions before progress was made in solving many other pressing
problems. Is there here an analogy with the present status of psy-
chology, anthropology, sociology, even branches of economics?

A really reliable crystal ball is needed for the answer. But
since the desire for a more developed scientific study of human
nature springs largely from the manifest troubles of the world —
that is, from practical considerations — the analogy, if there be
one, might well be directed to the progress of the practical arts
(including medicine and agriculture). It might be appropriate,
according to the definition of science adopted in this article, to
consider studies about human beings "scientific" to the degree
that new ideas and generalizations are evolved which are fruitful
of more experiments and observations. Furthermore, if there
be any parallelism between the extension of the generalizations
and theories of physics and chemistry into the empirical pro-
cedures of the practical arts, the eventual impact of new ways of
thinking about human problems on the age-old questions treated
by Machiavelli might be regarded as quite certain. But as to the
time which may be involved, one must be cautious in his pre-
dictions.

Very few scientists and philosophers have been successful
prophets as to the speed of advance of the science of their day, or
the direction of the progress or the long-range effects on the prac-
tical arts. For example, signs of increasing speed in the reduction
of the degree of empiricism in the treatment of the ailments of
mankind could be read with certainty at the turn of this century;
but it would take an optimistic reading of history to find them in,
say, 1840, even two generations after the chemical revolution and
200 years after Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood.
We who live in an age carried away by a mixture of enthusiasm
and horror as we contemplate the applications of science would
do well to ponder the slow history of medicine. Dr. Beddoes in
1800 established a pneumatic institute in which his patients were
made to breathe the gases discovered by the preceding generation
of investigators. That he killed no one seems to be an unexplained
example of his good fortune; that he provided the first research opportunities for one of the scientific stars of the early nineteenth century (Sir Humphry Davy) is quite certain. But are we to regard the doctor as a charlatan, a self-deluded quack, or as a pioneer in chemotherapy at least three-quarters of a century ahead of his time? With this question in view one may read with more sympathy about some of the more newsworthy unsuccessful attempts of social psychologists to measure the pulse of public opinion, or be less dissatisfied with the current methods of testing the skills and aptitudes of human beings.

We may or may not be on the threshold of a revolution in the scientific study of man or of society. But almost certainly through a slow and patient approach to human problems, by the evolution of improved techniques, considerable progress can be made in certain areas within the field of the social sciences. If so, politicians some day may be as much affected by the new knowledge as were the industrialists of this century by the work of the physicists and chemists. But that there is any magic formula, any new revelation as to methods which will transform the practical art of politics, seems extremely unlikely. We who are unable to isolate "the scientific method" from a study of the history of science can hardly share the enthusiasm of those who proclaim its virtues.

What then are we to do to answer the pressing practical questions that confront politicians, indeed, all leaders of human enterprise? The answer would seem to be, do not despair of pure empiricism; continue to use the accumulation of practical wisdom handed down through the ages; continue by trial and error methods to improve organizations of human beings, to devise better procedures for handling individual and collective problems. Those who argue for the scientific method in the social sciences often do so by analogy with the physical sciences. Yet they sometimes overlook the enormous advances made in the practical arts without benefit of science. Certainly no advances were made by arbitrarily discarding satisfactory methods but only by substituting better methods based either on trial and error experimentation or on the application of scientific knowledge. The example may well be followed by all who are pure or applied scientists in the field of human relations.

To wait on the results of the scientific study of man before courageously tackling complicated social situations might mean
to wait for generations, possibly forever. We have to do the best we can with the tools and principles now at our disposal. Surely history can demonstrate that if we set out to improve governmental machinery, for example, this is no hopeless task. Take the case presented in the opening paragraphs of this article, the improvement of methods for the evaluation of research projects in the field of weapons and military appliances. This is an urgent need today. Perhaps it is as essential in totalitarian lands as in a democracy, but the frame of reference in the United States is peculiarly our own.

First of all, we must be aware of the issues involved; then we must experiment with various types of new social mechanisms, using historical knowledge, political theory, argument by analogy and, above all, common sense experience to guide the way. There seems no reason to suppose that even the cumbrous apparatus of government in a democracy cannot be adjusted to take care of the startling impact of science on problems of national defense.

No one need warn those who have been immersed in the day-to-day planning of the defense of the nation that they should adopt a cautious or even a skeptical mood in listening to technical experts, be they scientists or engineers. All experts are human and tend to be carried away with enthusiasm for their own ideas. Indeed, without this autointoxication few of the revolutionary changes in technology could have been accomplished. But the existence of a conflict of technical opinion on many, many details in all manner of new developments of importance to our security requires that we take a careful look at the procedures used in arriving at decisions. The President and Congress have the ultimate authority, but neither the Chief Executive nor Congressional committees have the time to settle the enormous number of issues which must necessarily arise in any research, development or procurement program. The worst way to make decisions is to resolve conflicts in favor of those with the loudest voice or the closest approach to political leaders. Propaganda and counter-propaganda on behalf of a new departure in an industrial concern would never be tolerated by good management.

Careful studies by staff officers and advice by outside committees are often helpful to the “line officer” (military or civilian) who in a chain of command must make decisions. But one can have grave doubts that these modes of operation bring out into the
open all the conflicting views and relevant information. There is bound to be a tendency to compromise and side-step difficult decisions. Furthermore, the decisions made down the line may be too readily reversed higher up because there is inadequate documentation of the real technical issues involved. Perhaps something akin to the judicial process is what is required. An agency of the government faced with the type of technical problem here in question might establish regular procedures for “hearings” of experts who would be encouraged to present alternative solutions. Decisions of such technical tribunals might be subject to review, but the records would clearly indicate just what would be involved in a reversal of the “lower court.” As in the judiciary or administrative machinery of government, it would take time to recruit the necessary personnel to man this type of organization, for this is no part-time hit-or-miss job that is being suggested. Laymen who understand science and scientists and are familiar with engineering and engineers rather than technical experts might well prove the most suitable men for this task of refereeing technical disputes.

Whether or not there be any merit in these suggestions for improving the assessment of scientific and technical problems related to the work of the Federal Government, the existence of a serious problem is abundantly clear. To repeat, this is but one illustration of an important change which has taken place within a generation. An historian 50 years from now writing of the mid-twentieth century will certainly record that science and politics were by 1950 no longer to be regarded as two totally unrelated activities. He might well add that scientists and politicians were in this period to be found sometimes in amicable coöperation, sometimes in violent disagreement; only one thing seemed certain, the type of society in which each could go his own way with only a polite bow to the other had disappeared as irrevocably as the American buffalo from the plains.
DEVALUATION AND EUROPEAN RECOVERY

By R. C. Leffingwell

ON SUNDAY, September 18, 1949, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, announced over the air, in effect, that the pound was henceforth to be worth $2.80 instead of $4.03, a devaluation of 30.5 percent, in terms of our dollar. Promptly, like tenpins before the ball of a skilled bowler, many of the world’s currencies fell in unison. All (except Pakistan) of the countries of the sterling area in Asia, Africa and the islands of the seas, and in Europe the Scandinavian countries and Holland and Greece, also devalued their currencies by 30.5 percent or thereabouts. France, Belgium, Western Germany and Portugal in Europe, and our neighbor Canada devalued their currencies, though to a lesser extent; and the Italian lira though not devalued was permitted to depreciate and to fluctuate. And that is not all. This momentous event, affecting the dollar exchange value of the currencies of some one-third of the human race, indeed almost all of the world except the Communist area and the dollar area, dramatizes the unbalanced state of the world’s trade with the United States, and the key position of sterling in spite of its weakness, and the fact that the dollar is the world’s monetary standard, the measure by which other currencies are valued.

There is no great mystery about these devaluations. They reflect the famous, or infamous, dollar shortage or dollar gap. The United States produces more goods than it consumes, and many European countries, due chiefly to the two world wars and their consequences, are as yet unable to produce and sell for dollars enough goods and services above their own needs to pay for their necessary dollar imports. Thus European countries are spending more dollars than they earn, living beyond their means. Many of them have been forced to use up their gold and dollar reserves, to seek loans and gifts from us. If a nation lives beyond its means it is spending its substance and impoverishing itself; just as you, gentle reader, or I would do if we lived beyond our means. This expresses itself for a nation in currency depreciation: in exchange depreciation abroad and in the high cost of living at home.
But, let us Americans remember, this is more Europe’s mis-
fortune than her fault, and let us not feel superior because of
what has happened. But for the kindness of Providence, and the
enterprise of our ancestors, we should be in Europe’s fix our-
selves. It is not solely by our own virtue or effort that we have a
continent to enjoy and exploit, which is geographically remote
as yet from Europe’s wars, in spite of our vigorous and effective
participation in them. The bombs have not yet fallen here.
Europe’s problem is ours too if we want peace and law and order
in the world and solvent partners in the human enterprise. It is
our problem unless we think we can sit safe and unmolested on
our money bags while the world falls apart. It is our problem,
so we had better try to understand it and to solve it.

In spite of the British wish and determination to avoid it,
devaluation of sterling had finally become inevitable because
almost everyone had come to believe sterling was overvalued;
meaning that the British price level was too high for British
goods to compete with American. The supply of sterling ex-
ceeded the demand for it, and this resulted in black and grey
market prices for sterling and sterling securities much lower
than $4.03. This opinion affected, adversely to Britain, the action
of buyers and sellers of goods and sterling exchange in world
markets. Thus the general distrust of the pound hastened sterling
devaluation.

Sterling devaluation proved contagious; and no wonder. The
pound is still the greatest trading currency in the world. Further-
more, many countries were in the same predicament as Britain
and were merely waiting for Britain to take the lead and to give
a touch of respectability to devaluation. So only the timing and
extent of sterling devaluation were unexpected; and they were
unexpected indeed.

Though so eagerly demanded by so many here and abroad,
devaluation is a grave and deplorable event, only justified —
though amply justified — by grim necessity. Devaluation strikes
at the very basis of contracts. It upsets the terms of the world’s
trade. It arbitrarily scales down all foreign debts, whether public
or private, expressed in the devalued currencies and not entitled
to exchange guaranties. It tends to domestic inflation and the
consequent depreciation in value of domestic money contracts,
wages, insurance policies, annuities, pensions, savings and bonded
debt. Inflation is a capital tax and an income tax, indiscrimi-
nately burdening the rich, the well-to-do, the thrifty, and the poor and helpless. It is the worst and cruelest of all taxes.

Currency devaluation, moreover, is the symptom of a disease; it is not a cure. For a time, it may stimulate exports, and it will retard imports, of the devaluing countries, and so reduce their trade deficits; but if costs and prices are permitted to reflect the devaluations, as they most probably will after a time, these advantages will wear away and dwindle to nothingness, and the essential maladjustments will reassert themselves unless something effective is done to correct them. These maladjustments have been staring us in the face ever since the First World War.

Since the industrial revolution a great part of Europe's business had been to buy food and raw materials, to feed her men and her machines, from less industrialized countries to the east and west, and to sell back to them the products of her factories. But even before the First World War many European countries had a deficit of goods, a deficit in their trade balances, which they covered by their so-called invisible income, from foreign investments, shipping, insurance and banking services, emigrants' remittances and tourists' expenditures. The First World War left the world topsy-turvy. America, previously Europe's debtor, suddenly had become her creditor; and Europe's invisible income, her external wealth, had been impaired. In 1918 it had already become a difficult question whether the great populations of industrial and urban Europe could reduce their consumption and increase their production, and whether America, with her great natural resources and relatively small population, could readjust her production and increase her consumption to such an extent as to bring the world's trade into balance. The Second World War further shattered the European economy and shrunk Europe's invisible income. Her foreign and colonial wealth, except Belgium's, has been further impaired, and foreign debts and demands for help from dependent areas have taken the place of income.

Britain's Second World War debts to the sterling area, the so-called sterling balances, at the old rate of $4.03 to the pound, were some three times her First World War debt to the United States, which proved unbearable; and some of her present creditors are more intractable and exigent in their demands than we were. The inability of Britain to maintain the value of sterling was in large measure due to her creditable, if imprudent,
effort to pay these war debts—an effort which required her to make exports without being paid for them, the so-called unrequited exports. The invisible income of Britain included the earnings of British bankers, brokers, insurance men, merchants and traders from their innumerable services in the conduct of the business of the world throughout the world. British skill and experience, and British character, with the support the British Government gave to Britons as they went about the world on their business, made these earnings an important factor in the balance of payments. This source of income has been impaired by the war and postwar unsettlement, by the loosening of the bonds of Empire, by the inconvertibility of sterling, and by nationalization, bulk buying and other policies which tend to make the services of these merchants and traders and brokers and bankers less necessary and less profitable.

Europe's monopoly of the manufacturing business of the world, which was fairly complete in the early days of the industrial revolution, and through much of the nineteenth century, has disappeared. Every nation everywhere to a greater or less extent has gone into the manufacturing business, or wants to, and wants to become independent as far as possible of imports from Europe. President Truman's Point Four will, if implemented, advance this trend. The wars not only impaired Europe's manpower and plant, but greatly stimulated the technological development of American factories, mines and farms; and diverted to us much of Western Europe's purchases which had formerly been made in Eastern Europe and the Far East. The iron curtain and the military occupation of Germany have bisected Europe's trade. Trade with the Orient has been disrupted by war and revolution in Asia.

For these among other good reasons Europe has a deficit in her balance of payments. Her foreign wealth and income are lost or impaired and her imports exceed her exports. This is the fundamental disequilibrium. No export drive, no directed exports, no export bonus, no devaluation, no import restriction, can, with the best will in the world, produce net exports, if the people consume more goods than they produce. Only out of the surplus production can net exports be made. So it is that Europe is living beyond her means; and small blame to her under all the circumstances.

Spending more than her income abroad has involved inflation
DEVALUATION AND EUROPEAN RECOVERY

for Europe. Less blameless inflationary forces have been powerful too, and cumulative. Over-spending at home and inflation lead to the distrust of paper money, which the devaluations will aggravate, and to difficulty in capturing, in taxes and loans from savings, money enough to pay the governments' bills. Domestic deficits have to be paid by printing more money, foreign deficits by sacrifice of reserves and borrowing and gifts.

Great capital expenditure was necessary to repair war damage; but the immense capital expenditure in Europe since the war on public improvements, and on plant and machinery, under five-year plans or in a race to achieve greatly improved methods of production by 1952, has been inflationary. It has diverted labor and material from production to construction. It has increased the peoples' spending power without increasing the present supply of consumers' goods, thus giving the people too much money to spend and too few things to buy with it. It is doubtful that all of these capital expenditures will in the end fully justify themselves. When war shortages are satisfied and the sellers' market is past and all the new plants are in production everywhere, who will buy their product?

Ordinarily we associate inflation with an unbalanced budget, and with printing paper money and creating bank credit to fill the gap between a government's receipts and its expenditures. That has been part of the trouble in France. But England has had a balanced budget, or an approximately balanced budget; and one must pay deference to the British people who have carried the heavy load of taxation necessary to balance the immense expenditures of the Government. But too much taxation is part of Britain's trouble. It adds to costs and destroys incentive. Inflation in Britain has been due also to the fact that not only excessive capital expenditures but also subsidies, social services and civil and military expenditures, however necessary or desirable, add to the people's incomes and spending power without adding currently to the supply of consumers' goods for their use. Meanwhile the controls imposed by the British Government on prices have enhanced the buying power of the people by preventing prices from reflecting the inflation which has taken place.

It is sometimes said that Europe will have to accept a lower standard of living. Perhaps it is not the peoples' standard of living that is too high. It may be the governments' standard of
living that is too high — just as it is here at home. Governments spend too much money. There are too many civil servants, performing too many useless, or obstructive, tasks. There is too much government. What is needed in Europe, I suspect, is even better pay, incentive pay, for the workers who really work, and greater mobility of labor; and that the workers be able to buy the things they want, or their wives and children want, with their pay. This is the incentive that gets results.

Evidently a fundamental imbalance in the world's trade was the underlying cause of the devaluations, and inflation the secondary cause, while world opinion was the proximate cause that precipitated them.

To what extent will devaluation relieve the problem? The 30.5 percent depreciation of sterling makes possible a considerable cut in British selling prices, and should increase the quantity of their dollar sales; but whether Britain's sales for dollars can be increased enough in quantity to much more than make up for any reduction in prices is doubtful. Britain's facilities, both in plant and manpower, are pretty fully employed, and she has been enjoying profitable sellers' markets at home and in the sterling area for what she can produce. Where then are the goods to be found that are to be sold in the difficult dollar markets? American competition will not long be idle; and the American consumer may be the chief beneficiary of cut prices. On the whole it is not probable that Britain will gain much from increased exports to the United States. On the other hand, the 30.5 percent depreciation of sterling results in a 43.9 percent increase in the sterling equivalent of our dollar prices for British and sterling area purchases here. This will help balance Britain's trade, for it imposes an obstacle to our exports, in addition to existing and proposed British quantitative restrictions on imports, and the dollar scarcity. Nobody ought to object to these British restrictions, for there is nothing discreditable or unfriendly about not buying goods one can't pay for.

The deflations initiated by the dear money policy — the 6 percent and 7 percent bank rates of the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank — in 1920 and 1929 turned the terms of trade in Britain's favor. That is to say, the prices of food and raw materials, which she imported, came down faster and farther than the prices of manufactures, which she exported. Now, however, instead of dear money, the central banks are keeping money
DEVALUATION AND EUROPEAN RECOVERY

cheap, and the United States Government is supporting farm prices and stockpiling raw materials and doing some deficit financing. All this will tend to keep up the prices of what Britain has to buy. But the outer sterling area, which is normally an exporter of food and raw materials, should benefit by the higher prices. It is hard to tell where the advantage of the terms of trade will lie.

There is not much reason to expect any great flow of money toward sterling now, such as occurred after 1919 and again after 1931. Then the pound was depreciated; it was not devalued, but allowed to float or drift downward. The gold or dollar rate was established in a free market, by the process of trial and error. After falling as low as $3.19 in 1920, the pound came back to its old parity $4.86 in 1925; and after falling as low as $3.14 in 1932 the pound rose as high as $5.53 in 1933. As soon as the world became convinced after 1919, and again after 1931, that the free pound was undervalued, sterling attracted flight money, the money of speculators and investors all over the world, who bought the free pound cheap for a profit. So the depreciation of the pound influenced the movement of money, as well as the balance of trade, in favor of Britain. Now, however, the pound is not free, but is an inconvertible pegged currency, and foreign investors who hold sterling and sterling securities have had their investments frozen for years, and now devalued, and still they can’t get their money out. On the whole the present sterling devaluation can scarcely be expected to have the consequences here or abroad which sterling depreciation had after 1919 and 1931.

Some persons propose the homeopathic cure, similia similibus curantur, or a hair of the dog that bit me. It has been suggested, in the interest of the gold producers, or in a spirit of good clean fun, that the United States should devalue the dollar too, that is, pay more than $35 an ounce for gold. Let’s make devaluation unanimous, they seem to say. Thirty-five dollars an ounce was the price fixed in 1934. That price was too high then, and it has remained high enough ever since to make the United States the chief market for the world’s gold production. The Federal Reserve has more than 55 percent gold cover for its currency and deposits. The legal requirement is only 25 percent. It is unthinkable that the United States should set to work to defeat the foreign currency devaluations, by devaluation of the dollar, and thus re-
store the overvaluation of foreign currencies which their devaluation was meant to correct. It would be deplorable for the United States, whose position as a creditor nation is so strongly entrenched, to engage again in the futile race of competitive devaluation which contributed to the world catastrophe in the thirties. If there is to be peace and reconstruction there must be faith in somebody’s money, some nation’s money. If there is to be a solid rock on which to build our own welfare and European and world reconstruction, it must be the honor and impregnability of the United States dollar and its redeemability for settling international balances at the gold price fixed in 1934. We should not raise the gold price, and we shall not. The Secretary of the Treasury has again and again denied any intention to do so and the President himself has spoken wisely and decisively on this question. Let us hope that will end this nonsense. Nor should we put gold coin in circulation; we should keep it in reserve to settle international balances. Do let’s let our money be.

What other remedies may there be? Freer trade in Europe, lower tariffs, the removal of embargoes and quotas, and convertible currencies, are most desirable. But let us not exaggerate what free trade within Europe can do, nor forget that it is free trade with us that Europe needs to close the dollar gap. Europe is densely populated and highly industrialized, and her problem essentially is to make exports to the dollar area to pay for the food and raw materials which she must import from the outer world. Indeed too much intra-European trade may divert needed labor and materials from the necessary task of making exports to the outer world, and leave a yawning dollar gap. A stronger and better integrated Europe is greatly to be desired, but the solution of the European economic problem is not intra-European trade, but extra-European trade. It is hard to see how the consolidation of the dollar deficits of the deficit countries can reduce the dollar deficit.

Some go further and demand a Western European political or economic union. That seems hardly feasible in time to solve Europe’s problem. The analogy to our federal union, our great free trade area, is imperfect. Our people had one language, one literature, one common law and one King, when they rebelled and formed a confederation which later became a union. Even so it took 90 years and a civil war to confirm the union. Free trade within the United States has been a great blessing to us.
But we had no established manufactures to be displaced when
we adopted that great principle. Europe, however, has an eco-

nomic history; it has been a going concern for a long time. The
removal of quantitative barriers and lowering of tariffs seems
feasible, but free trade as we have it within the United States
might mean that some protected industries would collapse in
Europe. How then are the necessary migration and resettlement
of laborers from the abandoned inefficient plants to be arranged?
Must these newly displaced persons learn a new language, a new
patriotism? If nationalism is discarded, what substitute is there
for patriotism, for the love of country? Can the whole of Europe
be of one language, and of one speech? Or can a polyglot Euro-
pean Union maintain democracy and freedom and quicken the
peoples' blood and warm their hearts? It seems that a too hurried
union would involve a great upheaval, and this at a time of
trouble, when every minute counts and every disturbance should
be avoided. European union may come by evolution. It can't
come by fiat. No shotgun wedding will do the job.

Monetary union without political union is impossible. There
cannot be a common currency without common sovereignty and
a common parliament and common taxes and common expendi-
tures. The very life of the government of any nation, and the
welfare of its citizens, depend on its control of money and credit
within its borders; and the value of its money depends upon the
way that control is exercised. To put these at the disposal of a
foreign nation or committee of foreign nations would be suicidal.

If neither devaluation, nor intra-European trade, nor union
now, will solve the problem, what then can be done? First and
foremost, for our own sake and Europe's sake, we should manage
our own economy so that it will continue to grow and prosper,
but without inflation. Nothing more certainly will precipitate
disaster in Europe than a depression here, or a boom and bust
here. Our fiscal and monetary policy must be a middle-of-the-
road policy, avoiding rigorously both inflation and deflation.

We should be more liberal in regard to the movement across
our frontiers of men and of trade and of money. We should
open our doors a little wider to desirable immigration. We
should let Europeans earn dollars from their shipping, banking,
insurance and trading services, if they can, in free and fair com-
petition. We should eliminate our own subsidies and quotas.
We should further reduce our tariffs, all across the board, uni-
laterally, to the point where they let more goods in. As a creditor nation, our tariffs should be for revenue only, except where needed to protect industries essential for the national defense. Merely reciprocal reduction of tariffs is inadequate to the present situation, for it means we hope to increase our exports as much as our imports. What we need to do is to increase our imports more than we increase our exports, if we are to reduce the dollar gap.

Private American foreign investment would help. Indeed, the fundamental trade disequilibrium is so great that the international accounts can scarcely be balanced without great American investment overseas, both public and private. There has been some direct investment by American companies and will be more no doubt. The more the better. But private American investors whose foreign investments have been frozen for years, and are now devalued, and are still frozen, will be slow to make much more such investments. Surely in vain the net is spread in the sight of any bird. We are told foreign countries must not be exploited for profit. In the experience of American investors it has been too often the case that American capital sent abroad has been not the exploiter but the exploited. It has been subject to excessive taxation, to default, confiscation and repudiation, and now to inconvertibility and devaluation. If American foreign investment is to be encouraged, our Government and foreign governments must reverse their policies and give firm assurance to American investors that their investments will be respected and protected, and that they may hope to profit by them, and collect their profits. Otherwise, indeed, our Government should discourage American foreign investments, whether in developed or underdeveloped areas.

Until currencies are convertible and government policies are more helpful to private foreign investment, our Government will have to continue to help to fill the dollar gap. Our postwar loans to Britain and France and other European countries, whether made by our Government or by our wholly owned governmental agencies, should be extended, principal and interest, or cancelled. Let us follow the precedent of lend-lease and Marshall aid rather than the less happy precedent of the First World War debts.

Marshall aid must continue at least until 1952. The problems of each country should be dealt with practically, in the light of
its own peculiar requirements and our own national interest. Britain has problems quite different from those of any other country. Her currency is a key currency. She is banker for the dollar pool. She alone incurred a great external war debt, the sterling balances. These should be scaled down and funded; and we should help arrange it. If that results in hardship in special cases the United States should lend or grant money direct to the sterling area countries concerned for urgent needs. France has no foreign war debt but a heavy postwar debt to the United States. She lives in the memory and under the shadow of invasion and occupation. She has no permanent problem of balancing her international accounts. But France has failed for a long time to balance her internal budget and to maintain the soundness of her currency, and still needs our help. Italy has recently pursued a classically sound fiscal and monetary policy, but has a chronic unemployment problem. Holland suffers from the burden of her losses in Indonesia.

Capital expenditures of most European countries, and their imports of capital goods, should be drastically curtailed. Our aid should be increasingly restricted to necessary purchases of food and raw materials and, where adequate measures are being taken to achieve balanced budgets and balanced international accounts, to support currency convertibility. Some continental countries should be nearly self-supporting by now. They will not be fully self-supporting until compelled to be by shrinking our aid, which has tended to continue after the war the undue concentration on the United States of European purchases.

In view of all these considerations, it would seem well to allow the able administrator of Marshall aid great latitude in allocating to the European countries what money Congress decides to grant, to be spent pretty much as he may deem best. Too great specification about what European countries may buy must lead to waste and inefficiency. Indeed, it would be much better if the money granted were not spent at all but were added to the European countries' gold or dollar reserves, and used to support their currencies in foreign exchange when the need arises.

We might well take a further step toward currency stability and offer continuing aid specifically for exchange support at approved rates to those nations which stop inflationary expenditures, balance their budgets and their current international accounts, and (while restricting export or flight of capital) make
their currencies freely convertible for current transactions. Such a plan would offer a strong incentive to the nations to achieve convertibility. With nations as with men, the incentive system is more effective than the lecture system. Nobody disputes the desirability of restoring a system of multilateral trade and payments, but many experts doubt that the world will have the economic strength and flexibility to restore such a system in the near future. I, on the other hand, doubt that the world can recover economic strength and flexibility until a system of multilateral trade and payments is restored.

Though the Economic Cooperation Administration is to end in 1952, it is unduly optimistic to suppose that all aid to Europe can stop short then. The aid we give should be reduced gradually from year to year and be spread over a greater number of years. Abrupt termination would mean that all the $30 billion or thereabouts we have spent or promised postwar, through UNRRA, direct government loans, World Bank, World Fund, Export-Import Bank, Marshall aid and military aid, might be wasted and we might lose the cold war. Our aid must taper off, not just stop. In spite of war's dreadful losses, and war-weariness, Europe has made immense strides since the war. American aid, and notably, the brilliant and nobly conceived Marshall Plan, have contributed greatly to this progress.

Though we must help her on the way, Europe must save herself in the end. Her chief contributions to recovery must be balanced budgets, greater production, greater savings, greater freedom and greater enterprise. Europe cannot recover without stopping inflation and establishing monetary order. Europe cannot recover until mobility is restored to capital and labor, nor until the direction of the effort of both is determined by prices and wages instead of by politicians and civil servants. Europe cannot recover until the price system, the profit and loss system, the incentive system, are restored, and competitive enterprise and risk-taking replace controls by governments, by cartels and by trade unions. We can help Europe to survive, but only she herself can do what is necessary to recovery. The mistakes being made in Europe, however great they may be, are, like our own, still the mistakes of free peoples, made by their own choice, and, above all else, they remain free and free to change again. It is in our interest to defend their survival with our resources and our might.
AFTER DEVALUATION:
THE COMMON TASK

By Sir Arthur Salter

THE devaluation of the pound last September, followed immediately by that of so many other currencies, is a sharp reminder of the changing pattern of economic relations in the postwar world. In itself it is like a single figure in red at the end of a company’s balance sheet. Such a menacing cipher reflects only the net result of many factors, good and bad, in past experience, and indicates the compelling necessity of new adjustments. It mirrors neither the past nor the future pattern in all the complexity of individual transactions. It does, however, present an immediate challenge to think of both. This is an appropriate moment, then, to attempt a broad survey of the main forces determining the shape of things to come.

The present devaluation was, of course, not so much an act of policy as a recognition of facts and a surrender to necessity. Great Britain, and others in a comparable position, had been unable to sell enough to the dollar countries at current prices and exchange rates to balance their international accounts, even with Marshall Aid; and their reserves of gold and foreign exchange, especially those held in London for the whole of the sterling area, had therefore become dangerously depleted. Recognition of this, and increasing expectations of devaluation, had depreciated the pound, wherever transactions in it escaped the exchange control, even below its purchasing parity. The devaluation by 30.5 percent reflected both these influences. If the value of currency in purchasing power and in public estimation does not equal its exchange rate, the rate must obviously be allowed to adjust itself, before all reserves are exhausted. And that is what happened.

A new exchange rate is, however, more than a barometer. It changes the terms of trade with all countries whose rates have not been similarly altered; and must substantially modify, as it is intended to do, the whole pattern of foreign commerce. Before looking at deeper forces operating below the surface of current transactions, we should note the first effects of a devaluation of 30.5 percent on, for example, British trade with countries like the United States whose currencies have not been devalued. If, and where, dollar and sterling prices remain unchanged, British
goods as delivered are of course 30.5 percent cheaper in terms of dollars; and, at that rate, 43.9 percent more of British goods and services would have to be sold to earn the same number of dollars as before. That means that very nearly half as much again of British effort would be required to earn a given number of dollars — to get back to scratch, so to speak, without making any further progress in the earning of more dollars.

Also, to attain a reduction in price fully equivalent to the percentage by which the exchange rate has been lowered, costs including wage costs must not rise; although devaluation is bound to increase the cost of any imported raw materials used and to raise in some measure the cost of living and therefore strengthen the demand for higher wages. Of course in practice dollar and sterling prices will not remain the same in all cases after devaluation. Some dollar goods will fall in price; some sterling prices of articles exported to dollar countries will rise. On the other hand, even when the British manufacturer offers the same sterling price, later costs of salesmanship and so on will reduce the initial advantage. Moreover, it must be expected that when productive capacity is converted, or goods switched from the market at home, there will be some frictional loss. The net result of these qualifications is that the American customer will not, in general, get as great a reduction as 30.5 percent, and his inducement to buy more will be correspondingly less; and the increase in the volume of British goods required to earn as many dollars as before will not be as great as 43.9 percent. All this means only that, for both good and ill, the devaluation will not be fully effective. No one can estimate precisely the actual consequences; but the starting point of any attempt to do so must obviously be an analysis of the full effects of devaluation, in the absence of special factors which may reduce or offset it.

The effect on the trading relations of other countries which have devalued with the dollar countries will, in principle, be the same. Between each other (where the rate of devaluation has been the same, as in most cases it has been), the terms of trade will of course be unaffected.

What, then, is likely to be the result? I should guess that British exports to Canada (which has lowered her rate by only 9 percent) will increase very greatly, so much indeed as to earn substantially more Canadian dollars in spite of the extra volume required to earn as many. The devaluation will also add an ordinary eco-
nomic incentive to reënforce governmental limitations of dollar imports, and give a stronger impulse to the search for substitutes elsewhere. All devaluing countries should similarly be able to increase their exports substantially to hard-currency countries. Britain should, for example, be able to sell much more to Venezuela and Iran. The prospects of a sufficient increase in the sales to the United States itself are perhaps more doubtful. A small proportion of the vast domestic market in America would make all the difference to the non-dollar countries. But it will take a great effort to pass far beyond the point at which even the same dollars as before are earned with the increased volume now required. Much depends on the United States tariffs; and it must not be forgotten that, from the point of view of the American manufacturer who finds the increased competition of foreign goods inconvenient, these goods are coming in with the double advantage of lower wage-rates and what he will regard as "exchange dumping." It is true, as is argued below, that the free entry of foreign goods, even on this basis, is to the advantage of the American economy as a whole; and the Administration in Washington doubtless recognizes this. But the political difficulty of giving full effect to pure economic doctrine in these circumstances must be recognized.

Meantime the devaluing countries will have equal difficulty in enforcing the policy required for them to take full advantage of the export opportunity offered by devaluation. Internal prices both of imported foods and of raw materials required for the manufacture of both goods consumed at home and sold abroad must rise. If the effect on the standard of living were allowed to lead to wage inflation all the initial advantages might be lost. The elimination of internal inflation by measures of economy, both public and private, is essential. One of the most serious consequences of the devaluation is that it introduces a new and serious form of inflation. Professor John H. Williams was able to point out, in his article in the October issue of this review, that the "peak of the postwar inflation has been passed." ¹ But the large increase in the volume of exports required to earn the same dollars at the new exchange rates, still more to increase those earnings, must result in the withdrawal of goods from the home markets (whether they have hitherto been made at home or im-

ported from other "deficit" countries). No similarly automatic reduction of the public's spending power results, and the new inflation can be checked only by deliberate new measures of enforced economy. The British Government has introduced a program of economies, including capital and current expenditure, both public and private, amounting to something over £250,000,000. That is a very substantial total, but in the nature of the case the economies will come into operation more slowly than the inflation they are required to counter; and it is generally believed that much more will be required. The same problem confronts all the devaluing countries and will in every case be difficult.

Of course to the extent to which production per man can be increased by greater effort or improved technique, inflation will be reduced without corresponding reduction of purchasing power; and, as we shall see, any satisfactory solution must include measures to secure this. In the case of Great Britain there might be one other alleviation. Early in this year Britain's current foreign trade was in "over-all" balance. But a part of the exports which contributed to this consisted of "unrequited" exports paid for out of the so-called "sterling balances." These were balances acquired by other countries, especially India and Egypt, by the provision of goods and services during the war. They amount to over 3 billion pounds, and though the drawings on them have been controlled, the amounts released annually have recently been at the rate of some hundreds of million pounds. These obligations were of course incurred by Britain in large measure for the purpose of waging a war in which the creditors were also interested. There is, therefore, some moral claim for a suitable combination of funding, scaling down and control of the rate of release. Moreover, it would be against the interest of the owners of the balances that the British economy and sterling should be further weakened. Nevertheless, when full allowance is made for these considerations, the owners still have a moral as well as a legal claim to draw substantially on the balances, and an urgent need to do so for immediate necessities. The releases agreed to by the British Government have been those considered necessary on grounds of justice and political expediency. The Government has announced that, in the present crisis, it will now be compelled to exercise a tighter control of these balances.

It is possible that America might play a useful part in any settlement. At the time of the American loan to Britain, the
United States Government urged strongly that these balances (which were and are still weighing heavily on the British economy) should be strictly controlled. I have always thought it regrettable that America was not asked at that time to convene a conference to consider the general question of outstanding war obligations (other than those of the enemy countries) — a conference over which she would have presided with the immense prestige of her own lend-lease. No comparable arrangement could indeed have been expected in the case of the sterling balances, many of which represented purchases not directly required for the war. But a reasonably satisfactory settlement might well have been achieved. Perhaps, in a somewhat different form, America could still help in a solution. Indeed, she is in some measure contributing to it by some of the loans now being made to India by the International Bank (whose resources are mainly American) and by the aid now projected under President Truman’s “fourth point” to underdeveloped countries.

This description of Britain’s economy under the impact of devaluation may be a suitable introduction for a wider survey, because many of the factors discussed apply also in the case of other “deficit” countries, and because Britain and her sterling form the basis of so much of the trade which is actually taking place between these countries and which is supplying so many necessities to each. It is time now, however, to extend our vision over a wider range of countries and economic developments.

II

Devaluation is a dramatic reminder of what has been the principal failure of the Allied belligerents in Europe in their efforts to restore their economies after the war. They have not, as the drain on the reserves has shown, succeeded in balancing their accounts with the dollar world, even with Marshall Aid. Still less have they achieved such progress as to make it likely that they will do so when that aid comes to an end. Failure in this respect must not, however, be allowed to obscure their remarkable achievement in other respects. A recent U.N. bulletin gives an index of industrial production which shows, both for the United Kingdom and for belligerent Europe as a whole, excluding Russia and Germany, an increase of about 20 percent in the first half of 1949 as compared with 1938. This represents a more rapid recovery than after the first war in spite of the greater
devastation and the present division between west and east. Mr. Hoffman had reason to congratulate the countries of O.E.E.C., in his address to that body on October 31, on the "truly amazing progress in restoring industrial and agricultural production." This economic progress has, moreover, been accompanied by a steady political improvement in Western Europe since February 1948.

It is much, but it is not enough. More production, more inter-European trade, and more economical manufacture of the goods that have to be exported in return for dollar imports are all required. Some of this will depend upon more effective incentives to increased enterprise and effort. Much will depend on international arrangements. Mr. Hoffman, in the same address, said that the two major tasks were to balance Europe's dollar accounts, and, second, to "move ahead on a far-reaching program to build in Western Europe a more dynamic, expanding program — nothing less than an integration of the Western European economy." He asked for a concerted program early in 1950. It is notorious that O.E.E.C.'s work in this respect has been disappointing, especially to American observers. It is also obvious that this is a very critical stage in the Marshall policy. Funds are now being devoted to capital installations, and so far as these are related to existing national economies and not to a plan designed to achieve greater integration, they will prove additional obstacles to progress in the future. Renewed efforts are now being made to promote more inter-European trade and to enable the countries of Western Europe to supply more of each other's necessities. It is to be hoped that greater success will now be achieved than in the past, but if the American people are not to feel seriously disappointed with the new program (even to the point of endangering the future instalments of Marshall Aid) it is important that they should realize the immense difficulties of a comprehensive and complete economic union. The advantages of a single market like that provided by some 150,000,000 in the United States are of course immense, as American experience has demonstrated. But federation there was facilitated by homogeneity in race, tradition and language, and the economic adjustments resulting from free competition were made easier by the fact that workers displaced in one area could migrate to another. No similar opportunities are available in Europe, and a displaced migrant has to find his way through a network of security regulations enforced to ex-
include the politically doubtful as well as for other reasons. Moreover, a customs or currency union is scarcely possible in any complete form without a form of political union to which the resistances of national sovereignties and national loyalties are still very strong. These obstacles are probably too great, in spite of the powerful impetus given by the present situation, for union to be complete within any near future. Some intermediate system is all that can be hoped for. An increase in the goods allowed to pass freely without "quota" restrictions; reduction without abolition of tariffs and other impediments; a general plan for locating major industrial and power plants, with little regard for frontiers, and its assistance by the conditional allocation of Marshall funds; the extension of the sterling area (with reinforcement of reserves), with free inter-convertibility of currencies and their conditional convertibility into dollars; an embryonic common government (short of federation) in the shape of a strengthened O.E.E.C., for the purpose of securing reasonable similarity of domestic policies and of economy in dollar expenditure — these may together form the outline of a practicable system. It would prepare the way for a more complete union not immediately possible. No short-cut by free convertibility or unrestricted multilateralism or complete customs or currency union is likely to be possible. Progress along one line will depend on simultaneous progress along the others. If as much as is suggested above is achieved, it would be unfair and unwise to regard it as disappointing.

Apart from any arrangements between them, the Marshall countries all have in varying degree the same task as that described for Britain — the elimination of inflation and the increase of economical production. What has happened broadly is that, in consequence of world shortages and the weakness of national currencies caused by the general trade disequilibrium, each country has controlled external trade and currency movements. Bilateral trade agreements, inflationary conditions and currency restrictions have combined to form a market or markets sheltered from the full impact of world competition in which trade has developed on the basis of relatively high costs and prices. This mattered little while everything was less important than increased production. It mattered comparatively little so long as there was a sellers' market throughout the world. But a minor and short-lived American recession last spring and the arrival of the
inevitable buyers' market quickly revealed the underlying weakness and the reserves fell rapidly. Hence the devaluation crisis, and the need for the renewed efforts to encourage more exports to dollar markets under conditions of keen competition. So long as easy profits and sheltered markets are available, under inflationary conditions, either at home or in other soft currency countries, there will be no sufficient compelling force to secure the transfer of enterprise and the redevelopment of labor to the export drive. Hence the necessity for disinflation, as the prior condition of an increased effort to export, to avert the danger of losing the new opportunity offered by devaluation and the threat of even lower exchange rates.

III

The more we consider the magnitude of the task of adjustment, on the new terms of trade now set by devaluation, the more plainly we see that no satisfactory solution can be found solely in terms of enforced economies and austerity. Disinflation and "income freezing" are only an indispensable stage in preparing the way for a new creative effort to produce more and more economically. The provision of adequate incentives for this purpose of course raises the main issues between the two major political parties in Great Britain, and indeed between the policies and political philosophy of the present British Government and those of Western European countries as well as the United States. But it is perhaps true to say that there is a growing recognition in Britain as elsewhere that policy must be directed more to increasing the ordinary economic motives of conditional profit and loss, of varying wage rates; otherwise the necessary redeployment of labor on a sufficient scale to the essential industries and the increase in man-year production in those industries will be impossible. Such penal enforcement as is possible in a free society cannot be sufficient unless it is reinforced to a greater extent than at present by the pervasive and intimate compulsions of personal gain and loss. Social progress, as the great Cambridge economist Marshall remarked long ago, depends on harnessing to it not only the highest but also the strongest forces of human nature. Patriotic appeals and personal economic inducements are of course both in operation, and will continue to be; but the proportions need to be changed in favor of the latter. Too often, under inflationary conditions, economic incentives have tended to keep
enterprise and labor in less essential work rather than to secure
the transfer and redeployment required. They must be the ally
instead of the enemy of public policy. The provision of the ap-
propriate incentives of course depends partly upon government
policy, partly upon the trade unions and managements rearr-
ranging wage rates, after the first disinflationary wage freezing,
so as to give a greater reward for increased effort and transfer
to the most important work. The problems raised are too complex
and controversial for adequate discussion in this article. But the
recognition of the need for new disinflationary measures suggests
a movement in the right direction.

IV

The extent of the "dollar gap" can be conveniently seen by con-
trasting the United States balance of payments in the last com-
pleted year for which accounts are available, 1948, with the posi-
tion a decade earlier. In the years 1936-8 the United States ex-
ported $4.1 billion of goods and services, and imported $3.6 bil-
lion (including investment income in both cases), leaving only a
half billion for adjustments through capital operations and gold
movements. In 1948 the corresponding totals are $16.8 billion
and $10.3 billion, leaving a surplus of no less than $6.5. This had
to be abridged by the United States Government aid — $4.6 bil-
lion (mainly "Marshall") — by some advances by the Inter-
national Bank and Fund — and for the rest from the reserves of
non-dollar countries. This situation was aggravated — to an ex-
tent which cannot be exactly measured by available statistics —
by the minor recession last spring which precipitated, though it
cannot be said to have caused, the actual crisis.

Last winter O.E.E.C.'s "Interim Report" suggested that as
events were then developing, and without "drastic changes of
policy," there was the likelihood of a deficit of $2 to $3 billion
when Marshall Aid came to an end in 1952. Subsequent develop-
ments do not suggest that such an estimate would be too pessi-
mistic.

What will happen if nothing effective is done to improve the
position in the meantime? Since the logic of the balance of pay-
ments is inexorable, and the plus and minus items (including
capital movements) of every country are necessarily in balance
at every moment, the question is, what will be the resulting level
and pattern of international trade? Policy can only influence the
proportions of the constituent items, and so far as deficit countries cannot export goods and import capital on a sufficient scale, they will necessarily lose imports from the surplus countries. A lowering of the whole level of dollar trade of course involves loss to both seller and buyer, perhaps sufficient to cause or aggravate a depression for the first and to cause disastrous impoverishment to the second.

The penalty of failing to increase dollar earnings enough to prevent a great further reduction of imports from the dollar countries would indeed be very great. It would reduce not only food standards but also the rate of mechanization on which increased productive efficiency depends. Above all, it would probably result in such a loss of raw materials as would prevent factories running to full capacity, and so start a downward spiral. This would also cause large-scale unemployment. And it is important to realize that this would be a form of unemployment which the remedial measures associated with Lord Keynes could not relieve but would only aggravate. Those measures were designed to increase an inadequate home demand. They could do nothing to reduce the unemployment resulting from an inadequacy of imported raw materials. Indeed, they would add to the evil by causing new inflation and increasing the costs of exportable goods.

To the extent that there is a net export of capital from surplus countries (in the form of loans, investments or gifts), whether to the deficit countries direct or to others to which they can export, the change in the level of exports and imports, otherwise inevitable and painful to all concerned, is of course reduced. It is therefore natural and altogether a good thing that active efforts are being made to stimulate the export of American capital through the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank and the projects contained in the President's "fourth point." These all dispose of money either provided by the American taxpayer or raised by public loans carrying a United States guarantee. In each case, however, the intention is, by providing funds in this way, to pave the way for genuine private investment; and a President's Committee is specially charged with the duty of finding ways to encourage the American businessman to invest his money abroad.

How far is it reasonable to hope that the gap will be bridged
in this way when Marshall Aid comes to an end? Undoubtedly much can be done. The two Banks are already lending money on a not inconsiderable scale. By financing projects in underdeveloped countries which will either save or earn dollars, and by expanding basic utilities, such as transport and power installations, they are improving the conditions required for the kind of enterprise which may be attractive to private investors.

But what is the order of magnitude to be expected? Obviously this depends upon the opportunities for productive and reasonably safe investment and upon the extent to which private investment can be attracted. A recent study prepared for the National Association of Manufacturers has estimated that something like $2 billion of American capital a year might be available for foreign investment. If there were in fact annual investment on anything like this scale the gap might be closed without disastrous changes in the level of imports and exports.

But it would be misleading to count upon any such figure in the years immediately ahead. The limiting factor is not the amount of capital theoretically available for export but the discovery of sound and attractive projects. The International Bank has already found this in seeking outlets for the comparatively modest resources now at its disposal. Sound foreign investment requires a combination of economic opportunities for development and of political conditions which give an assurance that these opportunities will not be destroyed by administrative incompetence, confiscatory policies or armed strife. The regions of the world in which both conditions are satisfied are not very numerous at the present time. On purely economic criteria there may be opportunities for far-reaching development in China and Russia, for example, but obviously the political conditions in those countries makes them impossible for American capital investment. The same is true, in varying degrees, of many other countries in every continent. There is indeed one category, the "colonial" areas, especially in Africa, where the political condition may be satisfied. The International Bank is now negotiating loans to these areas on a modest scale, with the metropolitan countries; and what it is doing there may ultimately prove of great importance in paving the way for private investment on a much larger scale. One of the obstacles to the private foreign investment in such areas is that arrangements have to be made with the metropolitan country to ensure reasonable security for the
investor, while the native is protected from exploitation. If successive groups of private investors have to negotiate separately one after the other this may well prove an insuperable obstacle to otherwise promising projects. But if the International Bank negotiates, in connection with its own modest loans, a suitable general framework of protective rules, this might then be available for later private enterprises. Nevertheless, the possibilities of rapid and remunerative colonial development are often greatly exaggerated. We must remember, too, that if the capital development does not result in extra dollar-saving and dollar-earning equal to the return on the loans or the investment, then the "dollar shortage," though relieved for the time being, will soon actually be increased.

Moreover, there are now very formidable difficulties in attracting American private capital to foreign investment. The investor remembers the disastrous fate of the loans of the 1924–8 period. He has opportunities for a higher yield on his capital in good domestic securities than foreign investment can usually promise him with any certainty. And it is usually difficult or impossible for him to be assured that his profits will not be reduced, to an unknown extent, by taxation, or be inconvertible into his own currency — even if there is no actual confiscation of the capital plant itself. Perhaps the investor may be tempted to take some risk if some form of governmental guarantee relieves him of part of it. But private foreign investment on any very great scale is still remote and hypothetical. Perhaps the principal forms it will continue to take for some time are in the establishment abroad of subsidiaries of American industries, or the purchase of equities in foreign companies.

Devaluation may offer an opportunity for some narrowing of the "gap" by increasing exports to dollar countries. But at the best it is surely indisputable that no American loans and investments — governmental, semi-governmental or private — will even approach in magnitude the increase in the gap which must follow the termination of Marshall Aid.

One very important conclusion results. It remains true, as I argued in the article I wrote for this review before devaluation, that for as many years ahead as we can reasonably foresee, there will be a dollar disequilibrium in the sense that America will wish to sell, and non-dollar countries wish (and need) to buy,

much more than they can pay for with the dollars available to them either from earnings or the net import of capital.

Since the logic of the balance of payments is inexorable, it follows necessarily that everything that America does to reduce foreigners' earnings will reduce pro tanto the total value of American exports. We commonly hear it said that "if America wishes to sell, she must buy." This formula is inaccurate if it means that she must buy as much as she sells, since the export of capital may cover a part of the gap. If it means less than this it is not sufficiently precise to exercise a compelling influence on policy. But if there is to be a continuing "disequilibrium" in the sense just defined — and no responsible person will, I think, dispute this — a much more useful formula results. America's exports will be determined to a dollar by her foreign customers' dollar resources. Thus the extent to which United States Governmental action reduces foreigners' earnings, American exports will be reduced by exactly the same amount. If a tariff prevents foreigners from earning \( x \) dollars which they would otherwise have earned, the total value of American exports will be \( x \) dollars less than it would otherwise have been. If a subsidy is given to shipping or shipbuilding which reduces foreigners' earnings by \( y \) dollars, other American exports will suffer to the extent of exactly \( y \) dollars.³ If insistence on "nondiscrimination" prevents two deficit countries from making preferential arrangements with each other which are not extended to surplus countries, the effect must be that the advantage to some American exporters is offset by exactly equal disadvantage to others. "Nondiscrimination" is not beneficial to a surplus country, so long as there is a dollar disequilibrium. Insistence on it (as Professor John H. Williams pointed out) merely impedes the removal of the disequilibrium. And the removal of that disequilibrium is the prior condition of fruitful "nondiscrimination," genuinely multilateral trade and convertibility. In all the cases I have mentioned, governmental action to help one class of industries brings no advantage to the American economy as a whole — and leaves a net loss where there is a subsidy paid by the taxpayer.

From what has been said it follows that the maintenance of the highest level of international trade depends upon the observance

³I am not arguing the general question of shipping subsidies, into which of course certain noneconomic considerations enter, such as the "security" reason for maintaining a mercantile fleet available in case of war; I am pointing out only the purely economic effects.
of appropriate principles of conduct by "surplus" (or creditor) and "deficit" (or debtor) countries respectively.

Nor is it difficult to see what these principles are. For "deficit" countries they are indicated in the description of Britain's problem. Such countries need to eliminate inflation, to produce enough at prices which can compete advantageously, and on a sufficient scale, at least in neutral hard currency markets. A policy designed to secure this is demonstrably in the interest of the country itself; but it involves immediate sacrifice for the sake of a greater advantage later and is therefore politically difficult. Such countries must also restrict to a minimum their export of capital and encourage capital imports. So long as there is a serious dollar disequilibrium, deficit countries may also help to reduce it by preferential arrangements inter se.

For surplus countries the appropriate policy is, in terms of purely economic doctrine, equally clear. They would encourage the maximum of sound foreign investment and of foreign imports (even when made by lower-paid labor and helped by devaluation); and they would acquiesce in preferential arrangements between deficit countries — arrangements which cannot inflict any net damage to the general economy of the surplus countries so long as the disequilibrium remains. Once the deficit countries have made their goods competitive in general world markets, where the domestic tariffs of the principal surplus country give its exporters no advantage, it is reasonable to regard the responsibility of securing a satisfactory adjustment as resting on the surplus country itself. That was the idea underlying Lord Keynes' "bancor" scheme, proposed but not accepted in connection with the Bretton Woods negotiations. Its principles perhaps merit some reconsideration now. For a surplus country, as for one in deficit, the appropriate policy is demonstrably in the interest of its own economy as well as in the general world interest. But it involves loss to particular industries, which can reasonably claim that they are suffering from unfair competition, though this loss is offset by the gain to other, exporting, industries. The full application of the policy is again therefore politically difficult.

I may perhaps set down one general reflection. To achieve the highest level of foreign trade, a surplus country and a deficit country must each pursue a different policy. Each will be difficult in terms of internal politics. The difficulty does not result from a conflict of national interest; for the policy which would
benefit the world as a whole would benefit the country itself. Nor
does it result from a conflict of interest between classes — be-
tween rich and poor, or management and labor. In the case of
surplus countries the conflict is between industries which look to
the home market and to foreign markets. In the case of deficit
countries it is a conflict between immediate and later advantage.

It is natural to compare, somewhat nostalgically, America's
surplus position with that of Britain a little more than half a
century ago. Britain then followed the policy ideally appropriate
to a surplus country — free imports without tariff impediments
and new foreign investment absorbing the whole of any surplus
of earnings from exports and earlier foreign investments. There
was then no "sterling gap" as there is now a "dollar gap." But it
was immensely easier then for Britain to pursue the policy ap-
propriate to a surplus country than it is now for America. Her
trade with her foreign customers was essentially complementary
rather than competitive. Moreover, political conditions in the
world were then much more favorable for productive and reason-
ably safe foreign investment. In contrast, America (with com-
paratively small exceptions) produces and makes all she needs —
and in terms of manpower as economically as foreign countries,
or even more economically; and the obstacles to sound foreign
investment on an adequate scale are much greater.

None of this changes the character of the policy which would
be most beneficial to America as a "surplus" country as well as
to the rest of the world. But in any forecast of the failure we must
recognize that the political difficulties of a full adoption of this
policy are much greater.

An examination of the difficulties which arise from the dollar
disequilibrium, and impede its removal, may easily lead to an
unduly pessimistic view of the future. There has indeed been,
as Professor Williams has pointed out, a great structural change
in the whole international position of Western Europe in relation
to other continents — a change dating from the early years of this
century but accelerated and aggravated by the two wars. Its rela-
tive position in the world is, and will be, different. The pattern of
international trade is changing, and must change, rapidly and
on a large scale; and the losses and hardships of readjustment
are very great. But as older opportunities are lost others will ap-
pear. The recovery in production in all the belligerent countries
has been rapid and remarkable. If the political dangers of Com-
munitistic aggression within and without can be mastered — a problem outside the scope of this article — the constant improvements in mechanization and the technique of production will soon offset the losses of war devastation and postwar dislocation. Foreign trade may not reach the highest level which would be possible if all countries pursued the policies ideally appropriate to their position; the return to multilateralism, to political conditions which give the maximum incentive to efficient production, to free convertibility of currencies, will be slow and painful. But the goal is agreed and progress is being made towards it.

It is not unlikely that the close of the period of Marshall Aid will bring a temporary decline in the standard of living to millions of families. But the skill and industry of the European countries that were belligerent remain; the methods of production at their disposal are continually improving; their recuperative powers, though restricted by political difficulties, have already been demonstrated. A period of shortages, austerities and restriction, a long-drawn-out struggle to regain standards of living in the face of frustrating circumstances, do not easily evoke an intensity of effort like the dramatic crises of a war. But as the necessity becomes more evident, as it is likely to do in the daily life of every family in the course of the next year, a response similar to what we witnessed in the war may be expected.

If I may conclude by referring again to my own country, Hitler entertained the same illusion as had obsessed William II a quarter of a century before — that Britain was decadent. Our friends have sometimes made the same mistake. The British people (and not they alone) are slow to recognize ugly facts till they are hit in the face; but when they are they react with energy, courage and determination. In the next few years these qualities will be needed, and they are likely to be evoked as they were in 1940. Britain and the countries of Europe will not achieve the same relative position in the world as in the last century. But the steady and unceasing benefits of improving industrial technique give them an assurance that, if war is averted, our standards of living can be raised, if not relatively to those of other countries, at least absolutely. And individual human happiness after all depends more on absolute than relative standards.
URING the heavy fighting which took place on the Eastern Front in 1915 a regiment of Russian cavalry overran some Austrian trenches, killing or capturing their occupants. Amongst those taken prisoner was a non-commissioned officer named Brož, the son of a peasant from Kumrovac in Croatia, then aged twenty-three. It was thus that on the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution two years later Josip Brož, later to become famous as Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, found himself a prisoner of war in Russia. Having escaped from prison, Brož joined the Bolsheviks and spent the next two or three years fighting on their side in the civil war in Siberia and Central Asia.

The experiences of these years not unnaturally made a profound impression on the young Croat. In Russia he found something that he had hitherto lacked: a cause which commanded his devotion and loyalty. To him, a member of an underprivileged Slav minority, the Hapsburgs and their crumbling Empire meant nothing; nor had his early experiences as an industrial worker in Zagreb and elsewhere left him with any great liking for the capitalist system as he knew it. In the Russians he now found fellow Slavs, talking a language so closely akin to his own that he could soon speak it fluently, while the historic events in which, by chance as much as anything, he had become involved, seemed to provide the answer to many of his early doubts and questionings. He married a Russian woman, and when he returned home in 1920 it was as an enthusiastic supporter of the new ideas and a loyal servant of the recently formed Communist International. His wife and his infant son Zharko stayed behind in Russia.

Much had happened in southeastern Europe in the five or six years which Josip Brož had spent abroad. The Hapsburg Empire had ceased to exist, and he now found himself a citizen of the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, shortly to be renamed Yugoslavia. But the new state and the new order to which he came back were no more to his liking than the old had been. Resuming his old calling of metal worker, he soon made his mark in the trade-union movement by his energy as a strike leader and agitator, and before long rose to be Secretary of the Metal Workers' Union. In 1922, he was also made Secretary
of the Zagreb Branch of the newly founded Jugoslav Communist Party.

It was not long before these activities brought Broz into conflict with the authorities. Soon after its foundation, the Jugoslav Communist Party had been declared illegal. After being arrested several times and serving various short terms of imprisonment, he was in November 1928 condemned to five years' hard labor. From the account of his trial published in the press at that time, it appears that he conducted his own defense with characteristic defiance and vigor, openly attacking the régime and turning the dock into a platform for Communist propaganda.

His term of imprisonment was served at Maribor in Slovenia, at Lepoglava in Croatia, and at Sremska Mitrovica. Up to now he had led a life of action. In prison he had the time to read extensively and was able to continue and complete the modest early education which he had received at the village school at Kumrovec by reading numerous works on political and economic subjects. He was also able to keep in touch with other members of the Party. At Sremska Mitrovica, one of his fellow prisoners was Moshe Pijade, a Belgrade intellectual well versed in the theory of Marxism, today one of the two or three high priests of "Titoism." Pijade spent a great part of the years between the wars in jail, working out his revolutionary theories and spreading them amongst his fellow prisoners, for whom, to quote one of them, prison became a kind of Marxist University. A snapshot taken at the time shows Broz and Pijade in jail at Sremska Mitrovica in 1931: Broz alert and lively looking, Pijade gazing owl-like through his spectacles, his thoughts far away in the realms of dialectical materialism.

On his release from prison in 1934, Broz was made a member of the Central Committee of the Jugoslav Communist Party, and left for Vienna, where the Jugoslav Party at that time had its headquarters. Thence he was sent to Moscow to take a course in Marxism at the Lenin University, and thus plunge himself anew in the cleansing waters of ideological orthodoxy. But he remained a man of action rather than a theorist. After leaving Moscow, his life became that of a high-level agent of the Communist International: false names, forged papers, hairbreadth escapes from the police of half a dozen countries. Two anecdotes he tells show the kind of existence he led at this time.

1 Jutarni List, November 8 and 10, 1928.
On one illicit journey he travelled by way of Denmark, using a British passport. A Danish policeman, speaking fluent English, called on him to give some account of himself. He managed to get out a few words of broken English in reply. But the policeman was not taken in. Fortunately for Brož, he happened to be an easygoing fellow of left wing sympathies. “Next time you are travelling on a false passport,” he said with a wink, “choose a country whose language you speak.” Another time he was travelling from France to Germany. In Paris he had been given a fresh set of forged documents. But the last few days had been tiring and soon after taking his seat in the train he fell heavily asleep. He was wakened by a German frontier guard shaking him and asking his name. Only then did he realize that in the hurry of his departure he had not looked at his new passport and did not know what name it bore. By feigning ignorance of the German language he gained time to glance surreptitiously at his passport and thus find the answer to the Nazi official’s question.

In 1936, after the outbreak of the civil war in Spain, he was entrusted with the important task of organizing the secret channels by which foreign volunteers reached the Republican forces. His headquarters were in Paris, where he came into contact with many of the men who were later to serve with him in the mountains of Jugoslavja and who were now on their way to serve their guerrilla apprenticeship in Spain: Bebler, Popovich, Dapchevich and many others.

In all the tasks entrusted to him, Josip Brož had shown himself reliable, resourceful, a good organizer, and above all strictly orthodox. In 1937 he received his reward. For some time past the Jugoslav Communist Party had been in a bad way. The energetic measures of the active and vigilant police made life increasingly difficult for those of its members who remained inside Jugoslavja, while the absence of the Central Committee of the Party in Vienna had a demoralizing effect. Worst of all, the Party had fallen into grievous heresies — deviations to left and right, Trotskyism and Bukharinism.

In 1937, the year of the great purge, Corkich, the Secretary General, was expelled from the Party by a decision of the Comintern, and Josip Brož was appointed in his place. He was given the special task of reorganizing the Party, purging it of unreliable elements and bringing it back into line.

The new Secretary General’s first move was characteristic and,
in the light of subsequent events, highly significant. He at once returned illegally to Jugoslavia, taking the rest of the Central Committee with him. A Jugoslav Communist who was in Belgrade at the time has described to me the amazement and delight of the rank and file on finding that all the Party leaders were actually with them in the country, sharing their dangers and directing their activities. The days of remote control were past. For the next year or so Brož remained in Jugoslavia, ruthlessly purging the Party of undesirable elements, reorganizing the Party machine, infusing a new spirit into its members.

In 1939, he visited Moscow to report and obtain fresh directives. With war threatening and the police everywhere on the lookout for illicit travellers, the trip was dangerous. In the end he returned safely, having travelled home by Constantinople and thence by British ship to Salonika. Amongst those who anxiously awaited his return was Herta, a young Slovene girl, who had become his second wife. Not long afterwards a baby was born to them, another son, Misha.

Henceforward, Brož remained in Jugoslavia. In his underground army he made new appointments, allotted new tasks and established a new discipline. He would send for people and tell them what to do. “You,” he said, “will do this; and you, this” — in Serbo-Croat, “Ti, to; ti, to”. He did this so often that his friends began to call him “Tito.” The name stuck and grew to be more than a nickname.

Towards the end of 1940 the Jugoslav Communist Party held their Fifth Congress, which was attended by over a hundred delegates who had come together secretly from all over the country. After it was over, Brož (or “Walter” as he was known at this time in Comintern circles) sent from Belgrade a message to Dimitrov, then Secretary General of the Comintern in Moscow, reporting that “complete unanimity” had been achieved. The purge had had its effect; the new broom had swept clean.

Meanwhile the unmistakable German threat to the Balkans was bound to cause some uneasiness in Moscow, despite the Soviet-German Pact. The pundits of the Kremlin still refused to believe in the stories of an impending German attack on the Soviet Union, but they could nevertheless scarcely regard with pleasure the prospect of an extension of Hitler’s rule to the Slav countries of the Balkans, historically a Russian preserve. Elsewhere, Communists continued to denounce the struggle of Great
Britain and her allies against Nazi Germany as the "Second Imperialist War." In Jugoslavia the Communist Party, still underground, seem to have received different instructions from those sent to Communists in most other countries, instructions which were not altogether in accordance with the spirit of the Soviet-German Pact.2

In March 1941 when the Regent, Prince Paul, and the Cvetkovich Government sought to come to terms with the Germans, they were swept from power and replaced by the young King Peter and General Simovich. The German invasion ensued. Even before Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union had turned the "Second Imperialist War" into the "Heroic Struggle of Democracy against Fascism," Tito and the Jugoslav Communists started to prepare for active resistance to the invader. By the summer of 1941 the first Partisan detachments were operating in Serbia and elsewhere under Tito's command. They consisted of small groups of determined men and women who had taken to the hills and forests, armed with cudgels and axes, old sporting guns and anything else they could lay hands on. For all further supplies they depended on what they could capture from the enemy and what the country people would give them.

II

At first, Tito conducted operations from Belgrade, whither he had moved from Zagreb in May 1941. His distinguished appearance and natural easy manner made it simple for him to pass as a member of the bourgeoisie. He became Engineer Babich, a well dressed, well fed and generally respected citizen, travelling up and down the country—by air as often as not—under the very noses of the police. In Belgrade under the German occupation he lived in a comfortable villa on the outskirts of the city, situated, by a strange coincidence, almost opposite the house which he occupies today. He also spent much time in the house of Vlado Ribnikar, a prosperous Belgrade newspaper owner who was secretly a member of the Communist Party. Those who met him in Madame Ribnikar's salon recall the fashionable appearance and charming manners of this new recruit to Belgrade society.

Despite the German occupation, the capital for a time pos-

2 As early as the summer of 1940, after the fall of France, British intelligence officers, in search of potential elements of resistance in case of a German invasion of Jugoslavia, had been surprised to find the Jugoslav Communists ready to cooperate with them. They had the same experience elsewhere in the Balkans.
sessed numerous advantages as a site for the secret headquarters of the Communists. But, as the Gestapo's hold on the city tightened, existence there became more and more precarious. "Marko" Ranković, one of Tito's principal lieutenants, was arrested by the Gestapo and saved from execution only by a daring raid on the prison in which he was confined. At the beginning of September, Tito decided that the time had come to go into the field. With the help of an Orthodox priest, Father Miliutinovich, he was smuggled out of Belgrade, and a few hours later reached a Partisan detachment that was operating near Valjevo in Central Serbia. His career as a guerrilla leader had begun. From now onwards he was to be constantly with his Partisans in the mountains and forests.

This decision was as important in its way as the decision which he had taken four years earlier when he had brought the Central Committee back to Jugoslavia from Vienna. The advice given by Moscow to Communist Parties in Axis-occupied countries was to organize sabotage and resistance amongst the industrial proletariat in the towns, rather than to attempt widespread guerrilla operations in the country areas. But Tito, characteristically, preferred to strike out on a line of his own, a line that in the long run was deeply to influence the course of events in Eastern Europe.

When the Partisans first entered the field in the summer of 1941 they found another resistance movement already in existence: the Chetniks, formed round a nucleus of officers and men of the Royal Jugoslav Army, under the leadership of Colonel Draža Mihailovich. They were in the early days more numerous and better equipped than the Partisans. But at no time was their discipline so ruthless or their organization so good.

At first Jugoslavia had been dazed by the suddenness of the German attack. Now, when the first shock had passed, there returned to her people the fierce spirit of resistance for which they have been famous throughout history. The rising which took place in Serbia in the summer of 1941 was essentially a national rising. In it Partisan and Chetnik bands fought side by side. It was astonishingly successful. The Germans were taken by surprise. Large areas of the country were liberated, the peasants flocking to join the resistance. A unified command and a united effort against the invader seemed possible, indeed probable.

It was in these circumstances that a meeting took place be-
between Tito and Mihailovich. Tito himself has described to me the scene in the peasant's hut in the Ravna Gora. Both parties were very much on their guard — he himself, for so many years wanted by the Royal police, feeling it strange that he should be dealing on equal terms with a representative of the Royal Government; Mihailovich, very much the professional staff officer, not knowing what to make of this Communist agitator turned soldier and half believing him to be a Russian; each feeling that the other perhaps had something to offer that was worth having. In the end, some kind of provisional arrangement seems to have been arrived at, though it was not possible to reach full agreement for a unified command.

But this early cooperation was not destined to last. The difference of outlook between the two movements was too great for that. The Partisans were Communists first and patriots second. They were as determined to destroy the old order of things as they were to free their country from the Germans. In the eyes of the Chetniks, these revolutionary tendencies were a menace to all they held most sacred: King, Church and State, while they saw in Tito's presumed allegiance to Moscow an unmistakable threat to Yugoslav independence.

In the fighting that now followed, both Partisans and Chetniks accused the other of treachery, the Partisans claiming, for their part, that the Chetniks had betrayed their positions to the Germans and joined in the German attack on them. Two further meetings between the two leaders led to no better results. Thereafter clash after clash ensued between them. Simultaneously with the war of resistance a civil war was in progress. Henceforward the elimination of its rival and its own accession to power were objectives which neither faction ever let out of sight for one moment.

Meanwhile, the Germans had had time to collect themselves. The necessary forces were assembled, the liberated areas re-occupied, the guerrillas driven off with heavy losses, and savage reprisals undertaken against the civil population. While surviving Partisans and Chetniks licked their wounds in the woods and mountains, the towns and villages were burned and devastated and thousands of hostages, men, women and children, taken out and shot. To this and subsequent disasters Partisans and Chetniks reacted differently. In this difference lies the explanation of much that followed later.

In the eyes of the Chetniks, the results achieved by their
operations could not justify the damage and suffering caused to the civilian population. Their aim was to preserve rather than to destroy. Henceforward they inclined more and more to avoid active operations against the Germans; some, indeed, even arrived at mutually advantageous accommodations with the enemy. It was the beginning of a policy which in the end was to lead to their downfall. The equivocal attitude of the Chetnik leaders lost them the support of many of their own followers. It lost them, in the end, the support of the Allies, though it is only fair to recall that the Allied High Command had itself consistently encouraged them to lie low, avoid casualties and husband their resources.

Meanwhile, with true Communist ruthlessness the Partisans refused to let themselves be deterred by setbacks or reprisals from accomplishing the tasks which they had set themselves. Their own lives were of no account. As for the civilians, they too were in the firing line. The more civilians the Germans shot and the more villages they burned, the more enemy convoys the Partisans ambushed and the more bridges they destroyed. It was a hard policy, but in the end it was justified by results. “In war,” Napoleon once said, “it is not men, but the man who counts.” Of guerrilla warfare this is truer still. Without determined leadership and stern discipline, guerrillas, however brave individually, can achieve little.

The failure of the Chetniks was to some extent due to inadequate leadership. Though a brave man and an experienced soldier, Mihailovich did not possess many of the characteristics necessary in a guerrilla leader. Though personally popular, he was unable to control his subordinates or preserve discipline in his forces. He lacked (and later generations may count it to his credit) the qualities required to weather that “gale of the world” that was to sweep him to destruction, while it carried his rival onwards and upwards to supreme power.

III

When I was dropped in Jugoslavia in 1943, Tito to the outside world was still a shadowy figure. Some said that he was a woman, others a Committee, and others that he did not exist at all.

After a journey through wild mountain country, I reached the ruined castle where the Partisans had their headquarters high
on a hill above the river. A sentry, stepping from the shadows, challenged me, and then, on receiving the password, guided me through the crumbling walls to an open space where a man was sitting under a tree, studying a map by the light of a flickering lamp.

As I entered, Tito came forward to meet me. He was of medium height, clean-shaven, with tanned, rather haggard, regular features and iron-grey hair. He had a very firm mouth and light blue eyes. He was wearing plain dark clothes without badges of rank; a neat spotted tie added the only touch of color. We shook hands and sat down. A Partisan, his Schmeisser sub-machine-gun slung across his back, brought a bottle of plum brandy. Soon we were deep in conversation. His eyes, as we talked, were very alert. A man, clearly, who missed very little. His answers, when I asked him questions or put proposals to him, were clear and to the point.

I was to spend a year and a half with Tito and his Partisans. The war they waged was a strange one. It was savage and bitter. Quarter was neither given nor expected. There was no fixed front. The Partisans kept constantly on the move, attacking the enemy where he least expected it and then fading back into the forests and mountains, denying him as far as possible a firm target at which he could strike back. If they were to succeed against a well armed, well equipped enemy, supported by armor, artillery and aircraft, it was essential that they should retain the initiative themselves and not let it pass into the hands of their opponents; it was essential, too, that they should show themselves no less ruthless than their most ruthless enemy.

Tito brought to the war of resistance against the Germans the same qualities which had already stood him in such good stead up to now: courage, realism, ruthless determination and singleness of purpose, resourcefulness, adaptability and plain common sense. He imposed on the National Resistance Movement the same merciless discipline that he had imposed on the Party and he endowed it with the same oracle: the Party line. He himself stood head and shoulders above his fellows. When there were decisions to be taken, he took them, whether they were political or military — took them calmly and collectedly, however precarious the situation. He himself possessed, and could inspire in others, an absolute devotion to their common cause which led them to count as nothing their own lives or the lives of
others. By throwing together Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and the rest of them in the fight against the common enemy, he caused them to forget their old internecine feuds and thus achieve within the ranks of the movement a new sense of national unity.

Tito's immediate associates were for the most part men with the same background as himself, professional revolutionaries, who had shared his exiles and his imprisonments, helped him to organize workers' cells and promote strikes, run with him the gauntlet of police persecution. Edo Kardelj, the expert Marxist dialectician, was a schoolmaster from Slovenia, small, stocky, pale-skinned, black haired, in his early thirties, with steel-rimmed spectacles and a neat little dark moustache. "Marko" Rankovich was a peasant's son from Serbia, with an air of conspiracy, who, under Tito's supervision, operated the Party machine and its widespread intelligence organization. Djilas, a Montenegrin, was intolerant and good-looking, with a shock of hair like a golliwog. Koca Popovich, small and vital, was the son of a Belgrade millionaire, once a poet and philosopher and now one of the most dashing of Partisan commanders. Nearly all were in their twenties or thirties, an exception being Moshe Pijade, the elderly Jewish intellectual who had been Tito's companion in jail at Sremska Mitrovica and now shared with Kardelj the distinction of being the Party's leading theoretician. Then there were the girls, Olga and Zdenka, who took turns at working for Tito, keeping his maps and his bundles of signals; and his bodyguards, Bosko and Prlja, a formidable pair who never left his side.

Two things struck me about this oddly assorted group over whom Tito presided with an air of amused benevolence. First, was their devotion to the Old Man, as they called him. Secondly, was the fact that all of them, young and old, men and women, intellectuals and artisans, Serbs and Croats, had been with him in the woods from the early days of the resistance, sharing with him hardships and dangers, setbacks and successes. This common experience had overcome all differences of race or class or temperament and forged between them lasting bonds of loyalty and affection.

My own dealings were with Tito himself. From the first I was struck by his readiness to discuss any question on its merits, to take a decision there and then. He seemed perfectly sure of himself; he was a principal, not a subordinate. To find such assur-
ance, such independence in a Communist was for me a new and astonishing experience. There were other unexpected things about Tito. There was his surprisingly broad outlook; his never-failing sense of humor; his unashamed delight in the minor pleasures of life; a natural diffidence in human relationships, giving way to a natural friendliness and conviviality; a violent temper, flaring up in sudden rages; a considerateness and generosity constantly made manifest in small ways; a surprising readiness to see both sides of a question.

These were human qualities, hard to reconcile with the usual conception of a Communist puppet. And yet I knew (and I should have been ill-advised to forget it) that this was a man whose tenets would justify him in going to any lengths of deception or violence to attain his ends, and that these, outside our immediate military objectives, were in all probability diametrically opposed to my own.

One line of approach, I soon found, carried great weight with him: the suggestion, advanced at the psychological moment, that this or that line of conduct did or did not befit an honorable and civilized nation. He likewise reacted equally strongly to anything that, by the widest stretch of the imagination, might be regarded as a slight on the national dignity of Jugoslavia.

He shared this intense national pride with every one of his followers, from the highest to the lowest. For the Partisans, the outside world did not seem of immediate interest or importance. What mattered to them was their war of National Liberation, their struggle against the invader, their victories, their sacrifices. They were proudest of all of the fact that they owed nothing to anyone, that they had got so far without help from outside.

That they had achieved much was undeniable. By 1943 Tito had, without outside help, built up an effective guerrilla force of something like 150,000 Partisans, which was now containing a dozen or more enemy divisions. Each Partisan formation had its own headquarters, and these subordinate headquarters were directly or indirectly responsible to Tito's General Headquarters. In the areas temporarily held by them the Partisans set up a provisional administration, in which the key posts were everywhere held by Party members, and policy was in practice dictated by them. Already one thing seemed abundantly clear: that Tito and his followers would in the long run become the masters of Jugoslavia.

The Germans and Italians had realized, long before the
Allies, that the Partisans constituted a military factor of first-rate importance against which a modern army was in many respects powerless. In three years of war, they launched against them no less than seven full-scale offensives, each employing upwards of ten divisions with supporting arms. Once or twice large forces of Partisans came near to being surrounded and wiped out; Tito himself had more than one narrow escape. But each time they succeeded in extricating themselves, fading away, reappearing elsewhere and attacking the enemy where he least expected it. For the Germans, Jugoslavia became a running sore, a constant drain on resources that were badly needed elsewhere.

In September 1944, after a last unsuccessful offensive against the Partisans, who were by now receiving substantial assistance from the Western Allies, the Germans, heavily attacked by the Partisans and the Allied Air Forces, began to withdraw their forces from Jugoslavia. Meanwhile, a Soviet Army Group under Marshal Tolbukhin was advancing rapidly through Rumania towards the Jugoslav frontier. Tito, who a short time before had met Mr. Churchill at Naples, now flew to Moscow for the purpose, as he put it, of “giving the Red Army his permission to enter Jugoslavia” and of coördinating its operations with those of his own troops. A few weeks later the Red Army swept across the Rumanian frontier into Jugoslavia and, after a fierce battle, entered Belgrade at the same time as the Partisans advancing from the south.

With the fall of Belgrade, the guerrilla phase of the war in Jugoslavia had come to an end. Bitter fighting was still in progress in the north. But the enemy were now in full retreat, and within a few weeks Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Herzegovina and Dalmatia and some areas of Bosnia and Croatia were free. Politically, too, the capture of Belgrade marked the beginning of an entirely new phase. Tito and the members of his National Council were now safely installed in the capital, and it was their business to govern and administer the country instead of stirring up trouble, to quell resistance instead of organizing it.

Tito, for so long an outlaw, now lived in one of the Royal Palaces. He took to his new surroundings like a duck to water. From now onwards his suits and uniforms were made by the best tailor in Belgrade; his shirts came from the most fashionable shirtmaker; he ate the best food and drank the best wine; the
horses he rode were the finest in the country. His official receptions were on the most lavish scale. But it is only fair to say that, amidst all this magnificence, to those of us who had known him before he remained as friendly and as simple in his approach as ever. Indeed there was nothing he liked better than to collect half a dozen friends in a corner of one of the great gilded saloons and there, over a glass of rakija, talk of the days in the mountains and sing the familiar Partisan songs. Sometimes his son Zharko would be there, a tall good-looking young man with blue eyes and a mop of golden hair, back from Russia where he had lost an arm and won a row of medals fighting in the Red Army. And sometimes his younger son, Misha, would be brought in, a cheerful child of four or five, who, with his mother Herta, had somehow been kept out of the clutches of the Gestapo during the war.

At the insistence of Great Britain, contact had already been established between Tito's National Committee and the Royal Jugoslav Government in exile under Dr. Subashich. Negotiations were now opened between the two with a view to the formation of a united government, which the Allies could recognize as the legal government of Jugoslavia. The British Government, with the knowledge and approval of the United States Government, did what it could to overcome King Peter's objections and ensure that agreement was reached between the two parties. In March, 1945, a combined Government was formed under Tito's leadership. All the cards were in Tito's hand and it would have been unlike him not to use them. From the first it was clear that, whatever the terms of the agreement, in reality Dr. Subashich and his friends would play no part in running the country. One after another, they were eliminated from the Government; what remained of a legal opposition was suppressed; the Monarchy declared at an end; and a regular Communist régime set up with all the familiar features—a single party system, state controlled industry and commerce, an increasing measure of collectivization in agriculture, ceaseless propaganda, forced labor, an active and ubiquitous security police. One of the first acts of this régime was to hunt down and "liquidate" General Mihailovich and those of his followers who were still holding out in the mountains.

Now that the war was over and Tito established in power, there remained one all-important question to be settled: the relationship of the new Communist Jugoslavia with the Soviet
Union—the Country of the Revolution. "Much," I had written in a report which I sent to Mr. Churchill from German-occupied Jugoslavia in 1943, "will depend on Tito, and whether he sees himself in his former rôle of Comintern agent or as the potential ruler of an independent Jugoslav State." That, in a nutshell, was the problem which now arose in acute form. To what extent was Tito going to take his orders from Moscow?

His background, of course, was that of a Moscow-trained Communist, a loyal servant of the Communist International. There could be no doubt about that. When he had been made Secretary General of the Jugoslav Communist Party in 1937, it was because he was regarded in Moscow as an absolutely reliable man. But human experience shapes human character. The impact of events on the individual—even the Communist individual—cannot altogether be left out of account. A great deal had happened to Tito since 1937. He had undergone the hazards and hardships of a savage, bitter war—a war fought against a foreign invader for the independence of his country. He had experienced the satisfaction of building up from nothing a formidable military and political machine, of which he was now the absolute master. He had enjoyed the triumph of ultimate victory. And the Germans had been driven from his country, not by the Red Army, but mainly by his own efforts and by those of his fellow countrymen.

Jugoslavia seemed at that time firmly enough fixed in the Soviet orbit. In public, the Jugoslavs lost no opportunity of demonstrating their solidarity with Russia, and the treaty which Tito signed when he visited Moscow in April 1945 (and which Moscow has recently denounced with such vehemence) seemed to set the seal on their union. But behind this smooth façade, ominous cracks had already begun to appear in the basic structure of Soviet-Jugoslav friendship.

Already during the war there seems to have been some friction between Tito and the Kremlin. On first establishing formal contact with him early in 1944, the Russians found him more independent and less docile than they had hoped. The direct connection which, independently of them, he had already established with the west was in itself disturbing to them and there are indications that they more than once intervened to prevent the establishment of closer relations. But in this they met with only limited success. Practical-minded as he was, Tito could see noth-
ing but advantage in obtaining such technical and material assistance as he could from the west. For him the ideological dangers of contact with the capitalist world had no terrors. If Stalin would hobnob with Churchill, why shouldn't he?

It seems probable, too, that, from the first, Tito's ideas of his future relationship with Moscow did not correspond to those held by the Kremlin; that, for all his Moscow training, he envisaged a connection allowing him a very considerable measure of independence. Certainly the brutal reality—the complete subservience demanded of them by Moscow—seems to have come as a disagreeable shock both to him and to his principal lieutenants.

The Russians misjudged the psychological effect of the war not only on Tito but on the Yugoslav people as a whole. After what they had been through, Tito and his followers had come to believe in working things out for themselves. For them Marxism-Leninism was not an unalterable dogma, but something to be adapted to their own needs.

There has been much speculation as to the cause of Tito's breach with Moscow. But in reality it is not necessary to go beyond this belief in the possibility of working things out for oneself, this refusal to accept the line laid down by the Kremlin as dogma. The subject of the dispute was in a way of secondary importance. What mattered was that there should be a dispute at all. The Soviet system is based first and foremost on authority, the supreme authority of the Kremlin. And Tito was challenging that authority.

The key to what has happened already and to what is likely to happen in the future must be sought first and foremost in Tito himself. Without his leadership, without his ruthless determination, without the personal devotion which he inspires in his followers, such a rebellion would have had little chance of succeeding. But it was no mere accident that such a movement should have arisen in Yugoslavia. In Tito the national characteristics of pride, stubbornness and shrewd pertinacity are highly developed. What he and his followers are fighting for is the right to run their own country in their own way. And for centuries resistance to foreign interference has been a tradition of the peoples of Yugoslavia—a tradition that has been favored by their country's geographical position midway between east and west.

For the past year and a half the Russians have been doing everything in their power to retrieve their initial blunder, but
so far without success. Soviet political pressure has only served to strengthen Tito's internal position. He has met economic pressure by increasing his trade with the west. Assassination, if it has been attempted, has failed. There remains only military intervention of one kind or another. At the present time the Russians must be weighing the advantages and disadvantages of such a course.

A principal factor in these calculations must be Tito himself. When I first arrived in German-occupied Jugoslavia in 1943, the weary, tattered Partisans amongst whom I found myself were fighting for their lives against tremendous odds. When I returned to Belgrade this past spring, my impression once again was of a struggle in which the odds were scarcely less formidable and the determination to hold out equally great. But nothing I saw reminded me more forcibly of those wartime days than Tito himself. He is a man who has always been at his best in a crisis, and it was clear to me as soon as I saw him that the stresses and strains of recent months had brought out all his fighting qualities — the ruthless determination and the confidence in himself and his followers which in the past have carried him through so many seemingly hopeless situations.

The scene had changed. Except for his wolfhound, Tigger, a good deal more sedate than when I first remembered him after his capture from the Germans six years ago, and the familiar faces of the men around him, there was little in the comfortable suburban villa to remind me of the huts and caves which had sheltered us in Bosnia. Nor was there anything about the well cooked, well served luncheon to which we sat down to recall our rough, often scanty wartime fare. But, despite his surroundings, despite his smartly cut summer suit and carefully chosen tie, there was something about Tito that left no doubt that here was a man who knew that he was up against it, but who also had a pretty shrewd idea that somehow or other he was going to come out on top.
LABOR AND THE CHURCH IN QUEBEC

By Blair Fraser

ONLY 18 months ago the French-Canadian Province of Quebec re-elected the provincial Premier, Maurice Duplessis, by a huge majority—he won 82 of 92 seats in the Legislature. It was a triumph of the extreme Right. Mr. Duplessis is said to have promised, and later did introduce, a labor law that made the Taft-Hartley Act look radical. He is an isolationist not only in world affairs but within Canada—a violent champion of "provincial rights" who often seems to regard Ottawa as a foreign if not a hostile capital. Altogether, his is probably the only government north of Georgia which not only is reactionary but proud of it.

He was also regarded, in 1948, as the darling of the Quebec Catholic clergy. Although Mr. Duplessis has never been noted for personal piety, he has cultivated the support of the Church with great assiduity and considerable success. The support was by no means unanimous; he has always had powerful opponents in the Quebec hierarchy, notably the liberal Archbishop of Montreal, Monseigneur Joseph Charbonneau. But there is no doubt that among the rank and file of parish priests he was a popular figure, and that this was a major factor in his sensational victory last year.

On the record, this affinity between Mr. Duplessis and the so-called "lower clergy" was not remarkable. Quebec had long been famous as the last remaining pool of cheap and docile labor in North America, and a friendly curé was often helpful in preserving the docility. Workers in the smaller industrial towns were organized, if at all, into well-behaved unions called the Catholic Syndicates. Most of them had originated more as a dike against the alien, godless C.I.O. and A.F.L. unions than as a genuine labor weapon; until a few years ago the typical syndicate was heavily dominated by its chaplain, the parish priest, and the typical chaplain was pretty friendly with the management of the local mill. There used to be a cynical saying among Quebec employers: "Buy a bell for the parish church and you'll never have any labor trouble."

Signs of change had been cropping up, especially in the post-war years. But to friend as well as foe, the Duplessis victory in 1948 seemed a guarantee that change would be arrested, that
Quebec would remain as it had been—if necessary, go back to what it had been. Mr. Duplessis may well have shared this view himself. At any rate he could hardly have expected the startling change that took place within less than a year, as exemplified by these events:

A Catholic Syndicate went through a five-month strike, militantly led by a parish priest—this in spite of the fact that the strike was illegal under Quebec's labor law, and had been violently denounced by the Duplessis Government.

By unanimous decision of the Quebec bishops, church-door collections in support of the strike were taken each Sunday for the last two months of the fight. In cash it brought the strikers $167,558, about one-third their total expenditure. In moral support it was invaluable.

Archbishop Charbonneau of Montreal, announcing the strike collection from the pulpit of Notre Dame Church, said "There is a conspiracy to destroy the working class, and it is the Church's duty to intervene."

That was unusual enough, from a reigning archbishop, but Monseigneur Charbonneau had always been known for liberal views. Far more remarkable was the Labor Day sermon of Bishop Desranleau of Sherbrooke, in whose diocese the strike had taken place. Bishop Desranleau had been regarded as a spokesman of the Right. He had last gained notoriety by forbidding his flock to join "neutral" service clubs like Rotary and Kiwanis, lest they be contaminated by outside influences. He above all, one would have supposed, saw the Syndicate movement as a conservative and not a radical force.

On the Sunday before Labor Day, Bishop Desranleau spoke to a Syndicate rally, with the strike padre, Father Louis Philippe Camirand, sitting on the platform beside him. The Bishop said:

Capitalism is the cause of all our miseries. We must work against it—not to transform it, for it cannot be transformed; not to correct it, for it is incorrigible; but to replace it. The reform of our socio-economic structure will be made through Catholic syndicalism, or through revolution, blood and death . . .

When they tell you our Syndicates are as ill-inspired as the neutral or socialist unions, it's not true. Workers must have a blind confidence in their Syndicates . . .

Men over 60 have seen two world wars and will perhaps see a third, even more unjust, more destructive, between two totalitarian camps— that of the concentration camp, and that of the American dollar. It is our task to change this situation by implanting the doctrines of the Church . . .
The basic cause is not new — Pius XI and Pius XII have proclaimed it for all to hear. It is greed. Everyone wants what he has not got. That is why the Popes recommend the virtues of moderation.

But we cannot succeed by the practice of virtue alone, for this is no longer a personal but a social evil. We must have reforms of the socio-economic structure, and no one has the right to dissociate himself from these reforms.

What caused this singular transformation? Why did an acknowledged reactionary, in the strict sense of that misused word, thus address his flock in the language of a militant Socialist?

It was the culmination of a movement that has been going on for some years in Quebec. In Bishop Desranleau's personal case the decisive factor was probably the aforementioned strike in his own diocese, but the real causes of the change — and of the strike itself — go back a long way.

On the lay side, the character of the Syndicate movement altered very materially about five years ago. The 376 Syndicates in Quebec and their 82,000 members are organized into the Canadian Confederation of Catholic Labor, and until 1945 the presidency of the Confederation was held by an ardent Duplessis man, a very docile unionist. That year his own secretary, Gérard Picard, led a successful revolt and defeated him with a platform of militant action. The Syndicates have functioned as real, aggressive trade unions ever since.

Instead of regarding C.I.O. and A.F.L. unions as enemies to be hated, the Syndicates now treat them as allies. There is close and often successful cooperation between the Catholic and the international federations. Syndicate ranks have been opened to workers of all faiths. The accent has shifted from the word "Catholic" to the word "labor."

This change on the lay side was a major victory for a kindred faction within the ranks of the clergy. A small but growing minority of Catholic priests had long felt that the Church in Quebec interested itself too little and too late in social questions. They recalled the words of Pius XI: "The great scandal of the nineteenth century was that the Church lost the working class." They believed the Church must regain that support by taking its place at the workingman's side.

Beside him, not in front of him. These clerics are anticlericals of a kind; they oppose and denounce the excessive domination of all activities by the clergy which has been so common in Quebec since the days of New France.
In a pamphlet a few years ago the Very Rev. P. M. Gaudrault, Provincial of the Dominican Order in Quebec, spoke out against this ultra-clericalism with astonishing frankness:

First, it wearies a great many good Catholics, many more than is supposed, who in their own secular domain feel themselves encircled, in tutelage, treated like minors. They want air . . .

Second, it exasperates those other Catholics who are already too much inclined to criticize the Church and the clergy. Unhappily the number of such Catholics is growing continually. . . .

Some time ago a Catholic of good education, a man whose work takes him among all ranks of society, said to me, "Father, you don't hear what's being said everywhere, what's cooking in the pot. But people talk freely before me, and the clergy would be frightened if they could hear the talk of some reputedly good Catholics. And this is true from top to bottom of society."

The minority of priests and thinking laymen who share these views have been working for years to change the Quebec picture. Laval University's School of Social Sciences, headed by the Dominican Father Georges-Henri Levesque, has been a disseminating center of liberal thought and action within the Catholic Church. Its graduates and men whom it has influenced are active in the labor movement, the useful cooperative movement, and in other progressive French-Canadian organizations.

However, as the 1948 election proved, these Catholic liberals were a minority indeed. That is why the 1949 strike at Asbestos, Quebec, was such a milestone in the social history of the province. There seem to be good grounds for believing that the Asbestos strike unified the Quebec clergy in a position somewhat left of center — at any rate, well to the left of their traditional ultra-conservative line.

The Asbestos strike was full of paradox. The employer chiefly concerned, the Canadian Johns-Manville Company, has a good reputation both for wages and working conditions. It pays one of the highest basic labor rates in the province, has a pension scheme and a good health service, runs the best and healthiest plant in the Quebec asbestos industry. When the strike was in its fourth month, one of the strikers told me, "This is the best mine I've ever worked in" — and he was a man of ten years' experience in various parts of Canada.

Yet the strike was bitter beyond all precedent. It caused the worst outbreak of violence in Quebec labor history. Strikers took control of the town and for 24 hours held it in a state of siege, capturing and manhandling the small detachment of provincial
police that tried to maintain order. Next day the police returned in force and carried out retaliations, equally brutal and deplorable, against the strikers.

The reason for the bitterness, and the reason why the bishops’ support was unfaltering in spite of the strikers’ violent outbreak, was the conviction of workers and clergy alike that this was a battle for the survival of the Catholic labor movement.

To the rank-and-file striker it was partly a bread and butter matter. The same man who had such a good word for the Johns-Manville mine, when I asked why he remained on strike, said: “We’re fighting for our union. If we lose, the union is smashed, and then we’ll have no protection.” Too many men in Asbestos remember the days before the union, when grown men worked for as little as 18 cents an hour, and any foreman could fire a man for any or no reason. But even to the rank and file it was more than a mere wage-and-hour battle, it was a crusade.

When the strike was about six weeks old, one striker had a falling-out with the union leaders and decided to go back to work. A day or two later his wife had a visit from a friend. “What’s the matter with your husband?” the visitor asked. “Has he left the Church?”

“Certainly not,” said his wife. “He’s a good Catholic. Why?”

“But he’s gone back to work!” said her friend.

That attitude was general in Asbestos. The strike was a holy war, a battle for the faith. The man who made it so, in the early stages, was Father Louis Philippe Camirand, the parish priest and Syndicate chaplain.

Father Camirand is a short, stout man in his 40’s who looks about as radical as Thomas E. Dewey. But he had been a labor chaplain before, and in that capacity went through a bitter textile strike before the war. He came out of it with a passionate conviction that the worker was not getting justice, and that it was the Church’s job to help him in his fight for it. At Asbestos, Father Camirand was heart and soul on the union’s side, and privy to its most secret councils, from the moment the strike broke out.

Outside the asbestos mining region, the strike got no unusual attention in its opening stages. It was a big strike — 5,000 men out, in two towns 80 miles apart — and it paralyzed a major export industry. That made it front page news in the French language press. But there was none of the fervor, none of the religious overtone that it acquired later on.
The bishops were not particularly interested in whether or not asbestos workers won the 15-cent increase they were demanding — too many plants in Quebec paid far less than the 85 cents an hour that unskilled laborers in the asbestos industry were already getting. Archbishop Roy of Quebec City and Archbishop Charbonneau of Montreal, who became the moving spirits of clerical support in the later stages, were not even in Canada during those first weeks; both were in Rome. Had the battle continued on the wage issue, interest in it would never have spread.

But just about the time Monseigneurs Roy and Charbonneau got back from Rome, the union decided to surrender. It offered to send the men back to work on the same terms they had had when they quit (the company had meanwhile given a 10-cent wage increase voluntarily). All it required was a guarantee that strikers would be re-hired without discrimination, and that charges and damage suits arising out of the strike be dropped. These guarantees are routine, in a strike settlement, but at Asbestos they were refused. The Duplessis Government would not agree to drop criminal charges, the company would not agree to re-hire all former employees. It was evident (and by some spokesmen it was even admitted, privately) that both the Government and the company had decided on a fight to a finish.

Syndicate leaders spoke bluntly to the bishops. “If we lose this strike,” they said in effect, “the Catholic labor movement is finished. Not only will the members desert it for the C.I.O., but we’ll desert it ourselves — we’ll go over to the international unions in a body.”

Meanwhile the Canadian Johns-Manville Company had done a very foolish thing. They had had many years’ experience with a friendly parish priest, now dead, who was a company shareholder and a close personal friend of their president. This may have given them a false idea of what should and what should not be suggested to the clergy. In any case, company officials saw Monseigneurs Roy and Charbonneau soon after their return from Rome, and intimated pretty bluntly that the archbishops’ immediate duty was to order the strikers back to work. Later, the company published full-page advertisements saying that the Catholic Syndicates had been organized to combat radicalism, and that it was the bishops’ duty to purge and curb radicals now. These statements stung the bishops to furious resentment. They regarded such talk as a direct affront, a reflection on the Church’s
integrity. The net result was a unity among the bishops, from the most liberal to the most conservative, which had never existed before on an issue of this kind.

Premier Duplessis, the erstwhile darling of the clergy, found himself in an awkward position, but he did not retreat. He had already called the Catholic union leaders “saboteurs” and “subversive agents.” As Attorney-General of Quebec he had sent his provincial police in to clear away picket lines.

After the bishops had announced their support of the strikers by calling for church-door collections, Premier Duplessis maintained the same attitude as before. Following the outbreak of violence (which took place within a week of the bishops’ call for help) he arrested a score of strike leaders on conspiracy charges and appointed his special “labor judge” to try them. He sent a delegation to the Apostolic Delegate in Ottawa, Monseigneur Antoniutti, to ask that the bishops’ attitude be forbidden. Monseigneur Antoniutti gave him no cooperation at all, but the Quebec clergy were further annoyed.

It amounted to open collision between the ultra-conservative, ultra-clerical Quebec Government, and the solid phalanx of the Church. It was a change in the social atmosphere of Quebec that might well be called revolutionary. But this is revolution, Quebec style. None of the ordinary clichés apply here—words like Left, Right and Center are useless to describe what is going on.

You could call the Asbestos strike a victory for the Catholic Left, as in a sense it is. Yet the president of the local Syndicate in Asbestos is a former Fascist, an ex-member of Adrien Arcand’s Canadian Fascist Party. His sympathies now lie with the Social Credit Party, which in its Quebec wing has a strong dash of Fascism. Not long ago the Social Credit weekly, Vers Demain, devoted a whole issue to eulogy of General Franco and Fascist Spain. The whole Asbestos area voted overwhelmingly for Maurice Duplessis’ Government only seven months before the strike.

Communists of Quebec did their best to make capital out of the strike and its concomitant discontent, but they failed utterly. Even the mildly Socialist C.C.F. (Coöperative Commonwealth Federation), Canada’s farmer-labor party, has made no headway at all in this section of the Quebec working class, and very little anywhere else. The social ferment at work in Quebec is not expressed in politics.

Just this past autumn, the Catholic Syndicate movement
formed its own Political Action Committee after the model of the C.I.O. But there was no agreement as to which party the Catholic P.A.C. should support. It would be against Duplessis — that much was agreed. Otherwise, it will work on a purely local basis, supporting whatever candidates the syndicate thinks have the best chance of winning, or are likely to prove the best personal friends of labor.

The movement derives its emotion not from politics but from the traditions of the French-Canadian race. Once again, as so often in the past, the French-Canadian feels that he is being mobilized in defense of his faith — against the foreign heretics who would have crushed the Catholic labor federation. That is a call French Canada has never yet failed to answer. In the present case it is answered with a new vigor, because the defense of the faith coincides with the defense of the humble worker's own interests. Even after such a hard and costly trial, the morale of the Syndicate movement is said to be higher today than ever before.

What the long-term effect will be is anybody's guess. The unity of the clergy in support of the labor movement is somewhat deceptive, because each faction still hopes to establish that unity on its own terms. Some of the priests who backed the strikers are men who accept the motto of Abbé Lionel Groulx — "Notre maître, le passé." They are the men who hope and intend that Quebec's collèges classiques shall not cease to follow the curriculum laid down when the Séminaire de Québec was founded in 1663. They are the men who built a Chinese Wall around Quebec, and fight every innovation that might breach that wall.

Allied with them, for the moment, are the men who want to bring Quebec into a working, living alliance with the rest of Canada, who want to see Catholics and Protestants side by side in the fight for social betterment, who want to bring Quebec education into the twentieth century and also to make it available to the whole people, not merely to the 2½ percent who benefit by it now. (The collèges classiques are private schools, but are the only road to the university; the public schools lead nowhere.)

Probably neither side will carry its point entirely. Meanwhile, each is helping to sway, but at the same time being swayed by, an upsurge of popular emotion that is bound to bring change. Just what change, in just which direction, it is too soon to tell. But it does appear safe to say that Quebec labor, and indeed Quebec as a whole, will never be quite the same again.
THE UNIFYING FORCE FOR EUROPE

By Paul Reynaud

EASTERN Europe is, in contrast with Western Europe, a disciplined unit with a plan and a will. Stalin is on top, the enslaved peoples on the bottom.

Russia has made the western borders of the satellite states a rampart. Unreliable populations have been transferred and replaced by others. The Bohemian mountains have been fortified; minefields and other defenses have been installed in the Czechoslovak countryside to a depth of six miles. The troops guarding the frontier separating Rumania and Hungary from Jugoslavia have been reinforced. The armies of the satellite nations have been unified under Russian leadership. Act I, suspect officers are purged. Act II, Russia seizes control of the military administrative services and transportation system. Act III, the army is strengthened and rearmament gets under way. In the last ten months a great effort to equip these armies with modern weapons has been made. The Czechs are using the Skoda works to the full. The Hungarian and Bulgarian armies recently received light armored vehicles, medium tanks and anti-tank weapons. It is rumored that the Russians intend to increase the military power of the satellites by 25 to 30 percent before the end of 1950—a total of 900,000, though somewhat lacking in officer cadres, of course, because of the purges.

Finally, last November, Stalin raised the curtain on Act IV. He sent one of his Marshals to Warsaw—and what a Marshal! This was the Soviet general who had halted his troops before Warsaw near the end of the last war in order to give the Wehrmacht an opportunity to massacre the members of the Polish Resistance Movement who had started an insurrection in expectation of help from the approaching Red Army. Today, this Russian general is head of the Polish Army and Minister of National Defense of Poland, which is to say that he speaks as master at the seat of government and commands the armed forces. Anyone who knows the hatred of the Poles for the Russians can measure the scope of this stroke.

Russia herself can put 500 divisions into the field in wartime. Her Army is said to possess a large number of self-propelled guns. She will soon have a stockpile of atomic bombs, and ac-
According to a British aviation magazine now has planes capable of carrying them to America. Her munitions industry is widely scattered for protection, and many of the plants are hidden like the factories the Germans built during the last war near Berlin and in the neighborhood of the Krupp works.

The economic unification of Eastern Europe has also reached an advanced stage. At the head of this effort is the Russian Ministry of Economic Affairs, aided by a Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. Under its direction the countries of the Eastern bloc have signed trade treaties. This organization has Russia's gold at its disposal; and the Russian output of gold undoubtedly has increased while that of the rest of the world was falling from $1.3 billion in 1940 to $795,000,000 in 1948. The exchange rates of the satellite currencies are fixed in Moscow. As a result of all these measures, the index of trade among the East European countries rose from 100 in 1938 to 288 in 1948, while the index of east-west trade fell from 100 to 42.

Thus the Russian giant kneads and molds the clay of Eastern Europe with his powerful hands. His sway extends from Goethe's Weimar to the Pacific. And he cares very little if in order to maintain his grip he must sometimes strangle with the hangman's rope a satellite minister guilty of "nationalist deviation."

The picture presented by the disunited states of Western Europe is very different. Here there are no ministers hanging at the ends of ropes, no trials at which the accused begs for the death penalty with such ardor that the presiding judge of the "people's court" has to calm him by assuring him that he will get what he wants. But there is not much efficiency here, either.

Behind Western Europe stands America with her mammoth factories, modern laboratories, incomparable technicians, atomic bombs and jet planes. But between Western Europe and America lies an ocean. This is the great weakness of the democratic camp. And east of the ocean there is no army which can be compared to Russia's 210 peacetime divisions and her 500 divisions for war. Western Europe has men, but she has not the means to arm them adequately and the American aid she is receiving will not for some years enable her to stem a Red invasion. German participation in this common defense would certainly be of value; but there are wounds which have not yet been healed by time and a repugnance which has not yet been overcome. Such is, at least, the position of the French Government.
Today war has taken on an entirely new meaning for Western Europe. The stakes are higher than ever before. Formerly when a country lost a war the victor seized one or two provinces from the vanquished — Alsace and Lorraine, for instance. This was a source of bitter grief for the conquered nation but, nonetheless, outside this territory life resumed its old course. In such wars, civilization survived. But today if the Russians invaded Western Europe they would bring the Communists to power everywhere, destroy free speech and the free press, end the independent judiciary, shoot or starve to death the educated classes, wipe out individual ownership of land — in sum, destroy western civilization. That is what will happen if war breaks out before Western Europe has been armed.

Against this peril fifty divisions must be created. Europe cannot do this alone. If American aid continues at the present pace, many years will pass before Europe can defend herself. Will war wait? Are we not tempting the enemy? The problem of preserving the oldest, most varied, most precious and most characteristic elements of western civilization is an Atlantic problem. And where the power to solve it lies, there lies the responsibility.

Contemplating this spectacle one cannot help thinking of the I.O.U.‘s, which the democracies gave each other between the two wars, those paper defenses called Locarno and the Little Entente. All Hitler had to do in order to destroy them was to blow on them. Baldwin said in the House of Commons on November 12, 1936: “A democracy is always two years behind a dictatorship.” Are delay and inefficiency the law of democracy, even when the question is one of life or death? By now the democracies should be tired of playing the good fellow whose grandiloquence and naïveté make simpletons applaud while the enemy who is secretly preparing to attack and destroy him smiles satirically.

II

So much for security. But, at least, are not the democracies more successful in preserving the economy and social order of Western Europe? Are not the development of free enterprise and the production of wealth their speciality?

American aid to Western Europe has certainly borne fruit. Communism is losing ground, as was proved by the recent general elections in Belgium, Germany, Austria and Norway. It is losing ground because production is now 25 percent higher than
before the war, making possible a relative stabilization of prices and control of inflation. These results would by themselves justify the generous aid of Americans to their far-off motherlands. But the aim of this assistance, as its authors conceived it, was to enable Europe to get along without the United States after June 30, 1952, when the Marshall Plan is scheduled to come to an end. This objective will not be achieved, nor was it ever possible.

Western Europe is now paying for her imprudence in permitting the growth of a population almost double that of the United States on a territory only half as large and lacking raw materials. Two world wars, unleashed one after the other, have destroyed the mechanisms which enabled Western Europe to exist. The gold of her banks of issue, the income on the foreign bonds held by her nationals, the financing, transporting and insuring of the raw materials produced in almost every part of the globe outside the dollar zone — the whole delicate spider's web that the Europeans patiently wove over the surface of the earth — all this is now dislocated or demolished. For example, Great Britain used to owe the Continent every year a sum in sterling that was the equivalent of half a billion dollars. The pound at that time could be converted into dollars. It can no longer be so converted. This means that the continental countries have lost an important means of making purchases in the dollar zone. The authors of the Marshall Plan do not seem to have realized the full scope of the damage resulting from the two world wars. The invisible injury is even more serious than the destroyed bridges, factories, mines, railroads and houses.

If she is to repair this damage, Western Europe must sell large quantities of goods to the United States; but the Americans still have their old mentality of a debtor nation, their tendency to close their doors against the articles which are Europe's only means of acquiring dollars. During the war, moreover, American industry increased both its output and its productive capacity, while Europe's factories suffered destruction and pillage. As a result, European goods are often more expensive than their American equivalents, although the wages of the European worker are only a third or a fourth as high as those of Americans in the same industry. It will be a long-term task for Europe to market in America enough exports to give her the dollars she needs to buy her raw materials from the dollar zone. It cannot be accomplished in two and a half years.
The task is made more difficult by the fact that the European masses, who suffered so cruelly during the war, now believe that they have a moral right to demand compensations; and these all result in increased production costs. In France, for example, the workers have been given generous social insurance against all risks, with the result that the total value of wages plus social security allowances is today equivalent to the volume of wages before the war. But the effects of the war must still be reckoned with, and the other social classes are far below their prewar standard of living. Moreover, the distribution of wages is different than before the war. Women workers and workers who support a family receive more than in the past, while the unmarried worker, that is to say, the most active and sometimes the most troublesome element in the trade unions, receives less. At the same time, Socialist ideology has worked havoc. Nationalizations have placed additional heavy burdens on the shoulders of a state already weakened by war and occupation. These burdens are not only financial but psychological and social; for the state, having lost its position as arbiter between the employers and workers, has in the nationalized enterprises become the most hated of bosses. The insurrectional strikes which afflicted France in the fall of 1947 and 1948 took place in the nationalized coal mines. Let it be added that excessive taxation has weakened the willingness to take risks and the taste for free enterprise which are among the main incentives of the capitalist system.

By pretending that what was desirable was also possible, the European countries have put themselves in a position where they must compete with American industry, and they cannot compete. They have thus committed an enormous blunder, for it seems most unlikely that, when June 30, 1952, comes, they will be able to secure the dollars they need for their supplies of raw materials without further American aid. This has led to the American demand for the unification of European economy. How else, indeed, can countries ranging from 8,000,000 to 49,000,000 inhabitants compete with America, which has 150,000,000 inhabitants and a purchasing power equal to that of 500,000,000 Europeans? Obviously, between the two giants, Russia and the United States, there is room for Europe—but not for a mosaic of European states. Obviously, also, it is more difficult to federate countries each of which has a language, a literature, a long and often glorious history, than it was to federate
the 13 colonies on the Atlantic coast. But Europe's need to unify
herself economically, and hence politically, is nonetheless press-
ing. The urgency was apparent in 1948, when the beneficiaries
of the Marshall Plan were asked to describe the means whereby
they intended to reach solvency by 1952, for the irreconcilable
plans which they outlined created nothing but confusion.

It is clear that, because of the decrease in America's national
income during 1949 and the budgetary deficit due to military
expenditures, Congress will make substantial reductions in
Marshall Plan appropriations unless Western Europe, in return
for the sacrifices demanded of American taxpayers, takes a de-
cisive step toward unification. Many Europeans, particularly
on the Continent itself, have understood the need to build a
united Europe. Following my return from captivity, in 1945,
I, for one, went to see Sir Alfred Duff Cooper, then British Am-
bassador to France, and told him that this was one of the con-
clusions I had reached during the years of meditation that I
owed to Adolf Hitler. The 1948 Congress of Europe at The
Hague, of which Winston Churchill was the moving spirit and
in which nationals of all the Western European countries par-
ticipated except Germany, Spain and Portugal, gave powerful
expression to the desire of Europeans of every party except the
Communist to build a single Europe. The Governments were
obliged as a result to create a Committee of Five, in which
France, Great Britain and the Benelux nations were represented,
to study the question. This Committee, of which I was a member,
met in Paris in December 1948 and January 1949 under the chair-
manship of Mr. Herriot. The British Government instructed its
representatives in such a fashion that it was impossible to reach
agreement, and the Committee had to submit to the respective
Governments the resolution of the British delegation on the one
hand and that of all the other delegations on the other. The
British resolution stipulated that the Consultative Assembly
should consist of only 40 members and that each delegation
should have as its chief a minister empowered to cast the vote
of the whole delegation. Mr. Churchill, for example, would thus
have to allow Mr. Morrison to vote in his, Mr. Churchill's, name
against one of Mr. Churchill's own motions.

The Governments did reach agreement on May 5, 1949, upon
a statute similar to that originally opposed by the British. With
the addition of the Scandinavian countries, Ireland, Italy, Greece
and Turkey, the Consultative Assembly now has 101 members belonging to 12 nations, and each member has the right to vote as he pleases. The members are appointed either by the parliaments, as is the case in France and Italy, or by the Governments, as is the case in Great Britain and Belgium. The only right enjoyed by this assembly is that of discussion. Here too it is limited. For the present it may debate only such subjects as have been accepted for the agenda by the Committee of Foreign Ministers. It may not encroach upon the functions of existing agencies such as the O.E.E.C. nor concern itself with problems related to national defense. It can merely submit recommendations to the Committee of Foreign Ministers which, in turn, submits them to the respective Governments. The latter are free to accept or reject them.

As we have seen, Great Britain agreed to the creation of the Council of Europe with extreme distrust. Under these circumstances and with these very limited powers the Assembly met at Strasbourg for a month, from August 10 to September 9, 1949. At the time, Léon Blum expressed surprise that no Mirabeau rose up in the Assembly to demand extension of its powers. Mirabeau was able to say to the Marquis de Dreux-Brézé, the Grand Master of Ceremonies who came in the name of the King, with his hat on his head, to invite the Assembly to disband: "We are here by the will of the people and we shall not leave except at the point of the bayonet." Léon Blum forgot that this was because Mirabeau had been elected by the people. If Mr. Churchill had spoken in such terms, his opponent, Mr. Morrison, would have answered: "Why no, Mr. Churchill, you are here by the will of Mr. Attlee." The weakness of this Assembly lies in the method by which its members are chosen.

At the Congress at The Hague I pointed out how difficult it would be to make the interest of Europe prevail over the selfish interests of each nation, and declared that the only chance of success was to shock public opinion in all countries. I said that we must therefore appeal to the peoples through the democratic mechanism of elections. I proposed that the Assembly should be elected by universal suffrage, with one deputy for each million inhabitants voting not as Englishmen, Frenchmen or Italians but as Europeans. This proposal was rejected by an overwhelming majority. A Conservative British M.P. objected with the old French proverb: "Make haste slowly." To which I retorted that
this was strange advice to give to a drowning man trying to grasp a branch. A French Socialist, former Premier Paul Ramadier, accused me of being "ahead of the times." I accepted his criticism in good part, remembering what price my country and the world had paid for the mistakes of those who, before the war, were behind the times. Today a current of opinion is forming in favor of repairing this initial error; but it seems unlikely that the British Government will allow itself to be convinced.

On the economic level, the advantage of a united Europe is that it would make possible a great single market and, consequently, a redistribution of labor, with each country henceforth producing what it can best produce. It would also give a strong impulse to the necessary organization of Africa, Europe's prolongation to the south. This process of redistributing industry and labor would result in a lowering of European production costs. It would be a painful process because it implies the transfer of manpower from one industry to another, after a period of adaptation during which the least favored industries may be stricken by unemployment. This is the inevitable disadvantage of the plan — the present evil for the sake of the future good. Several Labor representatives at Strasbourg expressed the view that one of them summed up in these terms: "If in creating a united Europe you create unemployment, we workers will say to you: 'Go to the devil with your Council of Europe and give us back our jobs and our wages!'" To which I answered that these workers seemed to believe that the choice lay between the status quo and the reconstruction of Europe, while the truth was that the status quo cannot last, since it is possible thanks only to American aid which must soon come to an end. I added that, as I listened to these speakers, I could not help thinking of Bismarck's phrase that Germany's unity would be forged only by blood and iron, and also of the formula of our own French historian, Jacques Bainville: "In order to build a federation there must be a federating state." There is such a state in Eastern Europe. Are we in Western Europe incapable, I asked, of achieving by an act of our own will what, in another part of the world, is imposed by a dictator?

I am afraid that the answer must be in the affirmative. Competition with countries whose production is less heavily bur-
dened by wages, social security and taxes implies a temporary lowering of the living standards of the privileged nations. The authority of a democratic state is too weak to force the people to accept this. Only economic constraint is strong enough. When a democratic state says: "Let me first bring about a levelling of prices by levelling costs and tax burdens, then we will build Europe," it is really saying: "Let me first do something impossible." It seems unlikely that, in order to build a united Europe, the countries whose costs are now lower than others will agree to raise them, thus putting their own exports at a disadvantage and engendering a rise in living costs that might lead to social unrest. And the countries whose costs are higher will find it very difficult to lower them. The internal policy of each country is at stake — that is to say, the electoral platform of the parliamentary majority and the government which stems from that majority. Only competition brings down prices by forcing down costs, and no government, even if made up of the best men, will open up the national borders and oblige its citizens to meet foreign competition unless outside pressure forces it to do so.

But this outside pressure does in fact exist. It is the threat of the withdrawal, or substantial reduction, of Marshall Plan credits. I am aware of the scruples which Americans feel at the thought of interfering in the internal affairs of European countries, but a purpose as lofty as this requires that this delicacy be overcome. Last October, at the meeting of the O.E.E.C. Council, Mr. Paul Hoffman stated the argument in favor of unification in terms of refined courtesy, but the argument was nonetheless compelling. It is true that the results achieved after the speech were limited. The resolution adopted by the O.E.E.C. Council was ambitious in its preamble but modest in its conclusions. To eliminate 50 percent of the quotas on imports in private trade was a wise decision, but one step only toward a return to the state of affairs that existed before the 1929 economic crisis. It represents a very slight effort on the part of the British since, because of state trading and various restrictions, it applies only to about 10 percent of Britain's total imports.

As for the rest, there was merely a promise to "study the question." True, there was talk in the lobbies of a "Fritalux," to include France, Italy and Benelux. (The latter has not yet achieved its objective, principally because of the conflict between Holland's managed economy, on the British pattern, and Belgium's
liberalism.) There is no doubt that a “Fritalux” would be far superior to a Franco-Italian customs union, which is so limited that it offers the disadvantages of unification without its advantages. But is it wise to exclude Germany from such an enterprise? Is “Europe” conceivable without Germany? If we exclude her will we not goad her to turn toward the east? It would seem that a Franco-German discussion of the eventual creation of a Western European coal-and-iron-ore pool as well as the problem of dual prices (Ruhr coal costs the French manufacturer five dollars more per ton than the German manufacturer) is a necessary preliminary to the building of a continental bloc.

Furthermore, I am not one of those who accept Great Britain’s present attitude. In a unified Europe, France and England together could balance Germany’s economic power. And if a single Europe is to be created, it would be better to subject Germany to one effort of adaptation than to a series of crises. The British delegates to the Strasbourg Assembly seemed to favor the objective in principle when they proposed to extend to the Continent their agreements with the Commonwealth; for the Commonwealth countries would be friendly to the plan because of the influence wielded in most of them by the United States. On the other hand, the devaluation of the pound in September, which was followed by a wave of panic on the Continent, seemed a defiance of the very idea of a united Europe. Yet it is unwise to harbor resentment in politics. No matter how difficult Britain’s managed economy makes European economic union, the project must be pursued with determination. There can be no “Europe” without a close understanding between France and England. America’s contribution should be to help create this. If she brought the British and French together, and then encouraged them both to reach agreement with Germany for the creation of a great, single market, the other countries of Western Europe would inevitably follow the lead. Such a great and sustained effort to aid in the creation of a new Europe would be not only sound politics but a fresh claim to glory for the American people.
In the “Cahiers” of the French philosopher Montesquieu we find the pensive lines: “One has to know the prejudices of one’s century, in order neither to offend nor follow them too much.” If Montesquieu had lived recently he most likely would not only have pointed to the prejudices of one’s time as constituting a great political danger but would have added a warning against collective judgments and might have suggested a way to avoid them in the sociological ideas which he himself put forward. In the following reflections I shall try not to overlook the fact that the politician and diplomat as well as the historian must utilize collective terms like “Germany” or “the Germans,” but I want to warn my readers not to confuse collective conceptions and terminology with reality. For the reality is not a firm element but a strange agglomeration which to some extent is on the point of genuine development and to some extent is about to dissolve.

I might illustrate what is to me the political meaning of this situation by an example from history. One can have strong doubts as to whether Germany really has ever been correctly referred to as “a nation of poets and thinkers.” But it is not open to doubt that belief in this general conception has for years prevented the world from making an accurate and understanding appraisal of Nazi crimes and Nazi criminals. This was true, moreover, not only of the outside world but also of Germany herself. Today it is equally dangerous to regard Germany or Western Germany as a state like the United States or any country of Europe and to imagine that the Germans form a nation either in disposition or structure similar to the western democracies. The reality about Germany becomes evident only through a sociological analysis which reveals the unique evolution of this fateful European country since 1914 — an evolution in which the years of Nazi terror were only a ghastly interlude.

I. The Historical Background

Whereas the other European countries had already gotten rid of the remnants of the preceding feudal era — either by revolution as in France, or by evolution as in England — Germany was
the only one of the great western industrial Powers that entered the twentieth century with a social structure in which the old feudal class was still of considerable importance — not on account of its strength in numbers but because of its power. The influence of the Junkers has often been overestimated outside Germany. Actually they played a minor rôle in the German economy, and no rôle whatsoever in German intellectual life. However, apart from representing a conspicuous abnormality in the eyes of capitalist society, they held essential key positions in the Army and Government and maintained their place as an established caste of the old order alongside the modern classes: the bourgeoisie and the working class. In addition, the bourgeoisie itself still contained remnants from the feudal era; for it must not be forgotten that originally the so-called middle class included influential Junker elements among its officials and representatives of the old guilds among its tradespeople. Also, within the peasant class the feudal peasant of the old order was more strongly represented than the modern capitalist landowner.

Upon this sociological system of rank the First World War and the so-called revolution of 1918 had comparatively little influence. The representatives of power, of course, changed places. Thus the government departments formerly controlled by members of the aristocracy, both old and new, were taken over by members of the bourgeoisie and the working class, and the officer corps in the new Reichswehr had a somewhat smaller percentage of members from the aristocracy than had been the case in the old Army. However, the "revolution" left feudal property almost untouched, and thus — precisely because the owners of this property now moved only rarely into powerful public positions — created a dangerous discrepancy between the social and economic groundwork and the political superstructure. An actual change in the social structure was of course brought about by the great inflation of 1919–23 — but this caused a disintegration of the old system without forming a new one.

Every inflation is disadvantageous to creditors and those who own funds, advantageous to debtors and those who own real values. Every inflation is disadvantageous to recipients of regular wages and salaries (which as a rule are raised only after a time-lag following the devaluation of the currency), advantageous to shopkeepers, middlemen and industrialists who can increase their prices as the currency falls and who may even profit
from it. A process like the German inflation, which with true
German thoroughness was carried right to the verge of making
the old money completely worthless, necessarily produced all
these consequences in an extreme degree never before seen in
history.

The result was that when the new Reichsmark was created in
1924, the old feudal class and a large part of the peasant class had
almost no debts, though they felt the lack of working capital.
Likewise, the upper middle class (including the industrial class
grouped around the heavy industries of the Rhineland and West-
phalia and the big chemical industries) had emerged from the
inflation not only without losses but with increased power. On
the other hand, the lower middle class had been severely hit. Its
savings were rarely invested in stocks, but mostly in loans and
saving accounts; these (except for minor remnants) disappeared.
Contrary to the predictions of Karl Marx, however, this im-
poverished middle class was by no means willing to join the ranks
of the old proletariat, either spiritually or politically. Thus there
existed a wide, romantically-minded and reactionary mass which
was ready to listen to any appeal for a rightist revolution. Mean-
while, social unrest had also increased within the working class.
The old cadres of the social democratic system were still intact,
but they did not receive reinforcements from the younger genera-
tion, who realized the failures of their “revolutionary” elders
and, viewing the decomposition of the old society, inclined
toward parties which like the Communist on the one hand or Na-
tional Socialist on the other promised them a “new order.”

Unless one has a clear perception of this preceding disintegra-
tion it is impossible to understand the rise of National Socialism.
It was unscrupulous enough to promise each class what it wanted —
to the aristocracy, national grandeur and posts in the Army;
to industry, capacity orders and the smashing of the unions; to
the middle class and the peasants, freedom from capitalist tyr-
nanny; to the workers, full employment and Socialism. Thus it
came to exercise a wide and enormous attraction. The combined
efforts of the officials and the workers were able to crush the
forces of reaction which were behind the “Kapp Putsch.” But
the inflation deprived the officials and intellectuals of their mate-
rial strength; and its progress from 1929 to 1933 resulted in
increasing unemployment, which in turn deprived social democ-

racy of its most effective weapon — the general strike.
The National Socialist “new order” did not really create a new social structure, but continued the process of disintegrating the old social structure to the utmost limit. *Gleichschaltung* (coordination) meant the end of the old political parties. The Storm Troopers, the S.S. and the Reichswehr disoriented the whole nation — uprooted the peasants, “purged” the middle class, and deprived the working classes of their rights. As for the aristocracy and the moguls of heavy industry, though they were able to set down in their books a few temporary profits, they also earned — a well-deserved reward for their stupidity — the final loss of their power. The “new order” which frightened and later almost subjugated the world was not a living social body, developing and subsisting on the successful cooperation of individuals, but a machine in which millions of robots were moved in accordance with the cool decisions of a ruling clique of criminals.

II. THE NEW NOMADS

Nomadism — history shows — very often marks not only the beginning but also the end of large empires and eras. When roaming tribes settle, states begin to form. Then the migration of the countryfolk into the towns and the growth of population of the cities creates a new type of people, and clears the countryside for other wandering peoples. Toward the end of the Roman Empire the great Caesars combated this process and actually succeeded in suppressing it for centuries. In the Third Reich, such a development was encouraged by the rulers of the state for the first time in history, and was designed to be spread destructively over a whole continent.

The diverse social body of the German nation was transformed into what might be termed a marching organization. This was the first step in the nomadizing process. The second step was the displacement and resettlement of millions of *Volksdeutsche*, as the German minorities in border-countries, especially in Eastern Europe, were called. Whatever ingenious ideas may have been in the minds of the German authorities when they recklessly brought the South Tyrolese “home into the Reich” and shifted the Volga Germans to areas which had been cleared in western Poland, the actual results were two: first, all those people were deprived of their homes; later — today — they have been funnelled into already overcrowded Western Germany. Nor did the men in charge of German destinies at that time foresee that hun-
dreds of thousands of the foreign workers who were driven to Germany as slave labor would never find their way back. These are the Displaced Persons — the third category of nomads. Besides these deliberate acts of policy, war forced involuntary acts on the German people. Air warfare made millions of Germans nomads in the most literal sense of the word, and even though the majority of these evacuées who were dispersed all over Germany have returned to their former places of residence, the cellars and tumble-down rooms in which many of them have to exist cannot be called homes. Even the most deplorable slums of the big cities provided better shelter in the old days.

One more category of nomads developed during the last months of the war when the Russians flooded over East Prussia and West Prussia, Pomerania and Brandenburg, sending long columns of refugees streaming westward. These were followed by further millions when the Germans from the Sudeten and Hungary had to leave their homes. Thus, if we include the people who lost their homes through bombing, at least one-fifth of the population of Western Germany today are nomads. (In Eastern Germany this ratio is likely to be higher.) Even if we exclude the Displaced Persons, the territory between the line of the Oder-Neisse and the west German border holds 11,000,000 to 12,000,000 refugees and expellees (7,000,000 of them living in Western Germany). Furthermore, 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 of the total Western German population of 45,000,000 have been nomadized by evacuation from the bombed cities or by migration from the Soviet zone. The number fleeing from the Soviets increases from day to day. Thus, an overcrowded country with a currency which was virtually useless had to admit more people in the course of three years than entered the United States in the decade from 1901 to 1910 when immigration was at its height.

The number of refugees and expellees varies considerably within the different zones and areas of Western Germany. There are comparatively few in the French zone, but Bavaria has one refugee for every three residents and Schleswig-Holstein one refugee per resident; and there are areas where the refugees considerably outnumber the residents. Some refugees have been moved out of Schleswig-Holstein, and the French zone has recently been opened to others, but such measures cannot solve the problem. Those who are thus shifted about are no more welcome
in the new location than in the old and tend to aggravate conditions in districts relatively better off.

Possibly the refugees could have been assimilated if the social structure had been intact, as the Huguenots once were absorbed, though in smaller numbers, in Switzerland, Italy and Prussia. But in Germany the middle classes had supported the Fascist revolution because they expected that it would break the process of "proletarianization" to which they already felt themselves subjected, and as a result millions more of them were uprooted, spiritually no less than physically. These people, desperately clinging to the memories of past glory and lost wealth, refuse to take their place in the real life of the present. No matter to which party they give their votes, they cannot be dependable elements in the state.

It is particularly relevant to note that the once reigning Junker class must be included in this "nomad" category. Their estates east of the Elbe River have been flooded by the Russian tide. Some of the Junkers who succeeded in escaping to the west may have found an adequate existence with relatives; others may find an outlet for their energy and ability as tenants of estates in the west or as managers of stock farms owned by wealthy western industrialists. But the remnants of German feudalism have been eliminated; the class that always exerted a particular influence for stability in the state, which sought to preserve the old social structure, and which, despite its political mistakes, still possessed a background of political and diplomatic knowledge and manners, must now share the fate of the "have-nots." As in similar cases in the past, some very strong individuals will be able to avoid the fate of their class, but these exceptions make the destruction of the class as a whole only more apparent and more final.

Are there, however, any forces within the German social structure which, when examined from the point of view that I have expressed here, may be regarded as sound? In the first place there is that part of the agricultural class that was not detached from the soil. It is not very numerous, especially as peasant families suffered many casualties in the war. A good many members of the industrial middle class also seem to have survived in fairly good shape. They are to be found in the small and medium industries rather than in the big ones, since these have been more affected by dismantling and decartelization. These two groups form the nucleus and supply the strength of the Christian Demo-
crat Union. There are, furthermore, the remains of the middle-
class artisans — the bakers, the butchers, shoemakers, owners
of garages and small machine shops, etc., who work with their
hands. Finally, and above all, there is the bulk of the Socialistic-
cally trained working class. Even though this group was by no
means immune to National Socialism, it was the one that best kept
its identity and social consciousness — the important qualities in
periods of social decomposition. It was the most effective bulwark
against Communism before 1933, and in many eyes seems the
most reliable cornerstone on which democracy can be built in
Germany. That the Communists treat the Socialists as their
primary enemies in Germany today is relevant evidence in this
regard.

III. NOMADISM AND DEMOCRACY

The classical form of democracy has been bourgeois. Democ-
racy was won by the bourgeoisie in a fight against absolutism
and feudalism, and was maintained by them. The idea of this
democracy (combined with the ancient elements of a peasant
democracy) is still realized in Switzerland; and in spite of cer-
tain changes in form it still represents the political ideal in the
United States. In Germany it failed at the time of the Weimar
Republic.

One would certainly be incorrect to assume that the German
national character makes democracy impossible. Toward the end
of the Middle Ages the German boroughs had a genuine and
flourishing democracy which the authoritarian state defeated
only after a severe struggle. Since the time of Luther and the
Peasant War, however — i.e. for more than 400 years — demo-
cratic institutions in Germany have deteriorated, except perhaps
in Swabia-Württemberg; and when toward the end of the eight-
eenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries a new his-
torical hour struck for democracy, the German middle class had
neither the strength nor the boldness to take command of the
state and establish a democratic system. The catastrophe of 1918
gave the German bourgeoisie another chance. But the oppor-
tunity was all too literally “given,” and those to whom power is
offered as a gift seldom know how to use it. If, as seems to have
been the case, the objective preliminary conditions of bourgeois
democracy were missing in Germany at that time, can they be
present now when the process of disintegration has gone so much
further? If not, the only possible democracy in Germany seems to be a social democracy.

A realistic view of the social forces in Germany today suggests that we would be mistaken to think of the Christian Democrat Union as a kind of "Third Force" in Germany and a bulwark against totalitarianism, as many Americans seem to do. To avoid misunderstandings, I take pains to say that I do not entertain any doubts whatever as to the democratic intentions of the Christian Democrat leaders. There are no better democrats or Europeans than Dr. Adenauer and Dr. Kogon, to mention only two names. However, a very considerable number of the votes that won a majority for this party came from political chaff which drifted together mainly because it feared "international" Socialism and as yet had no opportunity to give its vote to a new Fascist party. I use the word "Fascist" intentionally, as a term which includes National Socialism and every neo-Nazi movement. If the Fas-cisms of the twenties and thirties are to be understood — sociologically and politically — as revolutions of the dispossessed middle classes, then we must conclude that the military defeat of Nazi Germany has increased the number of those who have a vital interest in either a restoration of Nazism or a new revolu-tion motivated by resentment.

The fighting spirit of the old German bourgeoisie was feeble, compared to that of the middle classes in England, the United States and France, and now the absence of the former strong Jewish element adds to this weakness. Reactionary quarters in Germany frequently denounced the liberal and democratic par-ties as "Judaized," and the attack was by no means irrational, for German middle-class Jews, who had had to hold their ground in the face of prejudice and discrimination in the Army and in public life, had developed the very fighting spirit so sadly lacking in their Christian fellow citizens. They were not submissive, and from Ludwig Bamberger up to Walter Rathenau had provided opposition to absolutism. By expelling the Jewish élite and by killing the masses of the German Jews, the Nazis eliminated a factor of strength within the German middle class.

The cadres of the C.D.U. were recruited from the Catholic ranks, and to a certain extent the Catholic tradition and the power of the Church may be able to provide a substitute for this lost element of strength. But Catholic influence should not be overestimated. For one thing, Western Germany does not have
a Catholic majority; for another, the Roman Catholic Church has never committed itself to moving in one political direction only. German Catholicism does not possess that innate humanism which is to be found in France and Italy as a result of the Roman heritage. Above all — though this comes as a shock to anyone who did not set foot in Germany after 1933 — the Nazi régime succeeded in its 12 years of power in estranging many Germans from the Christian religion. True, a considerable number of voters in Bavaria and the Rhineland will continue to cast their ballots according to the advice of the local priest, but this does not provide sufficient foundation for a modern political party. There is strength in the politically active and fairly large section of the party which is recruited from the Catholic unions. But we should note that this group is nearer to the Socialists than to the C.D.U. leadership on many matters of policy, and it is no secret that Catholic labor would have welcomed a coalition with the Social Democrats in the present government.

In his excellent book, “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,” Professor Schumpeter points out that everywhere, with the exception of Switzerland, democracy has reached a stage in which its essential difference from totalitarian forms of government is that it permits competition for political leadership. In short, it permits free elections. The German working class, which has in so many respects taken over the heritage of the bourgeoisie, now has a chance to acquire power under such a system. And its experience in the Nazi years made it understand better than any other group, I think, how much it has to gain from freedom. Both factors might be expected to recommend to the workers a “democratic solution” to their problems. It may be appropriate, at this juncture, to point out that the writer is not and never has been a Socialist. But the conclusion seems inescapable that the success of democracy within the disintegrated German social structure depends upon whether the working class can be won to support a democratic system and will remain steadfast to it. Since a good part of the German intelligentsia is aware of this, the Social Democrats have received considerable reinforcements from intellectuals, notably Professor Carlo Schmid, one of the most capable of German postwar politicians, and Alfred Weber, a gifted teacher of prewar days.

It is to be hoped, then, that any American aversion to Socialism will not weaken Allied relations with Socialist quarters. That
would not only separate the Allies from strong forces in Germany but would make it easy for the opponents of democracy to denounce the Allies as supporters of "reaction." The democratic idea can be effectively promoted only if political and economic support is given to all genuine German democrats, no matter to which class or to which party they belong. To fail to do so is to risk repeating the mistakes of the twenties, when everything that had been denied to democracy was thrown into the lap of the Nazis.

IV. THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALISM

Observers agree with no little alarm that nationalism is on the upsurge everywhere in Germany. Perhaps if this problem is viewed in perspective it can be made more manageable. The world looks upon German nationalism as a threatening, overbearing and aggressive force, whereas patriotism in most other nations is taken to be welcome evidence of inner soundness. The main reason that German national consciousness is such an undisciplined force is that German patriotism developed only as a reaction to the Napoleonic conquest, and not, as in countries already consolidated, in connection with the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The failure of the revolution of 1848 marked the failure of the democratic idea to fuse with the idea of patriotism in Germany. Thus German nationalism failed to find roots in domestic policy and found expression only in the field of foreign policy. Bismarck deliberately used national feeling, fanned through foreign wars, to frustrate democratization within the country — that is to say, he used "national liberalism" to defraud the middle classes of liberalism in the same way that Hitler used National Socialism to defraud the working class of Socialism. Both used the satisfaction of national desires as a drug — and now, as after 1918, the German people, bereft of these satisfactions of an exaggerated nationalism, show the erratic behavior of an addict suddenly deprived of his stimulant.

Moreover, every foreign occupation, even the wisest and most considerate (and wisdom and forbearance are rare qualities in a period of occupation), is bound in the long run to arouse resistance. The first step in dealing with the problem, therefore, is for occupation Powers who are planning for the long term to distinguish between patriotic national consciousness, with which their own citizens are imbued and which they should respect and
even welcome in others, and nationalism which is running amok. Neither one kind of nationalism nor the other is the possession of any particular social class. Obviously, however, those whom I have called the nomads are the least secure and the most easily swept off their feet by blind passions; a good deal of the shrillness of the recent electoral campaign in Germany resulted from attempts to compete for the vote of this group, which either major party needs to gain a majority. And any German government which hopes to stay in power must build up a life worth living for all those millions of displaced and impoverished people, with the support of the social forces that are still intact. The process will take many years and can succeed only with help from abroad.

It is dangerous to believe that the experiences which Germans have had with the Russian occupation will cause them to turn to the west under any and all circumstances. When D. H. Lawrence visited Germany in 1924 he wrote: "The great leaning of the German spirit is eastward towards Russia, towards Tartary." There is even more need to remember this today. Not only the German Communists, but millions of refugees have their eyes fixed toward the east. Many of them are ready for a new war if that is the only way they can regain their old homes. And never in history has there been a war in which hired soldiers have not been found to fight for the party which promised the greater profit. The payment desired in this case cannot be made by the west. It might be taken in alliance with the west; but it may be freely promised by the east as a reward of service, at the expense of Poland. How willing and able the Soviet Union may become to destroy her system of satellite states in Eastern Europe—which is what the policy suggested would amount to—is, of course, another question. Few men will offer a confident answer to a situation so obscure and so fluid. But we can be sure that expediency will be the determining factor in any Soviet decision.

However this may be, we must, I think, conclude that the first phase of the occupation policy has ended badly. The policy of "denazification" has not "denazified" Germany. The Nuremberg trials did not appeal to the German sense of justice. The currency reform succeeded in its objective of increasing production, but it squeezed savings and now unemployment is mounting and prices are rising. In short, the prestige of the occupation Powers is low. The Allied "democratization" policy has tried to do what can in fact be accomplished only by the Germans themselves.
through the gradual construction of a German democracy. Un-
fortunately, every attempt at "democratizing" Germany from
outside has a result opposite to that intended. Reeducation of
adults has always been an insoluble problem, and when attempted
by foreigners or emigrants is bound to arouse distrust that will
destroy all chances of success.

Yet if the problem is correctly diagnosed, the situation does not
seem hopeless. A clarification of Allied policy toward Germany
is certain to come, since even though Western Germany has not
been admitted to the Atlantic Pact as a junior partner, it consti-
tutes an advance position of vital importance for Western Eu-
rope, and, no doubt, for the entire western world.

There are three ways, at the moment, in which it seems to me
that the growth of German democracy may best be aided. In
devising means to follow any of them it is essential to remember
that German democratic leaders must not be exposed to the
charge of "collaboration" — that is, must not in appearance or
in fact be made the puppets of foreign rulers. Most urgently, eco-
nomic support is needed. Americans are being blamed for the un-
desirable consequences of the currency reform, and a rapid re-
laxation of the tight credit situation is in the American interest
as well as in the German interest. I will not attempt to discuss the
solutions that might be found. German industry might be aided
by private capital investments, or it might be more useful to in-
crease credit in Western Germany by a revival of the so-called
shadow-accounts. It matters less which method is chosen than
that action be prompt and vigorous. Incidentally, the release of
the frozen German foreign assets seems overdue.

Next is the need for measures to advance the social consolida-
tion of the country, using as the nucleus the social forces that are
still intact, in particular the working class. Above all it is essen-
tial that the process of nomadization — actual and potential —
as described above, be checked. The fate of the European Conti-
nent may depend upon whether, gradually, a solution is found for
the refugee problem. Those who are really aware of the situation
— as are the representatives of the Church — realize that it can-
not be mended by German strength alone and probably not in
Western Germany alone. In this connection we may compare
the calming effect of the free immigration and emigration of the
nineteenth century with the results of autarchy and isolationism
in the twentieth. Those who regard the immigrant just as an un-
desirable competitor might be reminded of the wise words of Adam Smith, that labor is the source of wealth.

But the success or failure of the second phase of Allied policy in Germany will not be decided in the economic field nor the social field, but by politics. The third and most important way to aid democracy in Germany is by promoting the consolidation of Europe. The fact that this is essential for the success of the Marshall Plan is better understood in the United States than in most European countries. The need for this broader consolidation should be the decisive factor in charting economic policy. The further Western Germany recovers economically, the more unwilling Germans will be to accept measures which they think—perhaps unjustly—are motivated by hatred, whether in regard to the application of the Ruhr Statute, against the revival of heavy industry or the chemical industries, or in questions of foreign trade. But the wider the aims of the Allies, the more readily the Germans will cooperate. Successful steps toward the integration of Europe would furnish the most effective kind of support for German democracy.
THE RACE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND REFORM IN IRAN

By T. Cuyler Young

MOHAMMED REZA SHAH'S recent good-will visit to the United States has again drawn American attention to his strategically important country. Iran is due to receive a small amount of aid under the Foreign Arms Aid Bill passed in the last session of Congress; and the initiation of a Seven-Year Plan of Iranian self-development and improvement in cooperation with western, especially American, technical aid and advice has recently been announced. These events call for an appraisal of the present situation and future possibilities in Iran, and of American foreign policy there.

The first skirmish in the struggle between Russia and the west in the Security Council of the United Nations took place over Iran. The Soviet Union failed to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran by March 2, 1946, as she was pledged to do under the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, and when Iran, with a notable display of nerve and coolness carried the matter to the Council, the pressure of western diplomacy and of world opinion focused in the United Nations forced the Soviets to climb down. It was not until the close of 1946, however, that the Azerbaijan rebellion was liquidated and the integrity of Iranian territory reestablished. Iranian independence of choice and action was proved in practice in the fall of 1947 when the Iranian Parliament rejected the Soviet-backed oil agreement between the two countries. This was possible because Iran received the diplomatic support of the Western Powers, under vigorous American leadership, and felt confident that the United Nations would support her if the U.S.S.R. resorted to aggression.

Iran is accustomed to the policy of adroitly balancing opposing Powers against each other, but during the last two years she has been increasingly forced into open alliance with the west by the Kremlin's machinations. The Soviets have continued to create tension and friction within the country, have perpetrated annoying border incidents and persisted in radio and press attacks upon the government. Most serious of all is the constant attempt by the Soviets to build up a case for armed intervention on the
RUSSIA AND REFORM IN IRAN

basis of the variously interpreted Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship of 1921. To this end they accuse Iran of connivance with the United States in building airfields and military bases as a threat to the U.S.S.R., whose oil fields are vulnerably close to the Iranian border. The response of the Iranian Government to all this pressure has been resistance, if not indeed defiance: a bold procedure for a country so weak and so close to the Russian colossus.

Though still sincerely protesting her desire to live at peace and in friendship with her great northern neighbor, she has turned to Western Powers for help. The rôle of Soviet satellite she resolutely rejects. What are her chances to remain independent and free?

II

The answer will depend upon Iran's ability to carry forward her modern social revolution and to apply the program of political and economic reform which she has drawn up; and her ability to succeed in this will in turn depend to a considerable extent upon the accuracy with which the United States appraises the realities of the Iranian internal situation. Since the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, his son and successor, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, has tried to rule as a constitutional sovereign. Those who know him find him sincere, intelligent and devoted to the best interests of his country; but his task is very difficult. The young ruler is under the necessity of prodding a reluctant government into constructive action, and is constantly blocked by its lethargy and shortsightedness.

The majority of the people favor the monarchy and trust the present ruler. But they deeply distrust the ruling class of Iran, which dominates the Majlis, or National Assembly, and the Government, that is, the Cabinet and ministries. This landed and mercantile aristocracy manages to control elections of deputies in most of the provinces, and in general dictates the reshuffling of Cabinet ministers in the successive administrations. The people look to the Shah for leadership in ending this sterile situation and bringing new men into the Government. Thus far the response of the Majlis to the effort to pull the nation together in the face of Russian efforts to disrupt it has been even more futile than that of the executive branch of government, which, although parliamentary in form, resembles the United States system in
that the members of the Cabinet do not hold seats in the Assembly. The inherent atomistic individualism of Iranian society has intensified this aristocratic futility. During the dictatorship of Reza Shah there could be no training in constructive parliamentary politics, with its necessary compromises and coalitions. This has contributed to the inability of Iranian politicians to develop the kind of party alignments essential for effective legislative action in a constitutional government. But the fractional and unstable character of the association of deputies in recent parliaments, with personalities rather than policies and programs the determining factors, is caused primarily by the lack of any real connection between the deputies and the electorate.

The franchise is widely held, but a large majority of the people are illiterate and are the easy prey of wealthy and powerful politicians. The Shah and his Government have tried to create a more realistic democratic base by limiting the vote to the literate, while simultaneously pressing a campaign to implement the existing law which specifies that elementary education be universal and compulsory. The members of the Majlis, however, have shown no disposition to favor the limitation of their present power which would be inherent in such a reform. The consequence is that an increasing number of Iranians are convinced that the only hope for concerted and constructive action lies in the leadership of the Shah, who alone can supply the unifying force which will put the nation on the road to stability and progress. This movement is the most significant development of recent years in Iran, and it was immeasurably strengthened by the unsuccessful attempt upon the Shah's life last February. The Government described this as part of a far-flung plot of the leftist Tudeh (Masses) Party, whose record of subservience to Moscow was demonstrated in 1945-47, and most Iranians accepted that explanation. The people reacted by closing ranks behind the Government when it outlawed the Party, and by rallying behind the leadership of the Shah.

Even the Majlis responded to the popular pressure and gave to the Shah some of the increased powers for which he had been asking for more than a year. In May a Constituent Assembly amended the constitution, empowering the Shah to dissolve Parliament when it rejected or refused to act upon major governmental proposals and to carry the issue to the electorate for a new
mandate. Mindful of the abrogation of the constitution by the present Shah's father, the delegates hedged this new grant of power with the provision that the Shah could dissolve Parliament once only on the same issue. Another decision calculated to give stability to the Government and to enhance the prestige of the Shah was the implementation, at last, of the constitutional provision which calls for an upper legislative chamber, or Senate, to be composed of 30 members, half of them elected by the people and half appointed by the Shah. These elections have recently been held and the 16th Majlis will be the first bicameral legislature.

No one can tell just how the movement will develop, for in the last analysis it depends upon the character of the young ruler. The relationship between the military and civilian leaders of the country is a point of tension. The generals were more privileged and more powerful under the dictatorship, and there are those among them who would be glad to induce the present Shah to desert his constitutional rôle. The recent decision of the Government to reincorporate in the Army most of the national gendarmerie, heretofore under the command of the Ministry of Interior, was contrary to the desire of the majority in the Majlis and increased the concern of those who fear the ambitions of the military. Suspicion is not directed at the Shah so much as at the generals who would like to use his popularity and prestige to increase their own power. And in any case, public concern was considerably reassured by the Shah's subsequent order forbidding Army officers to interfere in any way with civil affairs and in particular with the impending elections. Theoretically, the Army is responsible to the Cabinet through the Minister of War. But this official is almost invariably an appointee of the Palace; and in any major issue between the Premier and the Palace the allegiance of the Army is given first to its royal commander. But the question is not likely to arise in serious form unless there is basic distrust between the Premier and the Shah, such as existed during the incumbency of Ahmad Qavam, who resigned on December 10, 1947, after a vote of lack of confidence.

The present coöperation between the Shah and the Government is predicated upon mutual trust and a sincere acceptance by the monarch of a constitutional rôle. The enhancement of the Shah's influence is welcomed by the majority of the people and their leaders. There is hostile opposition, but it is that of the
extreme Left, especially that part of it under Soviet influence, and an extreme Right led by the conservative clerics. The assassination last November of Hazhir, Minister of Court, by a young fanatic who had been protected by clerics in 1946 after he murdered a brilliant and popular reformer shows how real is the danger from the Right.

III

In the face of such internal tensions, the rôle of a friendly Great Power such as the United States is delicate and difficult. We wish to respect Iran's own independence of action, and to pursue the traditional American policy of noninterference in another nation's domestic affairs. Yet if we did not place our prestige and strength behind those groups and programs that make for democracy and the extension of the welfare of the people we would in fact exercise our power blindly and irresponsibly. Justifiably or not, the United States has acquired the reputation of supporting the status quo everywhere in the Middle East. In Iran there is desperate need of basic reform, and many of the ruling class oppose it. The United States must devise means to develop Iran for the benefit of all its people. We cannot dictate economic methods, and certainly not forms of government, but American aid can and should be plainly contingent upon agreements on goals that promote the welfare of the nation as a whole and not that of some privileged class or group only. Broad humanitarian conditions may properly be attached to help freely asked.

American help to Iran has not been lacking since the war. In addition to advisory missions to the Army and the gendarmerie, there has been a $10,000,000 loan to secure war surplus many times that in value, and special legislation by Congress to provide a loan to cover the cost of transporting these supplies. This material has been used by Iran to reéquip her police and military forces. Some Iranians are inclined to think that American funds are theirs as of right, and to key their demands accordingly. For United States administrators to disillusion those who take this attitude is necessary for the welfare of all concerned.

On the other hand, there does seem to be justification for those Iranian critics who point out that their country has received relatively less than her share of help as compared to Turkey and Greece. Iran is by no means a military investment comparable in
importance to Turkey, and though the United States does well not to listen to all the requests of expansive generals in Teheran, we should remember that no chain is stronger than its weakest link and that the need for economic aid is constant if Iran is to have the will and the means to resist Soviet tyranny. Moreover, the United States might well be more alert to the possibility of making some small grants in aid for which no Congressional appropriation is needed and which would be practical and psychologically helpful. For example, it seems inexplicable that our Government should have curtly dismissed Iran's recent request for grain to meet near famine conditions in some areas with the observation that there was plenty of wheat to be bought on the world market. A small gift would have strengthened the Iranian Government's hand, especially with recalcitrant hoarders of grain, and would have brought much good-will to the United States among the hungry people.

The relationship of British and American policy in Iran offers a rather difficult problem of public relations, since many Iranians assume that the United States has simply taken over the rôle that Britain played there in the nineteenth century, and that the British are angrily trying to resist the American attempt to replace them in this sphere. Of course the Soviets do their best to foster this interpretation. Soviet propaganda, aiming to present the British and ourselves as the most brutal of imperialists, talks unceasingly of the bitter rivalry between the British and American Embassies. Quite the opposite would appear to be true. Certainly at the high policy level there is agreement between London and Washington on Iranian policy. But this is not because the United States has taken on the nineteenth-century imperialism of Britain, but because the present Labor Government perceives the bankruptcy of that policy in Asia. An almost pathological anti-British feeling exists in Iran, and most Iranians cannot credit Britain with any good intentions toward their country. The fact of British and American friendship can perhaps best be demonstrated by actions rather than words — and, after all, actions are the only convincing demonstration of American intentions toward Iran, though full and accurate information about those activities of course has a very necessary place.

A negative stand against the Soviets in support of Iranian independence is not sufficient, particularly since (to return to the central problem) such a policy takes the form of buttressing
the ruling class. It is imperative that we perceive the danger in this. Some means must be found to support those dynamic forces that are demanding new leadership and a liberal program in behalf of the people as a whole. The recent elections for the 16th Majlis in Teheran — where at least elections have been comparatively free — trumpet this warning. Although at this writing all the count is not yet in, it would appear that those candidates who have been bold enough to stand in vigorous opposition to the Government have been supported by large majorities. As this report appears in print, the new Majlis will be initiating its session. We shall see whether it is an improvement on its predecessors. Even if there is new blood, one should not be too sanguine. The fifteenth parliament yielded to the popular pressure which made itself felt during the spring and early summer in support of the Shah; but before it adjourned the old atomistic Iranian individualism seemed to have returned. Basic change comes slowly in such a country.

Yet there is no question that new forces are emerging, especially among the younger educated citizens, and that they will not long be denied a share in shaping the country's destiny. The Tudeh Party is outlawed, and discredited by its prostitution by Moscow; but the patriotism which was perverted in that body is still alive, and is searching for a leader of stature and integrity. The Shah could fill this rôle, and probably would attempt it if he were assured of American support. There seems to be a growing realization in Washington that only a more positive program can build solidly and well in Iran.

The core of the problem, therefore, is economic. What the people ask is bread, and a lightening of the burdens of everyday existence. This is what the Soviets promise them, and the only answer to it is a rising standard of living in Iran. It is significant that the people are revising their estimate of Reza Shah's dictatorship; at least, they say, he provided some bread and some hope, and what good are freedom and democracy, unless they can do likewise? During his régime, Iran was started on the road to economic improvement by the development of motorized communications, light industry and technical education, and by the expansion of trade. Top-heavy centralization, neglect of the basic industry of agriculture, and the repercussions of the
world depression slowed this development. Then came the war, Allied "occupation" and a 1,000 percent inflation which brought confusion and eventually dislocated the economy completely. No one has yet struck a balance of the gains and losses which the war brought to Iran, but the unfortunate fact seems to be that the gains, such as they were, accrued to a small percentage — the ruling aristocracy and the new rich — while the masses bore the brunt of the inflation and the results of the economic dislocation.

Since the war Iran has been struggling to meet this situation. New labor laws of an advanced and liberal character have at least been put on the books. State industries have been reorganized and more opportunities opened to profitable investment of private capital. Pest and malaria control has been instituted in various test areas of considerable size. The highway system has deteriorated, but the interrupted prewar effort to provide a rail network has been resumed. A new agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for the exploitation of their oil concession in the southwest has been worked out, but the last Majlis refused to ratify it on the ground that it is not favorable enough to Iranian interests; unfortunately Soviet political ambitions have to date prevented Iran from capitalizing on her other petroleum resources. Not least has been the flow of students abroad to secure the necessary technical training to take part in this new national development; at present, more than 700 are studying in the United States, the majority of them meeting their expenses on their own resources.

The most important and comprehensive effort of Iran to meet the postwar situation is her projected $650,000,000 Seven Year Plan for development of her human and material resources, due to get under way in 1950. The plan is indeed ambitious, since the most recent annual budget of the Iranian Government is only approximately $250,000,000. Studies were initiated in 1946, and some of the best American engineering advice has been sought. A preliminary survey cost Iran a quarter of a million dollars, and a more detailed and definitive report cost more than twice that. The plan will be administered by a Supreme Planning Board, which, except for its dependence upon the Majlis for appropriations, is autonomous and independent of the Government. The Chairman of this Board is the executive director of the plan. He will be a powerful figure in the country, and, along
with his colleagues, the target of considerable pressure in decisions which will greatly affect individuals and groups.

The Shah will of course exert much influence in the formulation of policy and choice of personnel. His American-trained younger brother, Abd al-Reza, has been his usual means of liaison with the Board, though sometimes the Shah's contacts are direct, as when he recently agreed to the replacement of the Chairman of the Board without the knowledge of his brother, a good friend of the ousted official. Considerable expert personnel will be required for the implementation of the plan. All administration will be in the hands of Iranians, and it should be possible to find a sufficient number of qualified administrators among the men trained abroad since 1930. Foreigners will advise only. Some advisers will be supplied by private firms in the United States, and some will be drawn from other countries. After the passage of the "Point Four" legislation, which is expected in the next session of Congress, it will also be possible to assign government experts employed by the United States to advisory positions, as has already been requested by the Iranian Government.

The character of this advisory personnel will be of primary importance. The United States Government can naturally expect to play no part in the choice of non-American advisers. Perhaps it can properly be consulted in the selection of private American advisers, though it cannot make the decision. But it can and must take great care in the selection of its own experts loaned to Iran. After the rather unfortunate experience in regard to some of the personnel of the Millspaugh economic and financial mission during 1943-45, there appears to be a disposition in Washington to screen recommendations very carefully and to retain the check of recall on all advisers loaned by the United States Government. With foreigners employed only as advisers, not as administrators, some of the difficulties which were created for the Millspaugh mission will be eliminated. But Iran has a record of paying high prices for advice and then disregarding it, and it is well to be aware that personnel problems will become acute. It is difficult to retain high caliber advisers and to maintain morale when disinterested advice is constantly disregarded.

The plan is to be financed by Iranian oil royalties and by capital funds (two-thirds) and foreign loans (one-third), the latter probably from the World Bank and Monetary Fund. Al-
though to date Iran has done no more than file notice of application for such a loan, Bank and Fund officials have visited Iran and are reported as well disposed toward such a request. There is considerable difference of opinion in responsible Iranian circles as to the present need for a loan. A. H. Ebtehaj, Governor of the National Bank and a member of the Supreme Planning Board, insists that for the first two years Iran can finance the program herself by oil royalties (a substantial portion of which are, by agreement with the British, available in dollars), by loans from the National Bank, by sale of government property, by private capital and by a 50 percent devaluation of Iranian currency. This devaluation would be achieved by reducing to that extent the present 100 percent backing of the Iranian rial by gold, foreign exchange reserves in both sterling and dollars, and the treasury of the Crown. No other country in the world has such complete coverage for its currency, and Mr. Ebtehaj argues that if it were cut in half Iran's currency would still be better protected than that of most nations. It is not surprising, however, that many Iranians, including the Shah, fear to put this theory to the test. Monetary stability rests on the confidence of the people in their currency, and the maintenance of confidence is of double importance in the Middle East.

The program will in any case require foreign financing eventually; but foreign funds would be much easier to obtain if Iran showed that she could get the plan under way on her own resources. It is generally agreed that the project is sound and will make for increased productivity; and the oil royalties, estimated to carry about 35 percent of the financing of the plan, will continue to bring money into the Treasury. Iran is in an advantageous position to finance such a plan of self-development. There is no doubt that the program would be inflationary, but the rate of expenditure can be controlled and the increase in the production of the country ought to take care of this necessary risk. Some experts believe that Iran cannot efficiently spend the annual sums designated in the early stages of the plan; and, if so, a reduction in initial expenditures would correspondingly reduce the inflationary effect.

The program calls for correlated and progressively productive projects — the expansion of main and subsidiary communications
to increase the flow of local goods and tap undeveloped areas and resources; the increase of the size and yield of cultivatable land by dams, irrigation, and such small scale mechanization as is practicable; the expansion of the light industry needed to supply the materials and tools for these projects and to process certain exportable products; the development of the oil resources of the country outside the Anglo-Iranian concession (although this is so expensive that only a beginning can be made with the small amounts of capital available); the extension of public health projects such as control of malaria and tuberculosis and the provision of pure drinking water and modern sanitation that will increase and raise the efficiency of the country's labor supply; and, finally, the spread of educational opportunities, especially at the elementary level and in village and rural areas.

If this plan can be developed as projected, the living standard of the Iranian people should before long begin to rise, and there should be hope for the future. This would inevitably have a quieting and steadying effect upon the political situation; and in such an atmosphere the liberal and progressive elements might find an opportunity to make themselves felt. But for this very reason, we should be aware that the landed and mercantile classes are likely to perceive in the plan a threat to their present supremacy. To be sure, this plan does not call for any radical alteration of the present land-holding system, which must eventually come. But the success of the plan will in practice be a movement in that direction, and it is altogether probable that among these privileged classes there will be many who will strive to sabotage the whole effort.

These supporters of the status quo will be abetted by the conservative clerics who fear this program of industrialization and modernization as a threat to the Islamic religion, way of life and social structure. Too many of them fail not only to perceive the opportunity for utilizing modern technology in the building of a dynamic society dedicated to the best in Islam, but also to realize that the alternative is revolution and Communism. If Iran became a Soviet satellite they would be liquidated without ceremony.

Finally, we must expect the Soviets to use every means to ruin the whole effort. They cannot afford to see it succeed. By every device of unscrupulous propaganda they will brand it a diabolical enslavement of Iran by United States capitalistic
imperialism. "Exploitation" in the old sense of the word is, in fact, impossible within the framework of the plan, and American information services have an extremely important task to perform in making the Iranian people understand what is being done, as has been noted above. It is fair to report that officials in Washington are aware of these matters.

The chance of success for the plan is, of course, predicated on the assumption that Iran has a few years of peace in which to get her feet planted on the road to recovery and reform. Whether the Politburo will grant them to her, no man can say. An outbreak of war anywhere would probably quickly involve Iran, with the Red Army striking for the Persian Gulf in order to make Soviet petroleum resources secure and if possible to appropriate those of the Near East. For a country so vulnerable, Iran has shown courage in standing up so stoutly to Soviet intimidation. Her stand is founded on knowledge of American support. The pressure will be intensified if Iran shows success in her effort of self-development. Only the certainty that the violation of her territory would not go unchallenged by the United States and the United Nations can give her people the breathing space they need.
THEORIES OF SOCIALIST IMPERIALISM

By Lenore O'Boyle

SINCE the war there has been a certain amount of discussion, for obvious reasons, as to why Marx never developed a theory of Socialist imperialism. Proverbially, the revolution was to usher in the era of "to each according to his needs" and make power politics, old style, no longer necessary. But we have been learning that Socialists can be imperialists. Russia has been upsetting the Marxist equation.

Before the First World War there were some German Socialists who had quite a well-defined theory of imperialism. Not a great deal of attention has been paid to them, but there are interesting parallels (and differences) between their policies and those of the Communists today. The theory of this Socialist group, known as the Imperialists, was never officially approved; but the group was never expelled from the Party, the reason probably being that the Majority group (not the Independents, who were genuinely liberal and anti-imperialist) were in any case of pretty much the same mind in foreign policy. The Imperialists, who centered about the periodical, *Die Sozialistische Monatshefte*, contained a heavy representation of trade union men: Max Schippel, Ludwig Quessel, Max Cohen and Wolfgang Heine. In addition they included a few highly articulate individuals who operated more on their own: Heinrich Cunow, Konrad Haenisch and Paul Lensch, the last being probably the most interesting of them all. It is somewhat artificial to treat these men as a separate group, for half the time they were only making the Majority's implied beliefs explicit and what new elements they added to Socialist theory were not too difficult to fit onto the Majority scheme. Yet they did have some ideas which the Majority, even though sympathetic, could never have accepted, and which are worth examining in the light of current developments in Socialist theory and practice.

These Imperialists of the old German Socialist Party wanted what the Russians seem to want today, but they had a harder time in justifying their position. The Russians can point to the

---

1 The German Socialists during the First World War split into three groups. The Spartacists were the nucleus of the later Communist Party; the Majority group supported the Government; the Independents went into opposition in 1916. After 1918 the Independents broke up, some returning to the Majority, some joining the Communists.
revolution, and they can make out a case of sorts for being a Socialist country. Russia and Marx being synonymous, the Russians never conquer; they only spread the revolution. In Germany in 1914 it was all too obvious that the classless society was a long way off. The Imperialists therefore could only argue that though Germany was not yet a Socialist state it was becoming one very fast. To make this argument, though, they had to resort to some fairly elaborate explanations about the nature of the state. Marx said that the state is always a class state, that is, it can never represent the interests of society as a whole, as democrats hold, but has to represent the interests of a class, and in fact is merely the instrument used by one dominant class to oppress all other classes. There can be a proletarian as well as a middle-class state, of course, but the proletariat cannot simply take over the middle-class state and expect it to function for proletarian purposes. The workers have to smash the state and rebuild it to serve their own purposes, which is why Communists claim that violent revolution is a necessity and condemn anything like the New Deal or the present Labor Government of England. Now if the Imperialists in Germany were anxious for conquest and neither wanted nor expected a proletarian revolution (as they did not), then they had to abolish the Marxist state idea or recognize their own government as purely middle-class. Their state could be bourgeois or proletarian, but it could not be half one and half the other.

Actually, though, the Imperialists adopted just that conception. They said that absolute classes and absolute class states did not exist, that there were only concrete states, and that these could be more or less under the control of the proletariat. The German state, for example, was controlled by the capitalists, but also by the proletariat. It was quite obvious that the proletariat was well organized in the Socialist Party and the trade unions, and had some real weight. This being the case, the proletariat had an interest in defending the state.

So far, the theory solved only the problem of the German worker. He might be hurt by Germany's defeat, but that was not the same thing as saying that his defeat would be bad for Socialism as a world movement. So the Imperialists went a step further, and made German capitalism practically equivalent to Socialism. They argued that Socialism would come first to the most advanced capitalist country. It had to, since only a mature capital-
ism could pass over into Socialism. The system had to provide its own gravediggers, and Socialism could grow only out of advanced capitalism just as capitalism could have come out of nothing but high feudalism. The whole point of Marx's interpretation of history was that things develop inevitably according to the laws of their own being: a system develops itself to the point where it has to pass over into something else or break down, and it passes most easily into the order which it has itself prepared. Thus capitalism produces the proletariat, mass methods, centralization of ownership and production, which make Socialism inevitable, and without which Socialism is inconceivable.

This led to the point where the Imperialists could argue that because Germany had the most advanced capitalism it was the country nearest to Socialism economically. And they could argue that because the state could change hands without violent revolution, and the proletariat was gaining more and more political power, Germany was nearest to Socialism politically. Thus it was that Germany, being in their eyes almost a Socialist state, and certainly the nearest to one in Europe, embodied the cause of international Socialism. "To endanger the future of German capitalism, and with it the future of the German working movement, is also to endanger the cause of international Socialism!"  

It was one thing for a Frenchman to defend his government, which was middle-class; it was quite another thing for a German to defend his.

In other words, German Socialists could not only support their government in its foreign policy but could cooperate with it in internal affairs. All kinds of arguments could be found for cooperating with other parties, joining a coalition government, voting the budget. Every time the German state interfered a little more in economic life the Imperialists saw a new victory for Socialism. The Independents thought that the German war economy was state interference for the benefit of the capitalists; but by the time the Imperialists were through with their explanations they had convinced themselves that it was an expression of Socialism, since they saw in it a partially proletarian state taking over from the capitalists. Similarly, the Imperialists were gentler in their criticism of the Army's rule over civilians, wartime censorship, rationing and such. In general, they were careful not to make any demands which they thought would hurt capitalism,

on the theory that the stronger it was the nearer the state came to Socialism.

As for foreign policy, the Imperialists found the appropriate quotations from Marx to prove that he had really been in favor of the great nations taking over the small. Incidentally, Marx's attitude toward the Slavs made this not too difficult. The Imperialists reasoned that the more mature capitalism became, the larger its necessary field of operations. In other words, capitalism had outgrown national boundaries. Progressive capitalism called for supra-national units. This did not mean that small nations would have no rights at all, simply that their rights would not extend beyond the needs of cultural autonomy. This to them represented historical progress, similar to that represented by the breakdown of the independent artisan economy. "Even a certain forceful annexation or impoverishment of small 'crippled' nations by the great nations of civilization was held by Marx and Engels justified under certain conditions. . . ."

According to this theory, also, colonies could be justified for the first time. The traditional line of the Second International had always been that colonies were evil and only provided a means for capitalists to exploit more human beings. Now anything that benefited Germany was ipso facto good, and as Germany needed raw materials the proletariat should favor the possession of colonies. Outright demands were not often made for new colonies, but emphasis was laid on the fact that Germany had to keep all her old colonies, and the general impression was given that if Germany had a chance to obtain others she should make no bones about taking them. Cunow, less hesitant than the rest, said frankly that Germany should take the Portuguese colonies.

Much stress was laid on the hatred of other countries for Germany. Russians today see Russia being plotted against by the capitalist states because as the great Socialist state she represents the cause of progress; the Imperialists of the Socialist Party saw Germany being plotted against because she was the most advanced capitalist state. According to the Imperialists, the war of 1914–1918 was economic in origin, basically an attempt of the old capitalist states to crush the German economic threat. They developed a standardized picture of what would happen to Ger-

---

many if she lost the war — dismemberment among the Allies, and economic serfdom. England was their particular enemy. Paul Lensch worked out a very sweeping analysis to prove that the war was in reality a world revolution on the part of progressive capitalism, represented by Germany, against the reactionary principle of laissez-faire capitalism, represented by England. Since a German victory would save the most advanced form of capitalism, it would be a victory of Socialism. Carrying his concept of Socialism to fantastic lengths, Lensch identified whole nations with classes, and interpreted the war as a struggle between a world-wide exploiting class, made up chiefly of the English capitalists and proletariat combined, and a world-wide exploited class, composed chiefly of the German capitalists and proletariat combined.

Lensch and other Imperialists advocated the old idea of a continental bloc against England. Their talk of economic infiltration and exploitation did not differ greatly from what the Russians say about the Marshall Plan and the American design for turning Europe into a colony. The double standard, of course, came in here again. If Germany dominated Central Europe economically, then the Imperialists approved it as a victory of Socialism; but if England did the same, then it was imperialism, and hateful. In short, Imperialist theory was hardly more than window dressing for traditional German nationalism, plus a strong trade union sentiment. When the war came, the Imperialists wanted Germany to win in every possible respect just as the Conservatives did. But since the Imperialists were Socialists, and for any number of obvious reasons wanted to stay in the Party, they had to resort to the tortuous ingenuity described above.

Certain features of the German state could be made to seem Socialistic. The very fact that the German state was so reactionary was in a sense an asset, since this meant that there was no place for the ideal of laissez-faire individualism. Here lay the decisive difference between the Imperialists and the Majority Socialists. The Majority did stand, even though with reservations, for the western liberal tradition — rule by parliament, civil liberties, individual freedom; they carried on what was left in Germany of the liberal middle-class tradition after Bismarck. The anti-liberal, anti-middle-class Imperialists actually were returning to the ideas of Lassalle. Lassalle had been a Hegelian, and consequently wrote
THEORIES OF SOCIALIST IMPERIALISM 295

a good deal of nonsense about the state as the repository of the Divine and the instrument through which the Divine manifested itself in history. This, since it implied that in practice the state was always good no matter who controlled it, was far from Marx's idea of the state as the executive of the ruling class. Its purpose of revealing the Divine to man could, of course, be perverted, but there need be no talk about smashing the state. All that would be necessary would be to reform the state.

Actually, Lassalle would have been as pleased with a Socialistically-minded absolute monarchy as with anything else, and he tried to persuade Bismarck to bypass the liberals by granting universal suffrage and winning the proletariat's support for the monarchy. He never disliked the reactionaries. His hatred was reserved for the liberals. Though in practice they fought for many of his demands, nevertheless they represented the liberal Manchester school of thought that would have weakened the state. Instead of the traditional Marxist tactic — a proletarian alliance with the middle class against feudalism first, and only later a struggle between proletariat and middle class — Lassalle advocated an alliance of feudalism and the proletariat against the middle class. In 1914 Lensch and others did much the same thing. They wanted the proletariat to join with feudalism and the great capitalists against the lower middle class, cooperate in an aggressive foreign policy, and then divide the spoils. Noske, for example, advocated an alliance between the proletariat and the German officer class.

In insisting on the need for a strong state, the Imperialists could have the best of both worlds — they could be good Socialists and good Germans at the same time. German Conservatives saw, rightly, that a strong state was a necessary instrument for power politics. Hence their theories that the nation was an organism instead of the mere sum of its members and that freedom consisted in the willing subordination of the individual to the state. The Imperialists favored the same methods, the difference being in aim: Socialism demands mass organization and individual subordination for the good of the whole. Since Germany had always been distinguished by precisely these characteristics, it followed that Germany had a natural affinity for Socialism, and indeed had always been at least partially Socialistic without knowing it.

Where they found difficulty in identifying certain Marxist con-
cepts with the nationalist scheme of things the Imperialists changed Marxism. The class struggle, for example, they interpreted as a kind of good-natured rivalry among different groups to see which could contribute most to the national good. Capitalism fought so that Germany could have a strong industry, the worker fought so that Germany could have an educated and physically fit proletariat, and whichever won, Germany was also the winner. In particular, Socialism also helped Germany by making the worker nationalistic, since it brought the blessings of universal suffrage, universal education and universal military service, all of which made the worker conscious of his citizenship.

In fact neither in Germany before the First World War nor in Russia afterwards have Marxists ever faced realistically the problem of a Socialist brand of imperialism. They have always taken it for granted that no kind of imperialism would exist under Socialism since in theory there would be no need for it. There would be no capitalists wanting to make profits, there could be unrestricted production; there would be enough of everything, therefore, to go around. From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs. But what happens if material resources are not unlimited, and productivity is not that high? In fact nationalist rivalries are as strong as ever.

It is interesting to compare the rationalizations of these German Socialists with those of the Russian Communists, who today have the same desire to be good Russians and good Socialists simultaneously. Russian nationalism seems to have been amalgamated with pride in the peculiar brand of Marxism that Lenin and Stalin have developed; and the end product, whatever it is called, is nothing so simple as what we mean by the word nationalism in its nineteenth century sense. There is no doubt that the Russians have a supra-national ideology. German Socialists had little real interest in international Socialism. They were interested in German greatness and trade unions, and to the degree that they accepted Socialism they did so because it supplied a convenient ideology and organization for a trade union movement.

The Russians ignore the problem. They content themselves by saying that they are a Socialist state, and that world Socialism is inevitable. When their armies enter a country, the people are given an opportunity for the first time to express their wishes freely, and it is only natural that they should elect a Socialist government. There is no question of coercion. And since the
people's governments have no capitalists to restrict production, to put up tariff barriers and to exploit the workers, they cooperate freely. When a dispute like that between the Cominform and Tito arises, the Russians cannot admit that it is a quarrel among Socialist states. They must say that Tito has sold out to the Anglo-American imperialists and repudiated Marxism. And Tito as a Marxist must say that the difficulty has arisen because the Russians treat Jugoslavia as a colony, restrict her to the production of raw materials which they need and keep her poor so that they can be rich. In other words, they say, there is not enough to go around in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia is taking the lion's share, and that makes her an imperialist instead of a Socialist Power.

The Germans came closer to the problem, perhaps, but they never thought it through. Their theory had to be more elaborate than that of the Communists because they could neither claim that they had a Socialist government nor that the governments set up by the German armies in occupied territories were Socialist. At the same time they had to justify German conquests as a boon to humanity. Since big business and the traditional nationalist elements stood behind Pan-German peace plans, the Imperialists had to claim these forces as their own. German capitalism was almost Socialism, therefore the proletariat should support it; German business needed new territory, therefore the German proletariat should support the government's foreign policy. They took it for granted that there was too little to satisfy everyone. They never said that scarcity would prevail once all Europe or the world went Socialist; they talked only about the Europe of their day which was being fought over by the capitalist Powers, and argued that since Germany was the best of these Powers she should gain the most. Presumably the problem of division would not arise in a Socialist world, since England would no longer have need to hurt the German economy and Germany no need to defend herself.

Nationalism, which makes the theory held by the Imperialists in the old German Socialist Party seem so different from that of the Russian Communists, was probably less important as a measuring rod than it appears to be at first. The Russians simply find nationalism unnecessary for their theory. The Germans had to pretend that nationalism was the same thing as Socialism. In the process they produced a kind of theory very much like National
Socialism, even down to terminology. It would probably be going too far to say that the Imperialists were Nazis, or would have become Nazis under Hitler; and in any event, the leaders—Lensch, Heine and Quessel—were dead by Hitler's time. They were good trade union men, though, and in many ways excellent practical leaders. In fact, reading through Die Sozialistische Monatshefte, one is rather impressed by their realism and good sense in questions of practical economic policy. But when questions of German patriotism were involved they took refuge in the catchwords and pseudo-metaphysical gibberish of the Hegelian and anti-individualistic nationalists. We should not place too much stress on this, perhaps, since it distracts from the other aspects of Imperialist thinking. And while the Russians use more rational terms for argument, still they have a mystique just as hard to cope with on rational terms as German nationalism, as witness their claim to have a special Communist physical science.

In practice, the results of Russian policy are much the same as the results of German policy would probably have been had the Imperialists ever come into control of the German Government. In each case, a national cause is identified with a supranational cause. The Communists justify their actions by saying that anything that strengthens Russia is good because Russia is the great Socialist Power. The Imperialists said that anything that benefited Germany was good because the Germans, due to their peculiar character, were the nearest thing to a Socialist Power that existed in Europe. The logic of the two positions is the same. Dimitrov's main point at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935 was that the way to judge the character of any country is to examine its attitude toward Russia, and this is still the argument of the Cominform in its dispute with Jugoslavia: "The touchstone of a man's progressiveness is his attitude toward the Soviet Union."
PAKISTAN'S CLAIM TO KASHMIR

By Sir William Barton

Now that the Kuomintang has been overthrown and the Chinese Communist armies are sweeping toward Tibet and Burma, with a consequent threat to the Middle East as well as to southern Asia, there is need for a realistic appraisal of the dangers inherent in the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The Indian sub-continent is the strategic place at which Communism in Asia will either be contained or will irrupt east, west and south with consequences almost surely fatal to the peace of the world. Both the American and British Governments are inclined to look to Pandit Nehru to take the leadership in the opposition to Communism. But Pandit Nehru's India is only a part of the India of old days. The new India cannot by herself play the rôle of the defender of southern Asia against the Kremlin's ambitions; she must have her neighbor, the new Dominion of Pakistan, at her side.

Pakistan is at the moment responsible for Kashmir, which adjoins northern Pakistan on the east. On the northeast frontier of Kashmir, the Chinese province of Sinkiang has opted for the Communist Republic, thus forming a new Communist front. To the northwest, in Afghanistan, the Soviet Embassy in Kabul is intriguing with the border tribes, and especially with the Fakir of Ipi, a declared enemy of the Pakistan Government. And north and northwest of Afghanistan, the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks and Turkmen who, like their neighbors the Hazaras further south, have no love for their Afghan masters, are exposed to the infiltration of Communism from the Soviet Republic of Uzbek just beyond the Oxus. There is also an eastern wing of Pakistan, between India and Burma (not shown on map). This is exposed to Communist irruption from Burma and Malaya. Should there be war between Pakistan and India, Soviet intervention on the side of Pakistan seems likely.

In population, as well as geographically, Kashmir is logically a part of Pakistan; 85 percent of the people of Kashmir are Moslems. However, at the time of partition the state was under Hindu rule. This came about through a much-regretted act of British policy. About a hundred years ago, after the first Sikh War, Kashmir was ceded to the British by the Sikh Government. At
that time Gulab Singh, the ruler of Jammu, a small Hindu-Dogra principality, agreed to liquidate the indemnity of £750,000 which the Sikh Darbar had promised to pay the British, and in return the British gave him Kashmir with its overwhelming majority of Moslems. They have never been happy under Hindu rule.

Before partition there had been a Congress movement for self-government in the state led by a Moslem, Sheikh Abdullah, who enjoyed the support of Pandit Nehru even when he was a Minister of the Government of India. Sheikh Abdullah went too far and was imprisoned by the Maharajah's Government despite Nehru's protests. After the British withdrawal, a section of the Moslem community, influenced by rumors that the Maharajah intended to accede to India, started a revolutionary movement. It was savagely dealt with by the Maharajah's Hindu and Dogra troops. News of the oppression of their coreligionists spread
among the fanatical Afghan tribes of the Pakistan border, with the result that thousands of them swept into Kashmir on what they regarded as a holy war. They drove back the Maharajah's troops, sacked Baramula, a town at the entrance to the Vale of Kashmir, and would have seized the capital, Srinagar, had they not moved in other directions to loot.

The Maharajah appealed for help to Pandit Nehru, and aid was promised on condition that the Maharajah acceded to India and placed Nehru's protégé at the head of the administration. The Maharajah agreed. The approach to the Vale through Jammu, the southern capital of the state, is feasible only through the Pakistan town of Sialot — hence the only possibility was to send in troops by air. This was done. The tribal attack was held, Srinagar was saved, and the tribesmen were driven halfway down the Jhelum valley, where with reënforcements they held the Indian advance. Desultory fighting went on for several months, but meanwhile Indian engineers built a road from Pathankot in Indian territory through the foothills of Chamba, a Hindu state that had acceded to India. This made strong reënforcements possible and the tribesmen were pushed back; but finally, at a critical stage, Pakistan sent in her regular troops and checked the Indian forces. Thereupon Nehru appealed to the United Nations and a commission was sent to investigate.

India pointed out that Kashmir had acceded to India, that Pakistan had no right to intervene on the side of the revolutionaries, and that instead of holding back the tribesmen, as was her duty, she had permitted many of the tribal contingents to move across the districts she administered and had helped them in many ways. India charged further that Pakistan, by finally sending in her regular troops, had brought on what was in fact an undeclared war.

The Commission succeeded in the beginning of 1949 in inducing the two Dominions to agree to a cease-fire and a truce, with the respective forces occupying the territory in their hands at the time the truce was accepted. Thus Pakistan controlled a large slice of the hill province of Punch adjoining Jammu, a thin strip on the west, the tribal country of Astor, Chilas and Gilgit, and most of the north and northwest mountain country adjacent to Sinkiang. In this territory an Azād, or free government, had been set up supported by a force of 35 battalions recruited from the men of Punch who had fought for their country in the last war.
Both sides had all along agreed to abide by the result of a plebiscite; the Commission proceeded to consider the necessary conditions for carrying it out. Meanwhile the Pakistan Government had induced the tribesmen to withdraw, but had maintained its own troops in their positions as well as the 35 battalions.

Pandit Nehru’s attitude has been ambiguous. On several occasions in public speeches he has declared that Kashmir is part and parcel of India and will never be given up, though he has also said that if the people vote against Indian citizenship he will accept their verdict. The extension of representation to Kashmir in the Indian Constituent Assembly has also created difficulties. Not unnaturally, it was felt in Pakistan that this meant that Pandit Nehru intended that the plebiscite should be carried out by his adherent, Sheikh Abdullah, and, if so, that a verdict in India’s favor would be a foregone conclusion. That this view of the situation was not entirely fanciful was shown by Nehru’s insistence that, as a preliminary to the plebiscite, the Azād battalions should be disbanded and the country now administered by the Azād government be handed over to Sheikh Abdullah.

Pakistan would not agree to these conditions; nor was the Commission prepared to go to such lengths. In the end the Commission proposed that the questions at issue be settled by arbitration. Pakistan agreed, but India refused. Letters from the British Prime Minister and President Truman to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, the Pakistan Prime Minister, and Pandit Nehru, urging them to come to a friendly settlement, have left the position unchanged. Pakistan welcomed the intervention; Pandit Nehru apparently regarded it as uncalled for. The next move is up to the United Nations, and meanwhile the tension grows. The Pakistan frontier tribes are urging the Pakistan Government to permit them to move into Kashmir. It will not be easy for the Government to prevent an explosion of fanaticism, which would make civil war inevitable.

II

As already noted, the vast majority of the people of Kashmir are Moslems. Of these, the men of Punch and the Jhelum valley are of the same breed as the Punjab Moslems – good military material. The tribes of the frontier hinterland – Astor, Chilas, Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar – are also of the hardy hillman type. This group of Moslems, one might say, would almost to a man
PAKISTAN'S CLAIM TO KASHMIR

vote for Pakistan. They have never accepted Dogra-Hindu rule and now their detestation of Sikhs and Hindus has been raised to fever heat by the atrocities committed on their people and the wholesale expulsion of Moslems from the Jammu province. On the other hand, the majority of the Moslems of the Vale of Kashmir are a listless, apathetic lot, submissive to a heavy-handed bureaucracy. Even so, Pakistanis are quite convinced that, left to themselves, most of them would vote for Pakistan.

One wonders whether the Indian Government has considered the military implications of the retention of Kashmir in India. With half or more of the population hostile, especially in the frontier hinterland, it would have to maintain an army of occupation in the country. This would be all the more necessary because Hindu rule in Kashmir would be a standing affront to the tribes of the Afghan borderland; there would be constant raids, since the tribes can enter Kashmir without crossing territory administered by the Pakistan Government. Ten thousand Pathans from Swat moved into Kashmir in this way in the winter of 1947-48. Admittedly it is the obligation of the Pakistan Government to prevent such aggression by their tribesmen, but to do this Pakistan would be compelled to maintain at least a division in the border territory of Swat. Such a measure would excite the bitter hostility of the tribes, thus creating a new and difficult problem for Pakistan. Could India fairly expect Pakistan to incur such risks?

Much has been made of the culpability of the Pakistan Government in not preventing the tribal people from entering Kashmir in the winter of 1947-48. If an attempt had been made to drive them back, the whole border from Chitral south to Quetta would have burst into flame, and at that time Pakistan forces were still disorganized and largely unequipped, thanks to India's refusal to hand over Pakistan's share of the military supplies left by the British. They could not have held down a tribal rising and might have been driven across the Indus. This would have given the Afghans an opportunity of taking territory as far as the Indus, which they look on as Afghanistan irredenta. In such an event Pakistan would either have been absorbed in India, or have become a satellite of that country. But would Hindus view with complaisance the establishment of a militant Islam on the Indus even with the Moslem West Punjab as a buffer state? Surely not.

It may seem on a cursory view that Pakistan was utterly in the
wrong in moving regular troops into Kashmir in the summer of 1948. However, there is something to be said in extenuation. Punjab opinion was dangerously excited at the rumors that Dogra troops were driving thousands of Moslems out of Punch into Pakistan, and action to hold up the Indian advance seemed the only possible answer. Opinion in Pakistan would say in further justification that, in any case, India had no right to be in Kashmir at all.

The two Dominions are at variance on other matters. Thus, for example, there is a dispute over the waters of the Sutlej, a tributary of the Indus, which are essential for irrigation in the West Punjab. Trouble has also developed over the settlement of claims to evacuate property; and now economic relations have been further distorted by the refusal of the Pakistan Government to devalue her rupee, thus creating complications in the supply of Pakistan jute essential for the Calcutta textile industries. Pakistan is in a strong position as regards foreign trade, and took this occasion to strengthen it. Whether this will be to her advantage in the long run is a matter of conjecture. In the economic sphere the two countries are complementary, and must work together to prosper.

The Indian budget is unbalanced. This is partly because more than half of her expenditures are for defense, and also because her huge imports of food produce a heavy adverse balance of trade. The ruling Congress Party is weakened by internal disputes and is meeting considerable opposition from left-wing elements, including Communists. There is trouble with the Sikhs, a militant group strongly represented in the Army, who demand a separate province in the East Punjab in association with the Sikh state of Patiala. Another militant group, the Rashtriya Sevak Sangh, or R.S.S. — an offshoot of the great orthodox party of the caste Hindus, the Hindu Mahasabha — whose object is to absorb Pakistan, has of late been asserting itself. Pandit Nehru is said to regard it as almost as dangerous as the Communists. Moreover, the administration, both central and provincial, seems to be progressively deteriorating; young and inexperienced officials occupy high positions to which they are unsuited. The fact that every man in a Gandhi cap considers himself a ruler is a standing embarrassment to officialdom. Democracy is breathing heavily. Even the General Secretary of the Congress Party went so far the other day as to express the view that Congress might go
PAKISTAN'S CLAIM TO KASHMIR

the way of the Kuomintang; a movement to the left would, he said, mean a dictatorship. And only a month or two ago Sardar Patel, Deputy Prime Minister, told the popular Congress Ministries he had set up in the states that if they would not stop their squabbles he would administer the states from Delhi.

Congress is indeed fighting for survival. Moderate opinion is, however, on its side and it is generally felt that only the Congress Party can for the next few years hold the country together. The Indian political horizon would undoubtedly clear once a lasting peace had been established with Pakistan.

III

India was more fortunate than Pakistan in inheriting a central government as a going concern. Pakistan had to start from scratch, and this involved many complicated problems. Yet despite a shortage of senior officers and many other difficulties a sound and balanced government has been set up.

The economy of Pakistan is based on agriculture. There are practically no organized industries, and the lack of ordnance factories has, incidentally, been a serious handicap in the building up of adequate military forces. But as against this the country has a flourishing agriculture, which in normal years not only gives the country an adequate food supply, but also leaves something for export. Pakistan jute is the most important item sent abroad from the whole sub-continent; but much of it is consumed in Indian mills in Calcutta. The enhanced price of jute arising from the refusal of Pakistan to devalue her currency has held up supplies to India to the detriment of the grower and of the Calcutta mills. The Pakistan Government had pledged itself to indemnify the growers, and a way will doubtless be found to dispose of the crop at a reasonable price. West Punjab also produces high grade cotton, most of which goes to India or overseas; and hides and wool are also exported.

The Pakistan Government is trying to utilize its raw materials to the greatest extent possible; three jute mills, for example, are to be set up in Chittagong, a port in East Bengal. There is a lack of coal suitable for use in industries, but the Government is endeavoring to supply the deficiency by developing hydroelectric power on a large scale both in East and West Pakistan. Lack of capital is a difficulty. People with money, including the merchant class, have not shown much initiative in investing in industries.
The financial position is, however, on the whole sound; the budget is balanced, and there is a favorable balance of trade. There is money in the country and it will come into the open when peace is established. Rural debt has disappeared with the flight of the Hindu money lender. It is hardly necessary to say that the position would quickly improve if the major part of the budget, as in India, did not have to be spent on defense.

Politically Pakistan is in smoother waters than her great neighbor. The men of the stormy borderland who might have made control of the North-West Frontier impossible have thrown in their lot with her. There is no left-wing element, no militant group like the R.S.S. or the Sikhs. Still there has been trouble. The administration of the West Punjab had at one time threatened to dissolve into chaos due to the incompetence and corruption of the popular ministry. Equilibrium was restored only when the Governor General dismissed the ministry and placed the administration in the hands of the Governor. In Sind, two Premiers were involved in charges of corrupt practices. Both were convicted in the lower courts but were acquitted on appeal.

In external affairs the attitude of Afghanistan has been a cause of anxiety to the Pakistan Government. On the withdrawal of the British, the Kabul authorities put forward a claim to Afghanistan irredenta, i.e., the country between the international boundary (the so-called Durand line) and the Indus. It had for 50 years or more from the middle of the eighteenth century been a part of the then Afghan Empire. Pakistan could not, however, consider any such claim, whereupon the Afghan Government demanded control of the tribal belt between the Durand line and the administrative boundary at the foothills. This claim had no real basis; the tribes concerned have no desire to associate themselves with Kabul.

The Afghan authorities, rebuffed, continue to pour abuse on Pakistan in their official press and radio. Attempts are being made, so far without success, to influence the Pathan tribes on the Pakistan border in favor of the Kabul policy. It is one of Pakistan's grievances against India that she seems to support the Afghan attitude: the Delhi newspapers reproduce the outpourings of the Afghan press and there are rumors of an Indian loan to Afghanistan. The only explanation that occurs to Pakistan is that India is anxious to create embarrassment for her on the Afghan frontier, to distract her attention from Kashmir.
The attitude of Pakistan toward His Majesty’s Government unfortunately lacks cordiality. For this several reasons are given. Pakistan feels that very little has been done by the British to assist her in the field of economic development and it is generally felt that it was the duty of the Britain, as leader of the Commonwealth, to intervene in the Kashmir trouble, which the British Government definitely refused to do. Another count in the indictment is the failure of the British Government to support Hyderabad against the power politics of India. But perhaps the strongest criticism is directed against the acceptance in London of Prime Minister Nehru’s conditions for remaining in the Commonwealth. It was expected in Pakistan that such conditions would be refused, since they confer on India all the advantages of Commonwealth membership without any of its obligations. That the British Government seemed to assume that Pakistan would stay in the Commonwealth under any conditions was much resented.

There is a widespread belief in Pakistan that India is only waiting for an opportunity to attack her. Pakistanis feel that if war broke out over Kashmir neither the United States nor Britain would intervene, because they rely on the Nehru Government to save middle Asia from Communism, and that India would be allowed to overwhelm her weaker neighbor if she could, and reunite the two Indias. In support of the view that both Britain and the United States are partial to India, Pakistanis comment on their advocacy of India’s claim to a seat in the Security Council of the United Nations, which to Pakistan seems a demand by the delinquent to sit on the body that is to judge his conduct. The claim, however, has been conceded.

The clouds on the political horizon in Pakistan seemed to lift when her Prime Minister was invited to Moscow. “Russia is on our side,” was a headline in most of the newspapers. People generally were almost hysterical with delight. The significance of the episode was doubtless exaggerated, and the visit has since been delayed; but it is practically certain that Pakistan as a whole would prefer to be a satellite of Russia than submit to Hindu domination. This does not mean that Pakistan is attracted by Russia’s ideology; Islamic principles are opposed to Communism. It is hardly necessary to say that in a war with India
Pakistan would have at her back half a million well-armed tribesmen of the border hinterland reënforced probably by another half a million from Afghanistan. India would stand up against them only by dint of superiority in modern armament.

It should not be overlooked that the Moslem countries of the Middle East are watching with interest the course of the Kashmir quarrel, and that a decision adverse to Pakistan would undoubtedly be resented there. There is real need for efforts to dissipate the distrust and suspicion of the west which prevail in Pakistan. As Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, observed the other day in a public address, “If strengthened, the Moslem belt in the Middle East would be a barrier to Communism.” Today oil counts for much strategically; without Moslem support the oil supplies in the Middle East may well fall into Communist hands.

Something also might be done to bring the Afghan Government into a more reasonable frame of mind, for its endeavors to incite the border tribes against Pakistan could lead to trouble on that explosive frontier. Afghanistan is in the grip of an acute economic crisis and needs outside help. Pakistan is probably prepared to forget the past and cooperate with her, especially if economic support is given by the west.

Recognition by the western Powers of the immensely important rôle Pakistan is destined to play in Middle Eastern politics should help to induce Pandit Nehru and his Government to be less uncompromising. International opinion is beginning to realize that no American efforts can revivify India’s economy unless there is a mutually acceptable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. An impartial plebiscite is almost impossible unless the United Nations takes over the administration of the whole country, a scheme not easy to carry out. The best decision would be a compromise which gave the predominantly Moslem regions to Pakistan, leaving that part of the Jammu province lying south of the Chenab to India as a Hindu enclave. This would practically restore the boundaries as they existed before the tragic blunder of the British a century earlier. The record of Hindu rule since then can hardly constitute a claim to anything more than the original Hindu state. Recent reports from Washington seemed to indicate that Pandit Nehru is thinking of mediation as a possible means of settlement. Here perhaps is a new and fruitful approach.
THE BATTLE FOR MOSCOW,
TURNING POINT OF THE WAR

By Vice Admiral Kurt Assmann

UNTIL the summer of 1941 the German Wehrmacht had gone from success to success; all of the operations which it had launched were brilliant in conception and execution. Poland, Norway, France and the Balkans were the scenes of great triumphs. It is true that Hitler had cast longing eyes across the English Channel and had directed preparations for an invasion of England. Yet the fact that this was not attempted appeared to confirm that the German High Command knew the measure of the attainable and weighed carefully the chances of victory. Then like a bombshell came the news on June 22, 1941, that Germany had launched a surprise assault on her treaty partner, the Soviet Union.

All long-range preparations for this campaign, which had received the code name Barbarossa, had been made for a target date in the middle of May 1941. This time for launching the operation remained unchanged during the winter 1940-41 while the German Balkan campaign (Marita) was planned. Marita was limited originally to the occupation of northern Greece, to support the bogged-down Italian offensive in Albania; and in accordance with the Adolf Hitler directive of March 17, the forces provided for it were not to be considered in the deployment against Russia. Moreover, the opening date for Barbarossa suffered no postponement when, on Hitler’s order of March 22, the Balkan campaign was extended, as a result of the British landings in Greece, to include all of Greece inclusive of the Peloponnesus. The widely accepted belief that the British intervention in Greece resulted in a postponement of the opening date of Barbarossa is not valid.

Events in Jugoslavia did delay it, however. The Jugoslav Government which had joined the Three Power Pact on March 25 fell as a result of a coup d’état in Belgrade two days later. Hitler at once decided on the campaign against Jugoslavia. The forces earmarked for the Balkan campaign had now to be increased considerably and nine of the support divisions provided for Barbarossa were taken for this purpose. On April 3, three days before the beginning of the Balkan campaign, the Armed Forces High Command concluded: “The opening date for Barbarossa will be delayed at least four weeks as a result of the Balkan operations.” A further postponement of about ten days ensued when the German deployment was delayed by unusually heavy rains during May. Even so, certain of the forces employed in the Balkan campaign, among others the air forces which participated in the capture of the island of Crete, were late in arriving on the Russian front. There can be no doubt that the loss of almost six weeks of precious summer weather had a decisive and ominous effect on the outcome of the eastern campaign.

A fundamental difference in the concept of the German General Staff and that of Hitler came to light early in the operational planning for the Russian campaign. The General Staff planned the disposition of two large operational
groups, one of which was to advance in the direction of Kiev, the other toward Moscow. The Chief of the General Staff, General Halder, considered the conquest of the Baltic states, in the northerly direction, as only a secondary operation which must in no wise infringe on the assault on Moscow. On the other hand, Hitler explained to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, on December 5, 1940, that “Moscow is not very important,” and on March 17, 1941, that it was “entirely immaterial” to him. Corresponding to this concept which Hitler held from the beginning, the first directive issued by the Armed Forces High Command for Barbarossa on December 18, 1940, the secondary nature of the attack on Moscow came clearly to light. It provided for two army groups to be employed north of the Pripet Marshes to destroy the enemy forces in White Russia and the Baltic states; their primary objective was to be the conquest of the Baltic states and the occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt. A third army group was to advance south of the Pripet Marshes with Kiev and the area downstream of the Dnieper River as its objective. Only after the battles had been fought on both sides of the Pripet area would the objective of Moscow and the occupation of the Donets basin — east of the bend of the Dnieper — be undertaken “in the course of the pursuit.”

The contrary concepts of Hitler and the Army High Command resulted from two different points of view. Hitler sought political and economic objectives in his plan of campaign: in the north he wished to join forces with the Finns as soon as possible, in the south he sought to gain the granary of the Ukraine and the Russian industrial area in the bend of the Dnieper. However, the primary concern of the Army High Command was to destroy the military might of the enemy as quickly as possible. This objective could be realized most surely on the way to Moscow. At all other places the defending forces could retire before the onslaught of the invaders, but they had to make a stand before Moscow. A glance at the map will suffice to indicate the extraordinary importance of Moscow as a focal railroad point. It is the great center of power of European Russia, and was the one city the Russians had to defend.

Field Marshal von Brauchitsch postponed a clarification of the question until the Russian deployment had been broken in the border battles. Then a decision for the further course of operations had to be made, and the Army High Command began the effort to sway Adolf Hitler’s will. Had this question been fought out before the beginning of the campaign the Army might have succeeded, because Hitler’s directive of December 18, 1940, had described the general objective of operations as “to destroy the Russian forces deployed in the west and to prevent their escape into the wide open spaces of Russia.” Moreover, on July 13, 1941, after the dual battle of Bialystok-Minsk, Hitler declared to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army: “It is of less importance to advance rapidly to the eastward than to destroy the living forces of the enemy.”

In accordance with the Barbarossa directive of December 18, 1940, the German deployment was consummated in three large groups, for which 142 formations, including the Rumanian divisions, were provided, of which 19 were armored divisions with about 3,000 tanks, and 14 were motorized divisions. These were constituted as follows:

(a) Army Group South (Field Marshal von Rundstedt); the 11th, 17th,
and 6th Armies with Armored Group 1 (von Kleist), 37 divisions, of which five were armored, three motorized.

(b) Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Bock); the 4th Army with Armored Group 2 (Guderian); and the 9th Army with Armored Group 3 (Hoth), 51 divisions, of which nine were armored, seven motorized.

(c) Army Group North (Field Marshal von Leeb); the 16th and 18th Armies with Armored Group 4 (Hoeppner), 30 divisions, of which three were armored, three motorized.

In addition there were available the Armed Forces High Command Reserves, consisting of 24 divisions, of which two were armored and one motorized. The reserves of the Army Groups are included in the above figures; they were rated very weak. The German forces in northern Finland (four divisions) and the Finnish formations are not included in the deployment.

The relation of German strength to that of the Russians was not at all satisfactory. The General Staff estimated that Russia had available at the commencement of hostilities 213 divisions, of which ten were armored divisions and 37 motorized brigades. Only meager information was available as to the number of tanks the Russians had at their disposal. The General Staff reckoned with about 10,000, which would mean a considerable superiority in numbers for the Russian Army. As to fighting capacity, it was assumed that the German troops and officers were more battle-wise, that German leadership was superior to the Russian, and that the latter was definitely inferior in making quick decisions in a war of movement. However, the good fighting qualities of the Russian soldier, particularly on the defense, were not underestimated. If Hitler was of the opinion that the Russian armed forces, possibly also the Soviet régime, would collapse under the first heavy blows, this was a hypothesis which did not enter the calculations of the General Staff.

II

The Russian strategic principles, which were developed under Stalin's régime, were based on the assumption that the Russian armed forces must oppose an army equipped with modern weapons by utilizing time and space, by fighting a delaying action, and by striving to wear down gradually the strength of the enemy by means of offensive and defensive actions. During this phase of the conflict their own reserves were to be greatly increased with utmost mechanization of the army, so that in the second half of the war they could meet the enemy with superior forces and go over to an annihilating general offensive. Stalin's personal opinion was that, in view of the great depth of space in Russia which permitted the gaining of time by giving up space, and the tremendous supply difficulties, even the offensive of a fully motorized attacking army must gradually exhaust itself.

These command principles emphasized that it was necessary for the attacking forces to prevent the enemy from retreating, and to make him fight. Against an opponent who could and would utilize space as a decisive factor, the German Army suffered under a very severe disadvantage in that it could make available only a small number of motorized infantry formations because of lack of material and fuel. Under these circumstances the timely support of infantry for the rapidly advancing armored divisions presented the High Command with a problem which
could not always be solved despite the marching performance of the troops, which exceeded all expectations.

A question on which differences of opinion existed in the German High Command was whether the Russian deployment which had been in progress since the summer of 1940 was accomplished with a view to an attack on Germany, or whether it was only a defensive countermeasure to the German deployment. In a conference on the Brenner Pass on October 15, 1940, Adolf Hitler said to the Duce: “Russia will not attack; the men who rule Russia have good sense.” But did he actually mean it? German authoritative opinion inclined to the view that the Russian troop concentrations provided for a deployment with the objective of an offensive in the general direction of Warsaw. The Chief of the General Staff said of the situation of April 7, 1941, that “the Russian organization would permit them to go over quickly to the attack; it might be extremely inconvenient.” On the other hand, German generals who led their corps to the attack in the border battles declared to the author that they had struck right into the middle of a Russian defensive deployment, and that it was still in progress when the German troops crossed the border.

The strength and disposition of the Russian Army as obtained by the German intelligence service indicated that there were two primary Russian concentrations, one in the Ukraine with about 70 large formations, the other in White Russia around and west of Minsk with about 60 large formations. In the Baltic states there were apparently only about 30 formations. In accordance with its estimate of the situation the Army High Command considered the northern theater of war, north of the Priepet area, of decisive military importance. Here the German armed forces could strike to the heart of the enemy by an attack on Moscow. On the other hand, from a military point of view, the southern theater of war — where the enemy could retreat without serious sacrifice and seek to stop the assault behind the Dnieper — was of lesser importance.

In view of the tremendous extent of the front it was impossible to attack everywhere. The procedure was to establish focal points, to cut off strong Russian forces in deep penetrations at the decisive places, and to force them into battles with reversed front. Only a partial envelopment of the Russian group in the south was possible by attacking along the line of the primary road, Lublin-Lutsk-Rovno-Kiev, and then moving downstream along the Dnieper in the direction of Dnepropetrovsk. An envelopment from both sides by a simultaneous advance of a southern pincer arm from Rumania was not possible because the Rumanian forces were too weak to effect a breakthrough and strong German forces could not be transported to Rumania for lack of railroad facilities. The situation was more favorable in the north where the deep westerly bend of the border at Bialystok invited a two-sided envelopment by wedges driven from the two areas around Brest-Litovsk and around Suwalki. The enemy forces to the north in the adjacent Baltic states could be cut off by an attack in the direction of Leningrad via Kaunas, Dvinsk (Daugavpils) and Pakov, and forced toward the Baltic Sea. Thus the first operational objectives were laid down to about the line, Dnieper-Orsha-Leningrad. The further plans hinged on the development of this first phase of the war. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army hoped to effect a timely agreement concerning the differences between Hitler and himself for the further conduct of operations against the Soviet Union.
When the German armed forces advanced to the attack on June 22 they achieved tactical surprise. The Russians were in part startled out of their billets; in many cases their leaders stood helpless in the face of the attack, but the troops recovered quickly from the shock and offered tough local resistance. The conduct of the enemy created an impression on June 23 that he sought to withdraw. However, on the day following, General Halder noted: “The Russians have no intention of retreating; they are throwing in everything they have to stop the breakthrough.” It came as an unpleasant surprise to the High Command when the front reported the appearance of Russian tanks with 15 cm. (5.9 in.) guns.

Up to June 30 the situation had developed as follows: on the front of Army Group South the 6th Army with Armored Group 1 had fought its way through to east of Rovno, but the 17th Army attacking to the southward thereof did not get any farther than Lemberg. The fighting was hard and was repeatedly marked by Russian counterattacks. The situation was not entirely satisfactory. On the front of Army Group Center the designed envelopment of the enemy in the area between Bialystok and Minsk had succeeded; Armored Groups 2 and 3 had joined forces as planned at Minsk, which fell into German hands on June 28. The surrounded Russian forces attempted to break out of the ring singly and in broken formations. After the battle the German forces reported the capture of 290,000 prisoners with 2,585 tanks and 1,449 guns. Army Group North captured Dvinsk on June 26 and forced a crossing of the Dvina River. It was considered that 12–15 enemy divisions had been destroyed west of the Dvina in Lithuania and Latvia.

In general the Army High Command could feel fully satisfied with the results of the first ten days of operations. The Chief of the German General Staff adjudged the situation on July 3 very favorably: “It is probably not an exaggeration when I contend that the campaign against Russia has been won in 14 days.” However, Hitler was concerned for Army Group South, fearing enemy flank attacks on it from the north and south. General Halder remarked: “The Supreme Commander places no trust in the commands in the field, or in the education and training of the senior officers!”

After the border battles had been successfully concluded, the question of the advance on Moscow had to be settled for the two northern army groups. Army Group South had only minor interest therein, since its objectives lay in Kiev and the bend of the Dnieper. However, the farther it advanced to the eastward the greater became the danger to its two flanks, as Hitler had previously feared, and more and more forces had to be withdrawn from the spearhead for flank protection. This was particularly the case on the northern flank where the 5th Russian Army was concentrated in the Priepet area. The 11th Army had to be thrown in to relieve the danger to the southern flank, and in its further advance to Odessa it had to carry along the Rumanian divisions. By July 19 the 11th Army had reached the Dniester River, the 17th Army Vinnitsa, and the 6th Army the area west of Kiev.

Up to this day the progress of Army Group Center in the direction of Moscow was very gratifying. In conformity with the objectives of the Army High Command, it had been possible, despite tough resistance, to seize the passage between
the Dvina and Dnieper Rivers and to secure the triangle Orsha-Smolensk-Vitebsk as a base for a further advance on Moscow. Strong enemy forces were cut off at Smolensk; another 180,000 Russians were made prisoner, 2,000 tanks and 1,900 guns were captured. As early as July 13, the Commander of this Army Group, Field Marshal von Bock, who was always one to press on with all his might, viewed the prospects of a “breakthrough of tank spearheads on Moscow” as very favorable. However, strong enemy pressure from the 21st, 4th, and 13th Russian Armies now began to be felt on the southern flank of the Army Group.

Armored Group 4 of Army Group North, cutting between Lakes Peipus and Ilmen, was engaged in a bold advance on Leningrad; the 16th and 18th Armies had fought their way through to Lake Peipus-Velikie Luki. Unfortunately the situation led to a separation of Armored Group 4; one part advanced toward Narva in order to assault Leningrad from the westward, while the other part was directed against Novgorod on Lake Ilmen with a view subsequently to cutting off Leningrad from the eastward. This division of forces was entirely unwelcome to the Army High Command; for the time being it desired to cut off that city from the eastward and to join forces with the Finns at Lake Ladoga.

This was the general situation when Adolf Hitler’s directive number 33 of July 19 was issued. It contemplated a turning movement of strong forces, in particular fast formations, of Army Group Center to the southeastward and southward in order to annihilate, in cooperation with Army Group South, the Russian 5th Army and the enemy forces which had been shifted to the east bank of the Dnieper. Other motorized forces of the Army Group were to advance northeasterly, cut the line of communication Moscow-Leningrad, and cover the right flank of Army Group North in its assault on Leningrad. Army Group Center was to continue the advance on Moscow with infantry alone. Thus began a turning point in the war, incomprehensible to the Russians—“Marne miracle” as a Russian general called it—which was to save Moscow just as Paris was relieved in 1914.

However, the time had not yet arrived when directive number 33 had to be acted upon. The troops were still engaged on all fronts in concluding the operations then in progress. Consequently the Army High Command did not at once enter the lists with Hitler for the continuation of the attack on Moscow. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army advanced the argument that the fast forces of Army Group Center to which Hitler had assigned objectives urgently needed a 10-14 day rest period to restore their combat effectiveness. General Halder made this note of the conference with the Fuehrer on July 23: “At present the Fuehrer is not at all interested in Moscow, only in Leningrad. Therefore Bock must release his armored forces and move on Moscow with only his infantry.” After another conference with the Fuehrer on July 25, Halder viewed the new directive as a “bogging down of the current stirring operations;” a reference to the importance of Moscow was “summarily rejected” by Hitler. On July 28 the former added: “The operations ordered by the Fuehrer will lead to a scattering of forces and to stagnation in the decisive direction, Moscow. Bock will be so weak that he will not be able to attack.”

Nevertheless, the representations of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch about the directive of July 19 were not without their effect on Hitler. He admitted that the armored forces, Army Group Center, needed time for rest and refitting, and directed them to delay execution of the newly assigned tasks. Army Group Center
was to go over to the defense temporarily and make attacks only with limited objectives which might improve its positions for subsequent operations. In view of this interpretation of the directive, nothing was lost for the time being and one could hope for the future.

At the end of July Armored Group 1 of Army Group South finally succeeded in breaking through to Pervomaisk from the north, so that an encirclement of strong enemy forces around Uman was indicated; but in the Pripet area and before Kiev the 6th Army was still being held by the Russian 5th Army. Army Group Center was still employed in mopping up the encirclement at Smolensk; its armored forces started their rest period. The enemy worked hard to establish a new front and drew on Moscow continuously for fresh forces. The southern wing of Army Group North advanced as far as Kholm; the infantry divisions were moving toward Narva and Novgorod to support the armored spearheads. The enemy was working feverishly to defend Leningrad.

The further development of the situation to August 20 was not entirely satisfactory for Army Group South. To be sure it had been possible to cut off considerable Russian forces at Uman, and almost the entire bend of the Dnieper downstream from Kiev had been cleared of the enemy, but the 6th Army still remained tied down before Kiev. Like a dread specter, the Russian 5th Army continued to threaten the deep inner flanks of Army Groups South and Center. Moreover, strong Russian counterattacks in the vicinity of Kiev several times led to serious local crises, and continued bad weather hampered the operations of Army Group South. During the first week of August Army Group Center sustained bitter enemy counterattacks, some of which were warded off only with difficulty. These indicated that the enemy was preparing a defensive line west of Bryansk-Vyazma-Rzhev. On August 15, against the advice of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Hitler now directed Armored Group 3 which had just finished its rest period to turn over one armored corps to Army Group North. A strong Russian penetration at Staraya Russa had occasioned a local crisis and Hitler seized the opportunity to take a tactical measure which was entirely in consonance with his plan of operations.

On August 10 Army Group North began its attack on Leningrad, both from the southward and the westward. Even before this offensive had begun, the breakthrough to the Gulf of Finland at Kunda, halfway between Tallinn (Reval) and Narva, was accomplished on August 7. The German Naval Staff was particularly interested in this phase and constantly urged on the Supreme Command the early occupation of Leningrad. From its point of view this was more important than the capture of Moscow, for if Moscow fell, the war in the east would not end then and there. However, if Leningrad and Kronstadt were captured, then the Russians would lose their last Baltic naval base. This would end naval warfare in the Baltic Sea, and all forces of the Navy would become available for their primary task—the war against the United Kingdom.

On August 17 Narva was taken. However, the attack in the direction of Leningrad met tough resistance and made very slow progress. The previously mentioned crisis at Staraya Russa took place. A pessimistic note suddenly appears in Halder's war diary: "We underestimated Russia, we reckoned with 200 divisions and now have already counted 360. Our front on this broad expanse is too thin, it has no depth. In consequence the enemy attacks often meet with success."
The contest between the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Hitler over the operational decision continued during the entire first half of August and reached its height at this time. The notes of the Chief of the General Staff picture clearly this drawn-out conflict; here and there, they also show that the stand of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch was not always firm enough. Again and again Hitler emphasized his previously announced objectives: first Leningrad, then eastern Ukraine, and thirdly Moscow. The Army High Command reiterated that the Russian armed forces could be crushed only by striking for Moscow, where the enemy had gradually concentrated 70 divisions.

In addition to personal conferences with Hitler, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army also had a lengthy discussion with the Chief of the Armed Forces Command Staff, General Jodl, with a view to winning over the Fuehrer. Jodl was strongly impressed and promised to use his influence with Hitler. On August 18 the Commander-in-Chief gave him his estimate of the situation in a detailed memorandum.

On August 21 Adolf Hitler issued a new directive. It began with these words: "The Army proposal of August 18 is rejected." The directive made plain that the most important objective was not the occupation of Moscow but the seizure of the Crimea and the industrial area in the Donets basin, the severing of the Russian oil supply from the Caucasus, and cutting off of Leningrad and joining forces with the Finns. Thus Hitler continued to follow his original plan of operations; the contest which the Army High Command had waged against it was in vain. In particular the directive provided for a concentric operation with the inner flanks of Army Groups Center and South which should dispose of the Russian 5th Army, and in the north for a close siege of Leningrad. Army Group Center was to make available the necessary forces. Only after the attainment of these objectives would it be possible for this Army Group to resume its offensive against Moscow.

In the light of later events, it is apparent that with this directive the course of the entire eastern campaign was fatally determined. In the south this strategy led to the great encirclement of Kiev. In the north Leningrad was cut off, but a junction of forces with the Finns was not effected. However, in the decisive direction of Moscow, valuable time was lost to an enemy who was fighting for time, and who did all in his power to utilize it to build up his defenses. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army made a last attempt to get Adolf Hitler to change his course when he arranged for a personal interview between General Guderian, Commander of Armored Group 2, and the Fuehrer; it failed when Guderian yielded to Hitler's views.

The Chief of the General Staff thought that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army could not take the responsibility for the course set by Hitler, and, moreover, the Fuehrer had personally charged Field Marshal von Brauchitsch with allowing the Army Groups too much latitude in advancing their particular interests. Hence General Halder asked the Commander-in-Chief to request that both of them be relieved of office. Brauchitsch declined: "Since a relief of office would not, in fact, eventuate, the situation would remain unchanged." The ill-feeling between Hitler and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was alleviated a few days later when
Hitler declared in a conversation that "He did not mean it that way." But nothing essential was changed thereby.

It was in such a mood of depression that the Army High Command received a report from Field Marshal von Bock on August 28 stating that in view of the projected withdrawal of forces from Army Group Center "he could foresee the end of his Army Group's ability to hold out." At the beginning of September Marshal Timoshenko, Bock's Russian opponent in the middle of the eastern front, launched a powerful surprise counteroffensive against the 4th Army in the bend of the Desna. According to Russian accounts, the Germans suffered the loss of eight divisions; the bend of the Desna had to be given up on September 5.

The Russian front, like the German, was divided into three great areas of command. Voroshilov commanded in the north, Budenny in the south, and Timoshenko in the center. The latter was one of the most interesting personalities in the Russian High Command. He was born in 1895, the son of a landless peasant in Bessarabia, grew up as a farm laborer and received scarcely any education in his youth. In 1915 he was drafted for service in the Tsarist army. He distinguished himself in the chaotic fighting after the Russian Revolution to such a degree that he was given command of the 6th Red Cavalry Division at the age of 23 and attracted the attention of both Stalin and Lenin. It was said that he could not read or write when he was a division commander. At the War Academy, under Frunze and Tukhachevsky, he had a chance to make up for what he had missed in his youth. From 1925-30 he was both Commander and Political Commissar of the 3rd Cavalry Corps. He was in command of the military district of Kiev when the war with Poland broke out in 1939. His loyalty to the Stalin régime was considered so staunch that he was untouched while heads were rolling all around him in the great purge of the armed forces in 1937, even though he continued Tukhachevsky's fight to do away with political commissars in the army. After the poor showing of the Russian troops in the first phase of the war with Finland, Stalin appointed him Commander-in-Chief at the end of December 1940. After a month's preparation Timoshenko took the offensive, and his complete success in breaking through the Mannerheim Line won him the title of "Hero of the Soviet Union," appointment as Defense Commissar, and membership in the Supreme War Council. Timoshenko had "arrived." Within the army he sought to introduce titles of rank for officers and the military salute; these were ordered by Stalin in 1944. His primary concerns were the mechanization of the army and the establishment of a salutary relationship between the officers and men. Timoshenko was a bachelor; an army song had the refrain: "He treats his soldiers as his sons. . . ."

At the beginning of the war Timoshenko had command of the Russian center and fell heir to the most important task—the defense of Moscow. From the Russian point of view, the great sacrifices of the battles at Bialystok-Minsk and at Smolensk had not been in vain: they had intercepted and delayed the German assault. When the German High Command broke off the offensive against Moscow after Smolensk, Timoshenko gained time to consolidate his forces before Moscow. The prewar Russian strategic concepts were ingrained in him; he was the born "defensive fighter." When the Russians went over to large-scale offensive action in the later years of the war, he stepped down in favor of younger generals, whom the war itself had developed.

At the beginning of September the first indications of a sudden change in Adolf
Hitler's strategy were noted. In the north the isolation of Leningrad was imminent; between Lakes Ladoga and Ilmen the 18th Army was gradually pushing its way into the Volkhov River sector; south of Lake Ilmen the 16th Army had reached the area west of Valdai Hills. In the south the movements ordered by Hitler to effect an encirclement of Kiev were progressing favorably. On September 6 — this time in agreement with the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army — Hitler issued directive number 35, which ordered a rapid build-up of Army Group Center to launching a decisive offensive. Its stated purpose was to annihilate Timoshenko's Army Group which was "committed to action" in the center, "in the available time allowed prior to the onset of winter weather." This was the first reference to the approaching dread winter!

Army Group Center was to commence this operation at the end of September, with the objective of destroying the enemy forces eastward of Smolensk by a pincer movement in direction of Vyazma, and thereafter to reach Moscow in the course of the pursuit. Army Groups South and North were directed to make strong forces available to Army Group Center, especially fast formations, for this new operation, as soon as the situation around Kiev and Leningrad permitted. In this connection it was thought that Armored Group 2 would be in an excellent position to support the pursuit in the direction of Moscow by an advance toward Orel-Tula. Moreover, Army Group South was to aid the attack of Army Group Center by an advance of the 17th Army in the direction of Poltava-Kharkov, while to the south the 11th Army, supported by an advance of Armored Group 1 to the eastward, was to continue the attack on the Crimea. For the further course of the operations against Moscow, Army Groups South and North were to cover the adjacent flanks of Army Group Center.

When Adolf Hitler issued the directive of September 6, he desired to commence the new offensive on Moscow in eight or ten days, that is, by the middle of September. However, this proved to be impossible; the troops were still engaged in carrying out the operations of the directive of August 21, and then had to be re-grouped for the new assignments. Thus the advance on Moscow was interrupted not only for two weeks, between the dates of the two directives, but also by additional time needed to prepare the forces to take up anew the original campaign plan of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

The great pincer action in the area of Kiev, which was undertaken according to Hitler's orders of August 21, took a "classic" course, as the official war diary expresses it. On September 17 the ring around Kiev began to close and on the 19th the first German troops entered the city; enemy attempts to break out were repulsed. When this great encirclement was subsequently cleared out, 665,000 prisoners were taken as well as immense quantities of matériel. Adolf Hitler called this battle "the greatest battle in the history of the world," while the Chief of the German General Staff termed it "the greatest strategic blunder of the eastern campaign"!

On September 26 the 11th Army in the south broke through the defenses to the Crimea at Perekop. After conclusion of the battle at Kiev at the end of September, the other armies of Army Group South were released to continue their advance in the direction of Rostov-Kharkov. The situation of Army Group North developed less satisfactorily. The ring around Leningrad was not closed as tightly as desired by the Army High Command, and the 16th Army in its advance on
both sides of Lake Ilmen sustained strong Russian counterattacks; the enemy was noticeably reinforcing his troops here. After release of the fast formations for the operation against Moscow, a deadlock gradually set in on the fronts of Army Group North. The deep eastern flank of this group was a particular point of danger; it had to be watched carefully because it could easily develop into a threat for the north flank of Army Group Center in the course of its advance on Moscow.

On September 30 the tank divisions of Armored Group 2 (Guderian) started off the Moscow offensive in the direction of Orel. The enemy was apparently surprised; up to the night of October 1 the Armored Group had penetrated more than 37 miles into enemy territory. On October 2 the grand attack of the 2nd, 4th and 9th Armies began. Taifun was the cover name for the offensive.

This operation also took a classic course during the first days. The enemy stood and fought. Up to the night of October 3 the infantry divisions had also penetrated to a depth up to 25 miles. On the 4th, Armored Group 2 reached Mtsensk by way of Orel and encountered no further opposition; Armored Group 4 (Hoeppner) penetrated to the vicinity of Yukhnov, and Armored Group 3 (Hoth) to Kholm. Two large encirclements at Bryansk and at Vyazma appeared to be shaping up. On October 7 the objective of the first phase of operations was attained; the rings around the two areas were closed. Once again, upon conclusion of the action around the latter, the troops reported the capture of about 660,000 prisoners and vast quantities of matériel. Thanks to their almost unbelievable marching, the infantry had followed in close support of the armored divisions. Strong forces of the 4th Army were far advanced in the direction of Kaluga on October 9; the 9th Army was pressing on Rzhev and in conjunction with Armored Group 3 was preparing for the attack on Kalinin. Armored Group 2 was engaged in the advance on Tula, but its progress was slowed by the condition of the weather and enemy flank attacks.

The primary objective, Moscow, appeared to be within grasp. These were the days when all the German forces in the east were filled with pride, hope and confidence, and when Adolf Hitler in boundless overestimation of what had been accomplished announced to the world the collapse of the Russian armed forces. Even the Chief of the German General Staff, who was accustomed to see things in a cool and sober light, expressed the hope that "given moderately correct leadership and moderately good weather the encirclement of Moscow must succeed."

Now, however, the weather turned on the Germans and threatened to nullify all their gains. A period of rain and mud, unusually heavy and protracted for this time of the year, made what were bad roads impassable. After the dual battle of Bryansk-Vyazma the whole pursuit operation stuck fast in the mud. In particular the advance of Armored Group 2 on Tula, which was so important for the attack on Moscow from the south, was completely stopped.

Instead of the expected spirited pursuit of a sorely stricken foe, there was now a crawling advance through mud and rain against an enemy who was throwing everything he had into the defense of his capital. Nevertheless, the forces of Army Group Center continued to press slowly eastward. Up to October 20 the 4th
THE BATTLE FOR MOSCOW

Army with Armored Group 4 reached the area eastward of the line Kaluga-
Mozhaisk, the 9th Army with parts of Armored Group 3 reached the region
Kalinin-Staritsa. Armored Group 2, supported by the 2nd Army, continued to be
especially hard hit by the mud; it did not get rolling until October 20.

The situation remained essentially unchanged to the beginning of November;
meanwhile Armored Group 2 had reached the vicinity of Tula and thus was set
for the assault on Moscow. The Soviet Government considered the situation of
the capital so precarious that it evacuated to Kazan. Army Group North had
succeeded in joining forces with Army Group Center at Ostashkov, south of
the Valdai Hills. The southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, with the exception
of a strip at Oranienbaum, was in German hands, as were the outlying islands,
Oesel, Dagoe and Muhu, which had been captured by landing operations the
latter part of October. Army Group North prepared for an attack on Tikhvin,
which was important for an advance to eastward of Lake Ladoga in seeking con-
tact with the Finns. Army Group South, in particular Armored Group 1 (Kleist,
had continued rolling in the direction of Rostov. The infantry formations were
held up somewhat by tough enemy resistance and particularly by the mud, but
at the beginning of November the 6th Army was able to reach the area of Kharkov-
Belgorod and the 17th Army the Donets River on either side of Izyum. Also at
this time the resistance of the Crimea defense was broken.

Now the German High Command was confronted with the fateful question
whether the attack on Moscow should be resumed despite the ominous delays and
the approaching winter. On November 9 the Commander of Army Group South,
Field Marshal von Rundstedt advocated a cessation of operations in order to
preserve the striking power of the military forces, but the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army (von Brauchitsch) and the Commander of Army Group Center
(von Bock) were agreed that the attack must be continued. Von Bock in particular
stressed the necessity of carrying through, and both insisted that “both opponents
were calling on their last reserves of strength and that the one with the more
determined will would prevail.” Moscow lay only about 37 miles from the German
front. German leaders reminded themselves of the Battle of the Marne in 1914,
which was given up for lost when it might yet have been won. There is a wide-
spread belief that the question of the resumption of the offensive led to sharp dif-
fences between Hitler and Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, but this is myth.

On November 15 the weather permitted the resumption of the offensive on al-
fronts, and on that day Army Group Center commenced the assault on the enemy
capital. The 9th Army made good progress southeast of Kalinin, but the 4th
Army reported on November 17 that it could not continue the offensive because of
strong enemy attacks on its right flank; the opponent attacked here with four
divisions on a very small front. Field Marshal von Bock directed that the offensive
be continued notwithstanding; support was to be expected from Armored Group
2 from the vicinity of Tula and by an attack of the 9th Army. He drove his army
group forward with “unparalleled energy,” even though the 4th Army and
Armored Group 2 were near the end of their resources. “The last battalion will
decide the issue,” he declared. After heavy fighting on November 21 the 4th Army
successfully warded off attacks against its right flank and on the 23rd the situation
appeared to have eased. Armored Group 2 and the right flank of the 2nd Army
adjoining it were able to advance. However, the 6th Army of Army Group South,
on the right of the 2nd Army, which had orders to advance in the direction of Voronezh, could not be moved for days despite continuous severe prodding from the top. Its advance was particularly important because the enemy was continuously drawing forces from that sector for the defense of Moscow. The Commander, Field Marshal von Reichenau, had been taken sick; in consequence the army did not show its usual drive.

Even though the center of the German eastern front pushed slowly on Moscow, it appeared to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army more and more doubtful that the enemy capital could be reached before the onset of winter. On November 10 Field Marshal von Brauchitsch suffered a severe heart attack. Adolf Hitler was strongly impressed by the mounting difficulties. To be sure, he maintained that the enemy armament potential had been considerably reduced by the loss of the numerous areas which supplied raw materials; and he laid great store on political friction within Russia. But on November 9 he said, in words that were strange to him, "that the recognition that neither force is able to annihilate the other will lead to a compromise peace."

Developments in the south of the eastern front led to a serious crisis at the end of November. The attack of Armored Group 1 gained ground rapidly in the direction of Rostov, and on November 21 this important city fell into German hands. Since the end of October the Russian southern front was commanded by Marshal Timoshenko, the successor of Budenny; Timoshenko had been succeeded in the center by Zhukov. After the loss of Rostov, Timoshenko started his counteroffensive; the Germans were forced to evacuate the city on November 28. It was the first big success for the Russians in this campaign. Armored Group 1 was attacked by such superior forces that its further retreat was unavoidable. However, Adolf Hitler forbade the withdrawal of the front to the Mius River position north of Taganrog as proposed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch gave in. The Commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, reported that he was unable to comply with the order to hold the previous front, and asked for his relief. After sharp differences between the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Hitler, the latter accepted it on the very same day and appointed as his successor Field Marshal von Reichenau, who had recovered from his illness. Against the advice of his subordinates, von Reichenau hoped to hold a median position. It was broken by the enemy. Thereupon Hitler agreed to a retreat to the Mius position. "However," so wrote the Chief of the General Staff, "we have sacrificed strength and time and have lost Rundstedt." The precarious health of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was a matter of concern on account of this "constant irritation."

Meanwhile the offensive of Army Group Center had continued. The 4th Army, which for a time had been fighting varied defense actions, reported that it would resume the attack on December 1 because the enemy was apparently withdrawing forces from this area and "because the Supreme Command is strongly disposed to continue the offensive, even though the danger exists that the striking force of the troops will be burned out." The Chief of the General Staff confirmed "that this concept is in accord with that of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army." On December 1 Field Marshal von Bock reported that it was possible to gain only minor local successes, but this did not alter the opinion of the Army High Command that the forces must continue the assault though it took the last reserves
THE BATTLE FOR MOSCOW

of strength. On December 4 the possibility that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army might have to ask for his relief because of his health was discussed by the Armed Forces High Command. On the day following Field Marshal von Brauchitsch decided to tender his request to be relieved. On the same day 33 degrees below zero, Fahrenheit, was reported at Tula.

At the beginning of December the situation on the German northern front also became increasingly difficult. The German forces had previously been under heavy enemy pressure in the Volkhov sector, and now their hold on the Neva front in the area of Schluesselburg became precarious. Tikhvin, which had been occupied the middle of November, was evacuated on December 8. Here temperatures of 22 to 31 degrees below zero were reported.

After this unseasonable severity, the German offensive against Moscow came to a halt. But the Russians were accustomed to the cold weather and better outfitted for it, and began to launch successful counterattacks on all fronts. The mobility and striking power of the German troops had been vitally weakened by the constant fighting and the prodigious efforts of the past weeks; now the Russian winter was the final blow. Lacking adequate clothing for the winter, the German troops suffered terrible hardship. In planning the campaign, provision had not been made for protracted hard fighting in ice and snow, much less for the unusually severe cold which came that winter.

On December 6 enemy attacks took place north and northwest of Moscow at Klin and Kalinin, but even though the enemy broke through here and there, the front was held substantially intact. The Chief of the General Staff now realized that a major withdrawal of Army Group Center to the line Mozhaisk-Rzhev-Ostashkov was necessary. The Supreme Command, however, would not agree; in Halder's opinion, the Supreme Command did not understand the condition of the troops and was inclined to pursue "picayune measures when only a major operation would avail." On December 8 the enemy broke through east of Kalinin; General Guderian reported that he was deeply concerned about the condition of his armored forces. Two days later the front of the 2nd Army was broken at Livny, and the gap grew wide. Field Marshal von Bock termed the situation critical and ordered a withdrawal of the front to the line Tula-Novosil-Tim. Kalinin, an important position, was held for the time being, but a deep penetration by the enemy west of Tula on December 13 made a further retreat necessary. Preparations had to be made to withdraw the front to the Staritsa line. Adolf Hitler concurred in these measures, and also agreed to the withdrawal of Army Group North to the Volkhov front. But he declared that, "It is not at all a case of ceasing operations. The enemy has made deep penetration at a few places only. It is fantastic to think of building up lines in the rear."

Because of serious illness, Field Marshal von Bock had to give up command of his Army Group the middle of December and Field Marshal von Kluge was appointed his successor. On December 19 Field Marshal von Brauchitsch stepped down as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Adolf Hitler personally assumed the command of the Army; General Halder continued on as his Chief of the General Staff.

For almost three months, in ice and snow, in almost unbelievably cold weather,
without adequate winter clothing and with most difficult supply conditions, the
German forces in the east had to fend off the Russian attacks. On December 21
the enemy fought his way into Kaluga; that position had to be evacuated. A few
days later the Russians broke through the Oka River front north and south of
Kaluga, hitting the 2nd and 4th Armies; they were forced to retreat. General
Guderian, who had withdrawn on his own initiative and without reporting his
intention to the Army Group, was relieved of his command upon request of Field
Marshal von Kluge. The danger for the center of the Army Group occasioned
by the Oka penetration increased from day to day; the direction of the enemy
attack pointed toward Yukhnov. On December 27 the 9th Army was attacked
by much superior forces in the area west of Kalinin and a serious crisis developed,
but appeared to ease somewhat by the night of the 30th. It was clear that the
Russians aimed to encircle the entire northern half of Army Group Center in the
area between Moscow and Smolensk by driving two wedges. Field Marshal von
Kluge requested Hitler to authorize a further withdrawal of Army Group Center.
The latter vehemently refused, and sharp differences developed between him and
the Chief of the General Staff. "The fact is," Halder wrote in his notes, "that
the troops simply do not hold in 22 degrees below zero." He should have
added that in all fairness this could not be expected of soldiers fighting without
requisite protection in such cold. After the two enemy wedges — the northern
one in the area of Rzhev and the southern one by Sukhinichi — had created a
highly dangerous situation, Field Marshal von Kluge finally received authoriza-
tion from Hitler to withdraw step by step for the protection of the "railroad,"
the most important transportation line between Smolensk and Moscow. Hitler's
wrath fell with unprecedented severity on the Commander of Armored Group 4,
General Hoeppner, who had retreated without orders of the Army Group. On
January 8 he went so far against this proven tank general not only to relieve
him of his command but, contrary to all justice and law, to dismiss him summarily
from the Army "with all its legal consequences." Later on, after July 20, 1944,
the General appeared again in the prisoner's dock as one of the most active mem-
bers of the German resistance movement and was hanged by the executioners of
the ill-reputed "People's Court."

Hitler remained adamant in his determination to defend every foot of ground.
When heavy enemy pressure rocked Army Group North in the middle of Janu-
ary and the Russians penetrated German lines at Staraya Russa and on the
Volkhov front, he turned down the proposal of the Commander of the Army
Group, Field Marshal von Leeb, to retreat. Even when the situation in the area
of Rzhev became more and more dangerous and led to the interruption of the
service of supply to the 4th and 9th Armies as well as the 3rd Armored Group,
he could not bring himself to issue orders to withdraw. The Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff noted resignedly: "This sort of command will lead to the destruction
of the Army." Field Marshal von Leeb asked for his relief; his successor was
Field Marshal von Kuechler. During these days the command of Army Group
South also changed. Field Marshal von Reichenau had a stroke; his Army Group
was taken over by Field Marshal von Bock who had meanwhile recovered from
his illness.

Further crises developed. Major enemy attacks began on the 18th Army on
January 19, in the area of Leningrad, likewise in the southern part of the eastern
THE BATTLE FOR MOSCOW

front in the direction of Kharkov. The situation on the Naht between Army Groups Center and North became particularly dangerous. Toropets was lost; north of it the enemy attacked Kholm. About a dozen Russian divisions broke through into the gap which had developed between the two Army Groups and pressed on, swerving to the southward, to the line Velikiie Luki-Iljin by January 26. The troops engaged to the eastward were greatly endangered thereby, and it was possible to build up a new front west of Rzhev only with utmost difficulty. In February a very critical situation developed in the triangle Ostashkov-Kholm-Staraya Russa where the enemy sought to encircle the 16th Army by a two-pronged drive; it was necessary to supply this Army in part by air, but the situation was saved by German counterattacks.

From about February 23 a noticeable lull set in on the whole eastern front; the striking power of the Russian Army seemed almost played out also. There with the long months of winter warfare which had strained the German forces to the utmost came to an end. The German Army survived the ordeal of the Russian assault with untold effort and by giving up valuable territory. The ground lost was not great, relative to the enormous area captured in 1941, but the main objective, the enemy capital, Moscow, vanished beyond reach. Never again was the German Wehrmacht to get as close as it did on December 5, 1941. That the Russian counteroffensive did not inflict greater loss, and had to be content with partial successes is attributable to the firmness and toughness of the German troops, and without doubt also to the brutal energy of Adolf Hitler and his insistence that the Army stand fast at all costs.

Hitler's system of command did not, as the Chief of the General Staff feared, "lead to the destruction of the Army." Of course it is possible that if the German Army had executed a large-scale withdrawal at the beginning of December when the Russian winter offensive started, as the Chief of the General Staff wished, there would never have been the serious crisis which ensued. But who can prove it? In any case, when the winter battles developed in full violence along the whole front, it is probably true that the order to hold was the right one. Unfortunately, from the German point of view, two years later when the caliber of the German Army was much below what it was in the winter 1941-42, and when the Russian forces had been built up to overwhelming superiority, numerically and materially, Hitler was to remind his generals of the success of this policy of holding on.

In a survey of the bloody losses which the German Wehrmacht suffered in the eastern campaign to the end of February 1942, one is struck by the fact that the losses suffered by the troops in the hard winter fighting were far less than those sustained in the victorious, rapid advance into Russia during the first weeks of the war. In the period from June 22, 1941, to February 28, 1942, the losses on the east front were 210,572 dead, 747,761 wounded and 47,303 missing, a total of 1,005,636 officers and men. During the period of the first big successes (June 22 to August 13, 1941) the daily average of total losses was 7,338; on the Moscow front from December 11, 1941, to February 28, 1942, it was only 2,883. The author has been unable to determine whether the casualty lists which were used in calculating the above averages included the losses due to freezing. Up to February 20, 1942, such casualties numbered 14,357 serious — i.e., cases in which
major amputations were necessary — about 62,000 moderate and 36,270 light
— i.e., cases which were treated with first aid. From December 5, 1941, to Febru-
ary 30, 1942, the serious and moderate cases averaged 979 daily; this number
should perhaps be added to the figure 2,883 above.

VIII

The German eastern campaign of 1941 was handicapped from the start, in that
it was launched five and one-half long weeks late. Napoleon's invasion, which
likewise was undertaken too late in the year of 1812, should have been a warning
for the Germans. Even so, in view of the superior striking power and toughness
of the troops, the attacks might have succeeded if the Supreme Command had not
erred and denied the Army the prize of the campaign — the center of enemy
power, Moscow — when it appeared to be within grasp. The question whether
the occupation of Moscow would have brought the war with Russia to an end
will always be viewed differently by various authorities.

Before the author had the opportunity to study the German campaign in Russia,
it seemed to him that the turn of the tide in the Second World War was at the
close of the year 1942, when the German High Command was sorely tried by
three ominous events: El Alamein, the Anglo-American landings in Africa, and
Stalingrad. It now appears that this view is not correct: the turning point occurred
earlier — it was on the battlefields before Moscow. Here at the end of 1941 the
striking power of the German Wehrmacht broke for the first time in a task
which was beyond its strength. Here for the first time the enemy seized the initia-
tive and the German Army made heavy sacrifices of fighting power defending
itself against the Russian assault. The Wehrmacht was never able to recover from
this ordeal. The loss was not so much a matter of numbers as it was moral and
spiritual. Last but not least, it took out the most valuable and competent of the
military commanders. Even though the German Army could unleash a large-
scale offensive once again in the summer of 1942, it was never to regain the peak
of its military prowess.
RECENT BOOKS ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

NOTE — FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, post free, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher’s regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N. Y.

General: Political, Military and Legal

Mr. Sternberg is convinced that only a Socialist economy and political unity can save Western Europe — even with Marshall aid and an Atlantic Pact with teeth — from the chaos that the Communists desire and expect. However, American support should not be confined to the above-mentioned measures, but must include keeping our own economy from resuming the disastrous cycle of boom and bust.

A onetime legal advisor of the League of Nations shows how the shortsightedness, pacifism and mediocre leadership of the democratic Powers brought down on them the catastrophe of World War II.

This compilation of documents on Russo-German relations (1939-1941), and the author’s critique of them, would have been more serviceable had he indicated where the documents, reproduced either in whole or part, were originally published.

ON POWER. By Bertrand de Jouvenel. New York: Viking, 1949, 421 p. $5.00.
An historical analysis of political power and of the reasons why it is being concentrated in fewer and stronger hands. The original French edition was published at Geneva in 1945, the fruit of the author’s wartime exile from his native France.

Unhappily, most of this somewhat Utopian work dates from 1945 and is thus in no small part outdated.

A plea for world federalism, in which much store is placed on American experience, by one of Britain’s leading political thinkers.

A review of the historical development of democratic ideals and institutions since the heroic age of Greece.

Occasional pieces, published during the last three decades, on the economic and political problems of European federation, by the President of Italy.
L'EUROPE EN JEU. By Denis de Rougemont. Neuchâtel (Switzerland): La Baconnière, 1948, 170 p. Sw. Fr. 5.50.
Three addresses in favor of European federation (minus the Soviet Union) delivered before international federalist conferences 1946-48.

A revised edition of a classic in its field.

A pioneer synthesis of political, economic and social history, primarily of Britain, Canada and the United States.

An interesting comparison of the English and American constitutional systems, by a writer long connected with the London Times.

The 8,000 "peace" treaties from Ramses II to the Briand-Kellogg Pact, having failed to assure us that happy state, must be supplemented by what the author describes as "demographic disarmament."

An expert review of the operation of the balance of power principle in Europe from the Congress of Berlin (1878) to the outbreak of World War I.

A continuation of the massive official history of Britain's part in the campaigns of Western Europe during World War I, based on documents and prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defense by a panel of military historians. The first of the two volumes mentioned deals with the period from June 7 to November 10 (Messines and Passchendaele) and is edited by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds; the second, compiled by Captain Wilfrid Miles, treats the Battle of Cambrai of the late fall of 1917.

A handbook of contemporary international law intended, among other things, to teach the Germans how they may expiate their sins in this field.

A systematic treatise on its legal basis and function.

Another in the "War Crimes Trials" series — this one dealing with the barbarous killing of women members of the British armed forces.

A nuclear physicist seeks to strip the bomb of some of its terror and disabuse the American people of the assumption that with it they are guaranteed an easy victory in another war.
RECENT BOOKS


In these Sir Halley Stewart Lectures for 1948 six distinguished British teachers and writers consider some of the consequences of the bomb.


Admiral Dickens challenges the doctrine that aerial bombing won the war, asserting instead that it actually delayed and even jeopardized victory.


A sound treatment of the question of biological warfare in its political and strategic as well as scientific aspects, by a leading authority.


Colonel Ferré, after tracing the development of armored forces in the German and French armies, lays the latter's defeat to the former's vast superiority in tanks.


A posthumous work in which a senior French general, after weighing the experience of the recent war, concluded that the old rules of strategy were still valid.


A methodical exposition of the strategy of airborne warfare, by a French parachute officer who bases his doctrine largely on the experience of World War II.

General: Economic and Social


"The theory of international values here presented," stated Professor Graham, "is, in form, an elaboration but, in fact, a complete refutation of classical doctrines."


A theoretical analysis of the "laws" conditioning the economic relations between nations.


A well-organized treatise dealing with the evolution of economic practice and theory during the last century and a half.


A not too technical manual on the facts of contemporary economic life.


An expert analysis of theory and current practice.


This book is one of the few authoritative sources for comparison of American and British costs of production. It is of interest to all serious students of the dollar gap.

Published for the National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY. By HENRY C. SIMONS. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1948, 353 p. $3.75.
A collection of excellent essays, republished posthumously, by one of the principal
American protagonists of "liberal," i.e. anti-Keynesian, economics.

DE PLATON À LA TERREUR. By JACQUES AND ROBERT LACOUR-GAYET. Paris:
The authors ransack history for evidence of the unwisdom of price controls and of a
state-regulated economy in general.

UNA CRISI E DUE GUERRE. By AGOSTINO DEGLI ESPINOSSA. Rome: Faro, 1948,
438 p. L. 1,200.
An interpretation of the economic and moral crisis experienced by the last two
generations, victims of two world wars and an uneasy armistice.

EL LIBERALISMO DOCTRINARIO. By LUIS DIEZ DEL CORRAL. Madrid: Instituto
A treatise on the ideological and political bases of nineteenth century liberalism.

RELÈVEMENT DANS LA LIBERTÉ. By GAETANO MARZOTTO DI VALDAUGNO-
An Italian industrialist breaks a lance for free enterprise.

L'ÉTAT DEVANT LA PERSONNE ET LA SOCIÉTÉ. By ROLAND MASPETIOL.
An exaltation of the rights of the individual.

ÉMIGRATIONS POLITIQUES D'HIER ET D'AUJOURD'HUI. By CARMEN
A superficial review of the great modern migrations caused by political persecution.

POPULATION TRANSFERS IN ASIA. By JOSEPH B. SCHECHTMAN. New York:
Hallsby, 1949, 149 p. $1.50.
In this companion to his "European Population Transfers 1939-1945," Dr. Schecht-
man takes up the Hindu-Moslem exchange, the transfer of Middle East Christian
minorities, and the case for an Arab-Jewish exchange.

HUMAN RELATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD. By ALEXANDER H. LEIGHTON.
Lessons learned during the war by social scientists that may be of use in getting the
peoples of the world to live together in some degree of harmony. The author was head
of the Foreign Morale Analysis Division of the O.W.I. which had the bases of Japanese
resistance as the object of its special study.

MIRROR FOR MAN. By CLYDE KLUCKHOHN. New York: Whittlesey House, 1949,
313 p. $3.75.
A semi-popularization of the subject matter of anthropology and an attempt to
 correlate it to the cultural, social and even political forces operating in the world today.

NEW WORLDS EMERGING. By EARL PARKER HANSON. New York: Duell, 1949,
385 p. $3.50.
An explorer-geographer takes a sanguine view of the earth's capacity to support a
larger population at a higher standard of living — by technological progress, by con-
quering tropical disease and by opening up both the far north and the equatorial belt.

LA DÉCOUVERTE AÉRIENNE DU MONDE. Paris: Horizons de France, 1948,
413 p. Fr. 2,400.
Some 300 pages of aerial photographs selected and annotated to illustrate land forms,
cultural patterns and other aspects of human geography.
TOWARD UNDERSTANDING ISLAM. By Harry Gaylord Dorman, Jr. New York: Teachers College, 1948, 137 p. $2.50.
A scholarly comparison of current apologetics in the two great monotheistic religions.

Addresses delivered during 1946 by an Indian educator and dealing among other things with UNESCO and the educational ideology of Islam.

The President of Harvard explains how we must reform the method and content of American education so that it will respond to the insistent demands of the present age.

The Second World War

On the whole a balanced summary despite certain gaps and inaccuracies.

This second in an official series of seven projected volumes being prepared for the U.S. Air Force runs from mid-1942 to the end of 1943 in the European Theater — i.e. the North African, Sicilian and early Italian campaigns and the opening phases of the air war over Germany.

A thoroughly readable account of operations at sea, by the Naval Press Relations Officer at Mediterranean headquarters.

The story of the Italian naval expeditions that participated in the capture of Corsica and Toulon (November 1942 to May 1943), told by the officer commanding.

Anders led the famous Polish Second Corps whose exploits in the Italian campaign were legendary. This force he had organized in Russia from the remnants of the mass enslavement of Poles that followed Russia’s conquest of eastern Poland in 1939. Besides casting a lurid light on conditions in Soviet prison and labor camps, Anders pays his respects to what he regards as the betrayal of his country by its western allies.

A tribute to the courage and tenacity of the French Moroccan troops in the Italian campaign.

The adventures of some thousand French aviators who after June 1940 chose to continue from exile the fight against the Nazi invader.
An eyewitness account, by one of the few survivors, of the Battle of the Warsaw Ghetto, waged in April 1943 by some 40,000 Jews — out of an original 600,000 — who chose to go down fighting rather than be exterminated in Nazi gas chambers.

A Russian military correspondent belittles the efforts of the western Allies from the Normandy landing to the collapse of Germany.

CORAL AND BRASS. By GENERAL HOLLAND M. SMITH. New York: Scribner, 1949, 289 p. $3.00.
General Smith out-Stilwells Stilwell in this blistering diatribe against the Navy, the Army, indeed practically everybody but “Howling Mad’s” own Marines. Yet despite his pugnacity and blatant bias, Smith’s account of the Pacific War as he fought it from Tarawa to Iwo Jima is of first-rate historical importance.

A chronological record of the Fijian troops’ part in the Pacific War, with brief accounts for each of the units, noted for their fine scouting.

These first two volumes in a projected series captioned “Studies in Social Psychology in World War II” were prepared by trained sociologists and psychologists after extensive investigations among American soldiers in the recent conflict. They try to deal, scientifically and statistically, with the problems of “Adjustment During Army Life” and “Combat and Its Aftermath.”

The wartime record of the British India Steam Navigation Company which lost 51 of its 103 vessels between 1939 and 1945.

An official account of the contribution to victory made by British physicists through the development of new weapons.

The United States

LAST CALL FOR COMMON SENSE. By JAMES P. WARBURG. New York: Harcourt, 1949, 311 p. $3.00.
Mr. Warburg, in this collection of reprinted material and addresses from 1948, exhibits his customary zeal in examining our foreign relations but manages to give an interpretation of several major policies that events have not justified. His solution to our problems is world government.

The author maintains that the only way for the United States to prevent a war with the Soviets is by possessing overwhelming military superiority.
An Englishman finds us not well prepared for world leadership, but his program for our self-improvement will meet with anything but universal approval.

An expert in administration proposes some thoroughgoing reforms for making our federal government more efficient and more responsive to the popular will.

A new departure in which the authors first outline the framework of comparative government and international politics within which the American Government operates.

A useful manual by the Senate editor of the Daily Digest of the Congressional Record.

A revision of several essays on the evolution of the American concept of liberty.

An attack on the impartiality and reliability of the public opinion polls, especially as revealed in the 1948 election.

A description of the status of racial, religious and other minority groups, coupled with a not always successful attempt to explain their relationships with the dominant majority.

NORTH FROM MEXICO. By Carey McWilliams. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1949 324 p. $4.00.
As lawyer and author, Mr. McWilliams has labored earnestly to improve the status of racial minorities in this country. In the present volume he describes the contribution made to American life by the "Latinos" of our southwestern states and the disabilities under which they struggle.

The author has carefully marshalled evidence showing that the deportation of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast shortly after Pearl Harbor, and their internment in "relocation" camps, was the work of political lobbies inspired by racial prejudices.

A critical exposé of the rôle played by the Catholic hierarchy in the cultural life, social development and politics — domestic and foreign — of the United States.

The next-to-last volume in a masterly critique of the major American economic thinkers and writers.

How they operated in this country during the recent conflict, and what lessons we should learn from our mistakes.
A compilation of the five semi-annual Reports submitted to Congress from January 1947 to January 1949, plus Joint Congressional Committee Reports for 1947 and 1948.

A sympathetic treatment of the career of F.D.R.

Western Europe

A French interpretation of the economic origins and the political implications of the Marshall Plan, for America as well as for Europe.

DOCUMENTI SUL PIANO MARSHALL. Florence: Vallecchi (for the Istituto per gli Studi di Economia), 1948, 418 p. L. 1,500.
These select documents are preceded by introductory material written by former Prime Minister Parri and other prominent Italians.

The author, a noted medieval historian, fought in both world wars and during the second was a Resistance leader, executed by the Nazis in 1944. In this soul-searching little volume, written shortly after the collapse of France in 1940, Bloch seeks the underlying causes for the weaknesses of the French state which led to that calamity.

An honest effort to analyze the present situation of France, at home and abroad, in which the author, a professor at the University of Lyon, concludes that above all his country must preserve its freedom.

This "chronicle" of the Pétain régime is full of chitchat and valuable information — one is never sure which is which. The chronology is often vague, and there are no notes or references of any sort.

Mr. Williams, an American newspaperman, became acquainted with Clemenceau in 1913 and in many conversations during the following years of war and peace developed the deepest admiration for him. The substance of these talks, here reported, tells us much — if little that is new — about the climactic years of his hero's career.

An objective description, by a high police official, of the history, structure, aims and activities not only of present-day political parties in France but of labor unions and associations of foreigners resident in the country.

A professor on the Paris Law Faculty presents the case of de Gaulle's R.P.F. against the 1946 Constitution and its system of proportional representation.

A vigorous defense of the de Gaulle anti-Communist platform, and a plea for unremitting opposition to the Soviet Union on all fronts.
A penetrating analysis of strengths and weaknesses in the French economy, and a critique of plans for making better use of the country's resources, human and physical.

This voluminous special number of the Revue d'Économie Politique contains a wealth of statistical and interpretative material contributed by an impressive battery of economic, financial, legal and sociological experts.

A member of the Council of State describes how that body, through various opinions issued by it, gave shape to the provisions of the 1946 Constitution concerning legislation for France's overseas possessions.

The leader of the Catholic party in Belgium was active in social reform as a deputy and Cabinet minister. The second half of his book concerns World War I.

A popular introduction to the Swedish people and their country.

A professor of history at Freiburg, imprisoned by the Nazis in 1944, holds that Hitlerism was an aberration from the German tradition and was due primarily to circumstances not peculiar to Germany.

In this campaign book for the Christian Democrats a Catholic journalist sees the growth of materialism as the cause of Germany's catastrophe. He quotes the Nuremberg documents and Hitler's dicta in order to condemn the Nazi régime.

A plea for Weizsäcker and other German diplomats of the old school who were tried at Nuremberg, by the author of several works on modern diplomacy.

THE HIGH COST OF VENGEANCE. By Freda Utley. Chicago: Regnery, 1949, 310 p. $3.50.
In her hatred for Soviet Russia this ex-Communist writer goes overboard for the thesis that the Germans, far from sinning, are sinned against, notably by the occupation officials in the western zones; these are crypto-Communists, it seems, or at best unwitting Red stooges. To buttress this argument she peddles an amazing congeries of fact, half-fact and fancy.

A speculative proposal to apportion the material losses of Germany among her population according to their wealth. The book is technical and full of figures which are mere assumptions used for illustration.

M. Lauret was formerly Berlin correspondent of the Paris *Temps* and after the war foreign policy editor of its successor, *Le Monde*. After reviewing Germany's economic and political situation, he concludes that to allow German economic life to revive is less dangerous for the west than encouraging Communism by an enforced impoverishment of the German people.

**DEUTSCHLANDS RECHTSLAGE UNTER DER BESATZUNG. By ERICH KAUFMAN.** Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Koehler, 1948, 84 p.

A succinct statement by a Munich law professor.

**DIE VERFASSUNG DES FREISTAATES BAYERN VOM 2. DEZEMBER 1946.** By HANS NAWIASKY and CLAUS LEUSSEK. Munich (U. S. Zone): Biederstein, 1948, 335 p.

A learned commentary on the new Bavarian constitution and its relation to Nazi practice and law.

**DIE SOZIALISTISCHE ENTSCHEIDUNG. By PAUL TILLICH.** Offenbach am Main (U. S. Zone): Bollwerk-Verlag, 1948, 131 p.

The unrevised reprint of a Socialist brochure first published in 1932 and confiscated by the Nazis before it could be circulated. This volume reinaugurates the "Schriften zur Zeit" edited by August Rathmann.

**DOCTORS OF INFAMY.** By ALEXANDER Mitscherlich and Fred MIELKE. New York: Schuman, 1949, 172 p. $3.00.

The core of this book is the translation of a small volume written by Dr. Mitscherlich after acting as observer for the German medical profession at the trial of a score of their colleagues before the American Military Tribunal at Nuremberg on charges of bestiality and organized sadism masquerading as scientific experiment. The incomparably horrible story unrolled before the court is here set down in sordid detail, along with statements by several American experts associated with the case.


An interesting study of paternal "authoritarianism in the German family," with implications for the political behavior of the Germans as a people.


Human-interest reportage on life in occupied Germany and Vienna, by a correspondent of the London *Daily Mail*.

**MEMOIRS OF ALFRED ROSENBERG.** Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1949, 328 p. $4.00.

The German edition was reviewed in the April 1949 issue. Comments by Serge Lang and Ernst von Schenck interlard the text.


Articles and other published material selected to represent various points of view.


After reviewing the recent experience of Germany, France and England with high-level military administration, the author presents a scholarly history and analytical study of the organization of the Swiss Army's high command since 1850.
RECENT BOOKS


An illuminating commentary on the forces that have shaped Italy.


These pages are taken from Croce's diary from July 1943 to June 1944, when he was active as leader of the liberal political forces in Allied-occupied southern Italy.


Originally published as periodical articles, the chapters of this volume give the author an opportunity to find fault with the conformism, political cowardice and general cynicism which he found rampant among his countrymen upon his return from wartime imprisonment by the British.


The Italian Communist leader's program for national reconstruction.


Suggestions put forward in Catholic quarters as to how social, political and economic democracy might be reconciled in the new Italian Constitution.


The two Republics of 1873 and 1931 were strangled, according to Alba, by the three great reactionary forces — the church, the aristocracy and the army.


Though Cantalupo's account of his service as Italian Ambassador to Franco's rebel régime runs only from February to April 1937, it nonetheless throws light on a crucial epoch in the civil war and on the contradictory policies pursued by Ciano.


An analytical review of the history of the parliamentary monarchy in modern Spain, and why it failed, by the son of a noted prime minister under Alfonso XIII in collaboration with a leading contemporary political historian.


First-hand observations on conditions and popular sentiment, based on extensive travels and conversations with all sorts of Spaniards.

Eastern Europe


As there is little to record about Stalin that is not political, this brilliant and fascinating volume is in effect a full-fledged “life and times.” The author has devoted many years to studying the relevant material, including documents hitherto unused by biographers of the Communist dictator. In tracing Stalin’s ideological development, his struggle to achieve supreme power and the uses to which he put that power, Mr. Deutscher covers no small part of the main currents of Soviet history. Nearly half the text deals with Russia’s foreign relations and their reaction on her domestic affairs.
Some critics allege that the author's views have been too much colored by Trotsky's interpretations. But in general this seems probably as adequate a biography as we shall have until the passage of time shall have lent us still truer perspective.


A thoroughgoing and indiscriminate condemnation of the Soviet régime and all its works. The English edition, entitled "Stalin's Russia," was published by Gollancz (London, 1949, 492 p. 21/).  


As in the first volume of this conscientious work, which covered the period 1929–36, Mr. Beloff is content for the most part to reconstruct an authentic record of events, leaving to others the task of drawing inferences. In compiling this record he has tried to take account of documentation made public since the war.


A theoretical exposition based on Communist writings and official Soviet sources.


The first edition of this manual of facts and statistics appeared in 1944. The present (third) edition has been partially revised and a supplement added to take account of certain postwar developments.

MAN AND PLAN IN SOVIET ECONOMY. By ANDREW ROTHSTEIN. London: Muller, 1948, 300 p. 10/6.

In general a competent historical survey of economic planning in Russia since Lenin's day, based upon Soviet sources and intended for the non-technical reader.

MY LIFE IN THE RED ARMY. By FRED VIERSKI. New York: Macmillan, 1949, 260 p. 3.50.

A young Pole, drafted into the Soviet army after the fall of his country, relates his experiences in the Ukraine and Central Asia before and during the German invasion.

CONTRIBUTION À L'ÉTUDE DU PROBLÈME NATIONAL EN U.R.S.S. Paris: Sirey et Presses Universitaires, 1948, 86 p. Fr. 120.

A review of Soviet policy toward minority nationalities, with Kazakhstan taken as an example, published by the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Centre d'Études de l'U.R.S.S. Statistical tables and bibliography.

UKRAINIAN RESISTANCE. New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1949, 142 p. 3.00.

The unhappy history of the Ukrainians' attempts to obtain independence since World War I, which in the recent conflict led many of them to cooperate with the Nazis.

GOD'S UNDERGROUND. By FATHER GEORGE AS TOLD TO GRETTA PALMER. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949, 296 p. 3.00.

The pseudonymous author, a Croatian Catholic priest, claims to have served with Tito and later made a tour of the Soviet Union, where he found an active "underground" of Christians practising their faith in secrecy.


A useful compendium of articles by various hands on the geography, culture and history of the Slavic countries.
RECENT BOOKS


A group of six authorities contribute to this fiftieth anniversary history of the Finnish Socialist Party.


A none too successful attempt to elevate Mannerheim to the company of Napoleon, Garibaldi and von Moltke.


Professor Górski treats the whole of the Baltic basin as an economic and political unit, and shows that centuries of conflict have not broken this unity or the interdependence of the peoples living on the shores of that sea.


Well-informed essays on the country, its people and the development of their institutions, by the Director of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies in London.


This modern history of East Prussia stresses the unwillingness of the Polish population to accept Hohenzollern rule and its tenacity in preserving its national aspirations.


Ripka, a member of the National Socialist (democratic) Party, served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Czech government-in-exile at London and later in other ministerial capacities in the post-liberation government at Prague. This is the best circumstantial account yet of the "prefabricated revolution" — as he calls it — that gave the Communists control of Czechoslovakia. It should be said, however, that the behavior of Ripka's party in the crisis, which he seeks to explain and defend, is criticized by others as defeatist.


Addresses, statements, interviews and other documents issued by the Hungarian prelate, or by church colleagues, and prepared for publication before his arrest.


A compendious survey, by a professor at Turin University, devoted largely to the last two centuries and confined to the Balkan Peninsula. Extensive bibliography.


A Christian Science Monitor correspondent for many years in Danubian Europe leads us into some highways and byways of contemporary Rumanian politics.


An expose of Communist activity in Jugoslavia since World War I, culminating in a thoroughly anti-Tito interpretation of events in that country up to early 1947.


A friendly group portrait, with the late King George in the center.
   Personal impressions and fine photographs of Crete.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

   Though the period covered in this volume is less than half a year — from March to late July 1938 — it was one of crucial importance, for it saw the groundwork laid by London and Paris for their abandonment of Czechoslovakia at Munich the following September. The main thread of this unhappy story is already known, but a few strands are added in this documentation which do no credit to either the wisdom or the courage of those who presided over French and British policy.

   Within very brief compass Mr. Cherry tries to state the controlling long-term factors in Britain's foreign policy. He finds much fault with England's international behavior between the wars, but in his own survey he ignores India and the Far East.

   A detailed and illustrated history of the party, prepared by a number of Labor leaders and writers. A valuable source of political and biographical information, with index.

   A score of addresses made by the Labor leader since his party came to power in 1945, dealing primarily with domestic issues.

   This is the first of three "synoptic volumes" which will introduce a long series of books comprising the "civil history" of the United Kingdom's war effort. (The other two will deal with production and social policy.) Written by professional historians with access to official sources, the present volume tells the story of the rest of Britain's wartime economic problems and policies. Until the more detailed volumes appear, this will be the best source on most of the problems with which it deals.

   A scholarly monograph on the effect of government control during World War I in several sectors of Britain's economic and social life.

   The author, in considering England's "crisis," has divided his subject into four phases — historical, economic, political and spiritual.

   An intimate, conversational biographical sketch of Earl Mountbatten.

   Admirable reflections on the state of the empire by a former member of the Colonial Administrative Service, at present lecturer on colonial history at Bristol University.
RECENT BOOKS

The author devotes particular attention to the problem of how to underpin the growing self-government of the colonies with economic stability.


A review of its history, particularly its record in two World Wars.


This enlightening study of New Zealand's attempt to combine liberty with equality, economically as well as politically, is especially interesting in view of Britain's experiment with Socialism.


Mr. Sheean, after wartime Army service in India, returned to that country early in 1948, had two colloquies with Gandhi, and was present when he was assassinated. The Mahatma completely captivated the imagination of the American writer. The result is this book, set down in a fervor of spiritual intensity and with much psychological introspection. In the end it tells us more about Sheean, perhaps, than about Gandhi, and thus may be regarded as a continuation of the author's autobiography initiated with "Personal History."


Fascinating photographs and observations, sometimes keen, more often superficial, on events and conditions in India during the years of upheaval 1946-48.


An analysis of the causes and course of the riots and massacres that took place in the Punjab at the time of partition, and a survey of the problems of rehabilitation.


A treatise surveying the technical and economic problems confronting India's rapidly growing industrial machine.


Excerpts from lectures, delivered in 1926, published posthumously.


In this appreciation of the Mahatma's career and personality, Mr. Polak treats the South African years (1904-14), H. N. Brailsford the period from 1915 to 1939, and Lord Pethick-Lawrence the concluding decade 1939-48.


A superficial survey of problems both domestic and foreign confronting the new state.


A valuable little manual, by a noted British political scientist and first Chancellor of the recently established University of Ceylon.

The Middle East


A concise, objective review of Turkish history in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
An annotated review and appraisal of France’s record as a mandatory power in Syria and Lebanon from 1919 to 1946.

This guide to the diminutive republic is preceded by a succinct and up-to-date review of the country’s history, geography and economy. A companion work is the author’s “Damas, Palmyre, Baalbek.” (Damascus: Librairie Universelle, 1941, 230 p.).

JOURNEY TO EGYPT. By EILEEN BIGLAND. London: Jarrolds, 1948, 192 p. 18/.
Chatty but informative observations on economic, social and political conditions among the Egyptian people. Illustrations.

A workmanlike monograph on Persia as the pawn of the Powers in which the second half of the text treats the period of World War II and after. The author, professor at Hamilton College, was Press Attaché at the Polish Legation in Teheran 1942–45. Documentary appendix.

This biography by the scholarly author of “Lady Precious Stream” rests in part on unpublished material and stresses the personal rather than the political.

THE CHINESE STUDENT MOVEMENT. By WEN-HAN KIANG. New York: King’s Crown Press (Columbia University), 1948, 176 p. $3.00.
A Chinese Christian leader, in tracing the rôle of students in the evolution of modern China, provides much valuable insight into that country’s recent cultural development.

Sketches from a traveller’s notebook in China.

THE FAMILY REVOLUTION IN MODERN CHINA. By MARION J. LEVY, JR. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (in cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1949, 390 p. $6.00.
A sociologically scientific analysis of the changes taking place in the traditional structure of Chinese family relationships.

Observations on a 1944 journey, by the Indian Agent-General in China, from Kashmir to Chungking via Sinkiang.

EDUCATION FOR A NEW JAPAN. By ROBERT KING HALL. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949, 503 p. $6.00.
Professor Hall of Teachers College, Columbia, was one of the top educational officers of SCAP and knows the Japanese school system intimately. He very much doubts that the reforms put into effect under MacArthur will touch the basically authoritarian and chauvinistic nature of Japanese educational philosophy and expresses disappointment at the failure to romanize the written language of Japan.
THE RISE OF RUSSIA IN ASIA. By DAVID J. DALLIN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949, 293 p. $5.00.
An episodic, poorly integrated story of Russian expansion along the Pacific from the mid-nineteenth century to 1931.

An account of the campaigns waged by a Marine Brigade which fought in Indo-China from September 1945 to March 1947, by its commander.

A well-informed, objective presentation of the facts concerning the background (to August 1947) of the conflict between the Dutch and the Republicans.

A scholarly history of Protestant missions in the Dutch East Indies.

A scientific study of a “nonliterate nationality” in the Philippines that shows the first beginnings of an emerging state system.

AFRICA

A rather hit-or-miss excursion through the history of northwest Africa.

A popular survey, much of it written as a first-person travel narrative, of the geography — economic and human — of the Spanish Zone in northern Morocco.

A first-rate manual of reliable and well-organized material on the geography, history, social problems, government and economy of the three Zones of Morocco — French, Spanish, International.

A companion work on France’s oldest North African possession.

An objective, illustrated survey of political, economic and social conditions in Africa south of the Sahara.

TO-MORROW’S CONTINENT. By LIEUTENANT-COLONEL PETER PENN AND LUCIE STREET. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1948, 179 p. 9/.
A refreshingly candid critique of Britain’s policy in Africa, and a realistic program for reform and development of her part of the continent. The keynote is cooperation with the native population and the four principal areas of attack would be in health, transportation, food production and electrification. Colonel Penn is a member of the economic and development committee of the Joint East African Board.

An expanded and profusely illustrated edition of the record of an exploration among the peoples of the upper Nile basin in the southern Sudan.


A comprehensive account, based on secondary sources, in which the author pays more than the usual attention to native traditions and tribal movements.


Illustrations and text on the great missionary doctor's work in French Equatorial Africa, with a concluding chapter by him on "Our Task in Colonial Africa."


"Vignettes" of South Africa by the head of Lovedale Missionary Institution, a noted school for the Bantu in Cape Province.

Latin America


The first and third parts of this statistic-laden manual treat Latin America as a whole under topical headings; the second takes up each of the 20 republics individually. Stress is laid on the problems of international economic relations.


A popular, optimistic report on the health, education and economic development activities of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and the Inter-American Educational Foundation — offspring of Nelson Rockefeller's wartime Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, now consolidated under State Department control.


A statistical study dealing with other exports besides coffee.


A readable narrative spanning the whole gamut of this little country's history.
SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS


AGRICULTURE


AUSTRIA


CLAIMS


COMMERCIAL POLICY AND TRADE

Customs convention of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg; report on the Conference of Cabinet Ministers of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg held at The Hague, on March 10 to 13, 1949. (Unofficial translation) n. pl., n. pub., 1949. 71 p.


DENMARK


ECONOMIC CONDITIONS


Finland. 100 p. 2s. Peru. 85 p. 1s. 6d. Portugal . . . with annexes on Madeira and the Azores. 135 p. 2s. 6d. Portuguese East Africa. 48 p. 1s.

FINANCIAL POLICY AND EXCHANGE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

3d. 1946 to 1948 (No. 2). 11 p. (Cmd. 7698.) 3d. 1946 to 1949. 11 p. (Cmd. 7793.) 4d.
$1.00.


INTERNATIONAL Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Hearing before the Committee on
1949. 19 p.


United States direct investments in Canada; statistics of investments in all companies and
operations of the larger manufacturing companies. Ottawa, Department of Trade and

FOREIGN investment guaranties. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency,

GERMANY

Documents on German foreign policy 1918-1945 from the archives of the German Foreign
6. 1. From Neurath to Ribbentrop (September 1937-September 1938). 1220 p. (Publication
3277.) 6. 2. Germany and Czechoslovakia 1937-1938. 1070 p. (Publication 3548.) 8; 25 each.

Political parties in western Germany; prepared by Political Activities Branch. Civil Admin-

GREAT BRITAIN


GREECE


HUNGARY


INDIA


LABOR

III. Reports on the application of conventions (article 22 of the Constitution). 327 p. F.

V. (1). Equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value. 125 p. VII.
(1). Minimum wage fixing machinery in agriculture. 85 p. VII. (1). Holidays with pay in agricul-
ture. 85 p. IX. (1). Vocational training of adults, including disabled persons. 216 p.

INTERNATIONAL Labour Organization. Inland Transport Committee, 3rd Session, Brussels,
I. General report. 177 p.

II. Guaranteed wages in the iron and steel industry. 48 p. III. Technological improvements in
the iron and steel industry and their effects on employment. 169 p.

III. Systems of wage calculation in the metal trades. 138 p.

INTERNATIONAL standard classification of occupations; report prepared for the Seventh Interna-

MAINTENANCE of full employment (an analysis of full employment policies of governments and

Methods of family living studies; report prepared for the Seventh International Conference of
(Studies and reports. New Series 17.) 40¢.
SOURCE MATERIAL


Latin America


North Atlantic Treaty


Relief and Rehabilitation


FOREIGN AFFAIRS


Local currency counterpart funds. (Periodic reports.) Washington, Economic Cooperation Administration, 1949.


SECOND WORLD WAR

Preliminary inventory of the records of the United States Counsel for the prosecution of Axis criminality. Washington, National Archives, 1949. 184 p. (Preliminary Inventory 21.)

TURKEY

Turkey; facts and figures. Ankara, Turkish Press Department, 1949. 83 p.

UNITED STATES


DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES


— Report from the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Senate, 81st
FOREIGN AFFAIRS


II. PAMPHLETS


Customs unions; a tool for peace, by Leopold Kohr. Washington, Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1949. 64 p. (Foundation Pamphlet 8.) 75¢.

The dollar gap; six special articles and a controversial series of letters to the editor reprinted from The Times on the crisis facing Great Britain. London, The Times, 1949. 53 p. 6d.


Investing in Israel; what you should know about the economy of the Jewish state. New York, Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1949. 47 p.

Latin America; a selective guide to publications in English, by R. A. Humphreys. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949. 63 p. 5s.


Poland's economy; present and future, by Hilary Min. New York, Polish Research and Information Service, 1949. 44 p. (Documents and Reports on Poland 5.)


AGRARIAN UNREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Erich H. Jacoby

"An excellent survey of the factual background of the social, economic, and political changes occurring in Southeast Asia."—Hans Morgenthau.


DOCUMENTARY BACKGROUND OF WORLD WAR II, 1931-1941
James W. Gantenbein

"The editor has selected an amazingly comprehensive list of about 450 documents and speeches covering the incidents in every important country during the years 1931-1941. The book is indispensable to the student of this decade."—American Historical Review.

YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR 1947
A United Nations Publication

This second volume of the series projected by the Human Rights Division of the UN Secretariat is broader in scope than the 1946 volume, containing not only constitutional, legislative and international texts relating to human rights enacted in 1947, but also a full account of the UN's activities in this field since 1945.

YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1947-48
A United Nations Publication

A detailed account of the work of the UN and its specialized agencies from July, 1947 to September, 1948. Full references to original documents and to questions covered in the first Yearbook, Charts, maps, documentary annexes, bibliography, UN Who's Who, and indexes.
Serving Middle America

for 50 years

A half century of Caribbean service underscores today's function of the Great White Fleet. Here are fast, fully-refrigerated cargo and passenger vessels—modern and spotless—fit, willing and able to serve shippers and travellers in Inter-American trade. Competent staffs, afloat and ashore, and modern equipment and facilities are yours to command.

GREAT WHITE FLEET
UNITED FRUIT COMPANY

Pier 5, North River, New York 6, N. Y., Whitehall 4-1700
New Orleans: 321 St. Charles St., New Orleans 4
Chicago: 111 W. Washington St., Chicago 2
San Francisco: 1001 Fourth St., San Francisco 7

FOUNDATIONS for WORLD ORDER

Seven great authorities explore the present complex world situation, probing for the "foundations for world order."

ERNEST LLEWELLYN WOODWARD
J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER
EDWARD HALLETT CARR
WILLIAM E. RAPPARD
ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS
FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE
EDWARD MEAD EARLE

Annotated bibliography of further reading

$3.00

University of Denver Press
DENVER, 10, COLORADO
AN INTRODUCTION TO RUSSIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE
By Ivar Spector

- Brief, accurate and well-balanced history of Russia and the Russian people — from the establishment of the Rurik Dynasty in 862 A.D. to today. Excellent maps, unusual illustrations. "Useful for background reading on today's trend of events." — Seattle Times.

454 pages, $6.00

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION
By Samuel N. Harper and Ronald Thompson

- This important new revision of Samuel Harper's long respected, standard work on the Soviet government recognizes the emergence of the Soviet State from a multi-form democracy to that of a single, all-inclusive and highly organized Leviathan. The new edition treats fully of the interlocking political, social and economic functions of the Soviet system as a whole.

369 pages, $5.00

A HISTORY OF SPAIN
By Rafael Altamira
Translated by Muna Lee

- Both the international and domestic affairs of Spain are covered, by one of the most distinguished of living historians, in this powerful and absorbing history of the Spanish people — from pre-historic times to the present. Fine maps and many halftone illustrations of important historical scenes, masterpieces of Spanish art and architecture.

748 pages, $6.75

HOW FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE
By Kurt London

- "This is an interesting book on a very important subject. It deals with the nature and the mode of formation of foreign policy and with its execution. It centers on the United States and the Department of State but draws upon comparisons with other countries — Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia — to great advantage." — American Historical Review.

277 pages, $3.50
PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY

By LESTER MARKEL

AND EIGHT OTHER AUTHORITIES

"The Council on Foreign Relations and the large group of collaborators who have gathered and written this book have made a contribution to the winning of the war of men's minds which is worth more than a dozen divisions. It may almost be worth more than an atomic bomb." — ERWIN D. CANHAM, Editor, The Christian Science Monitor.

"The Council on Foreign Relations undertook a significant task when it decided to explore systematically the relation of public opinion to foreign policy — the means of utilizing, enlightening and shaping it. . . . The result is a well organized book containing much useful information and suggestive discussion."

— New York Herald Tribune.

"It is without question the best analysis ever made of public opinion and its effect on our national policies." — HAL O'FLAHERTY, Director, Chicago Daily News Foreign Service.

"It is to be hoped that Americans in large numbers will read this expert study. When they do, they will know better than ever before both why and how we must plan to tell our story, and why, both at home and abroad, we must keep everlastingly — and efficiently — at it." — San Francisco Chronicle.

"This book is eminently worthwhile reading for the general public. It should be required reading for all Congressmen, Army and Navy officials, and members of the State Department." — Saturday Review of Literature.

The authors are Lester Markel, Sunday editor of the New York Times, who planned the book and coordinated the work of the other collaborators; Hanson W. Baldwin, Arnaldo Cortesi, Cabell Phillips, James Reston, and Shepard Stone, all of the staff of the New York Times; C. D. Jackson, Vice-President of Time Inc.; W. Phillips Davison, editor of Public Opinion Quarterly; and Dr. Martin Kriesberg, University of Michigan.

At all bookstores, $3.50

PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS FOR THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68 STREET, NEW YORK 21

London: ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
A CHALLENGE TO YOUR CONSCIENCE...

ARE WE, "the great humanitarian nation," again to go down in history with the infamy of Genghis Khan as THE MASS DESTROYER of people, cities, and countries?

- Why ISN'T the atom bomb worth the powder to blow it up?
- Must we fight Russia? COULD WE WIN?
- Are we building a strategic air force which will be OUR OWN DESTRUCTION?
- What are the moral implications of OUR FOREIGN POLICY?

OPERATION SURVIVAL

AMERICA'S NEW ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

By WILLIAM H. HESSLER, Foreign Editor, Cincinnati Enquirer

"Should be read by every thinking American who has an eye to the future welfare of our nation."
- H. E. Yarnell, Admiral, USN, Retired

PRENTICE-HALL, Inc., 70 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, N. Y.

STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, CIRCULATION, etc., required by the Act of Congress of August 24, 1912, March 3, 1913 and July 2, 1946, of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, published quarterly at Concord, N. H., for the 12 months ending October 1, 1949.

State of New York, County of New York, ss.

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared F. D. Caruthers, Jr., who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is the Business Manager of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and that the following is, to the best of his knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management (and if a daily paper, the circulation), etc. of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the Act of March 3, 1933, embodied in section 357, Postal Laws and Regulations, to wit: 1. That the names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are: Publisher, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 58 E. 68th St., New York 21; Editor, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, 58 E. 68th St., New York 21; Managing Editor, Byron Dexter, 58 E. 68th St., New York 21; Business Manager, F. D. Caruthers, Jr., 58 E. 68th St., New York 21. 2. That the owner is: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. (no stockholders—about 930 members); Chm. Bd., R. C. Leffingwell, 21 Wall St., New York 5; Pres., Allen W. Dulles, 48 Wall St., New York 5; Y-Pres., Isaiah Bowman, 58 E. 68th St., New York 21; Sec'y, Frank Atchison, 40 Wall St., New York 5; Treas., Clarence F. Hunter, 58 E. 68th St., New York 21. 3. That the known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: none. 4. That the two paragraphs next above, giving the names of the owners, stockholders, and security holders, if any, contain not only the list of stockholders and security holders as they appear upon the books of the company but also, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, is given; also that the said two paragraphs contain statements embracing all that full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner; and this affidavit has no reason to believe that any other person, association, or corporation has any interest direct or indirect in the said stock, bonds, or other securities than as stated by him.

F. D. CARUTHERS, JR., BUSINESS MANAGER.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 19th day of Sept., 1949.

ESTHER L. GRAYMAN. (My commission expires March 30, 1950.)

AMERICAN AGENCIES INTERESTED IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Compiled by RUTH SAVORD

Librarian, Council on Foreign Relations

This completely revised edition, now available, gives the purposes, officers, staffs, finances, activities, membership requirements and fees, facilities for study, and publications of 176 organizations and partial data on 26 foreign chambers of commerce. In addition, 29 foreign information bureaus and 124 dormant and discontinued organizations are listed. In a Subject Index, the agencies are classified both under their primary and secondary spheres of interest. Officers and staff members of the organizations can be readily located in a Personnel Index containing more than 1,000 names. (202 pages, cloth binding).

$2.50, post free

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68 STREET, NEW YORK 21
"A One-Volume Course in International Relations"

The
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
READER

Edited by HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG

THE AUTHORS
Elihu Root
Thomas G. Masaryk
Giovanni Gentile
Harold J. Laski
Philip Kerr
W. E. B. DuBois
Jules Cambon
Vicount Grey
Edwin F. Gay
Newton D. Baker
Karl Radek
N. Bukharin
Gustav Stolper
Leon Trotsky
Viscount Grey
Edwin F. Gay
Newton D. Baker
Karl Radek
N. Bukharin
Gustav Stolper
Leon Trotsky

From the thousand or more articles which have appeared in FOREIGN AFFAIRS during the past 25 years, the Editor has selected this group which are of permanent historical importance and which bear directly on a paramount problem of our time — the successful conduct of foreign relations in a democracy.

Each contribution illuminates an essential part of the history of the last quarter century. Together they help explain the complex situation we face today. Compact editorial notes put each episode in its historical setting and weave the series into a connected narrative.

"This book provides an unparalleled opportunity for any American to try to measure the relevance and durability of the ideas which have been given us on international relations by the most competent and responsible leadership this country has developed in the foreign field." — N. Y. Herald Tribune

"The ideas of this quarter century of history are expressed by authors who often were protagonists of some of its major actions; some of the articles themselves are known to have played an important role in shaping public opinion... Altogether this volume seems to be particularly appropriate to furnish both for the general reader and for the advanced undergraduate student of international relations indispensable background information and an almost inexhaustible source for reflection." — American Journal of International Law

504 pages $5.00 post free

PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS FOR THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
58 EAST 68 STREET, NEW YORK 21
Notice to Subscribers

Change in Subscription Price
of FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Since the end of the war, costs for printing FOREIGN AFFAIRS have more than doubled — up 136 percent. Costs for paper have gone up 35 percent. Costs of other publishing operations have also risen sharply.

In the face of these mounting costs we have held as long as we could to our original subscription price, established 27 years ago.

Now we finally are forced to raise FOREIGN AFFAIRS rate to offset in part our greatly increased expenses. In this we follow other magazine publishers.

Our subscription price has been $5.00 a year.

Effective with the next issue, our subscription price will be $6.00 a year.

We are announcing this change now so that you may, if you wish, renew your subscription in advance for another year at the present rate which will expire March 15, 1950.
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT'S

deeply revealing story of her life
from the years preceding the
governorship to FDR's death

"A work whose indispensability for the historian can be matched only by its intense interest for the general reader . . . Only a great woman could have written it." — ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., Saturday Review of Literature. "It is as a human document that I have read and felt it . . . will be read and felt by generations of Americans." — VINCENT SHEEAN, N. Y. Herald Tribune Book Review. Illustrated with 25 pages of family pictures. $4.50

"A splendid statement of the credo of a public servant and a master plan for everyday democracy"

By DAVID E. LILIENTHAL

"The kind of philosophy Mr. Lilienthal expounds may well be a more powerful weapon in our defense than the furious and expanding atom. And it has the advantage of not being a secret weapon." — N. Y. Times Book Review. "An affirmation of the democratic way of life that his detractors might study with profit." — Cleveland News. $2.50

"One of the best pieces of reporting I've read in years." — JOHN GUNTER.

By VIRGINIA COWLES

What Lies Behind England's Peaceful Revolution. "It seems to me to tell Americans just what they ought to know about England in a way they can enjoy and easily understand." — WALTER DURANTY. "Any one wondering whether or not there would always be an England can go away with lightened heart." — WASHINGTON STAR. $3.75

Harper & Brothers • New York 16
THE CURRENT DIGEST
OF
THE SOVIET PRESS

Published Weekly by
THE SOVIET COMMITTEE ON SLAVIC STUDIES
Appointed by the American Council of Learned Societies and
The Social Science Research Council

The Current Digest brings you the Soviet press and periodicals in English translation as a service to the foreign affairs analyst and scholar. It covers the entire contents of Pravda and Izvestia, the leading Soviet dailies, received by air mail from Moscow: the more significant articles are translated in full, lesser ones condensed, and the remainder summarized or noted by headline and bibliographical reference. In addition, materials from some 40 other newspapers and periodicals — ranging from Voprosy filosofii [Problems of Philosophy] to the children’s newspaper — are presented among the 70,000 words translated weekly in the Current Digest.

The Current Digest thus provides a permanent record in English of foreign and domestic affairs as they are reported to the Russian people, and a rare source of research materials.

Its value as a reference work is enhanced by comprehensive quarterly indexes (included in subscriptions), covering not only the Current Digest but also other periodicals containing Soviet materials in English.

HOW YOU SUBSCRIBE
Institutions such as libraries, publications, government agencies and universities pay $39 for their subscriptions and contribute $100 to the operating fund, i.e., a total of $139 a year. Once an initial subscription has been entered, additional concurrent subscriptions may be entered by the same institution, or by anyone directly associated with this institution, at $25 a year. Single copies are $3 each. (Sample on request.)

The Current Digest of the Soviet Press
1219 Sixteenth Street, N.W.,
Washington 6, D.C.

Gentlemen: Please send your brochure and a free sample copy of the Current Digest.

Name ........................................
Address ......................................

Institutions such as libraries, publications, government agencies and universities pay $39 for their subscriptions and contribute $100 to the operating fund, i.e., a total of $139 a year. Once an initial subscription has been entered, additional concurrent subscriptions may be entered by the same institution, or by anyone directly associated with this institution, at $25 a year. Single copies are $3 each. (Sample on request.)
Act now

SAVE up to

25% on round-trip Clipper fares to

Europe

Save up to 30% on flying to and from countries which have recently devalued their currency.

Until March 31, 1950, you may fly round trip to Europe for only about a third under than the one-way fare. Typical round-trip fare—New York to London, $466.70 instead of $830. You save $363.30. Ticket is good for 60 days. This offer applies to all Pan American flights to Europe...excluding those of the bullish dollar-priced Clipper!

And now a dollar goes further—in England and on the Continent. You pay less for hotels, sports...everything. Call your Travel Agent or the nearest office of

Pan American World Airways
WORLD'S MOST EXPERIENCED AIRLINE